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Abstract
This thesis contains two theoretical essays on reciprocity and one that analyzes the effects of
perception biases on learning and decision-making.
In the first chapter, I propose a new theory of intention-based reciprocity that addresses the
question of when a mutually beneficial action is kind. When both benefit from the action, a
player’s motive is unclear: he may be perceived as kind for improving the other player’s payoff,
or as self-interested and not-kind for improving his own. I use trust as an intuitive mechanism
to solve this ambiguity. Whenever a player puts himself in a vulnerable position by taking such
an action, he can be perceived as kind. In contrast, if this action makes him better off than his
alternative actions do, even if it is met by the most selfish response, he cannot be kind. My
model explains why papers in the literature fail to find (much) positive reciprocity when players
can reward and punish.
The second chapter extends my theory of reciprocity to incomplete information. I outline how
reciprocity can give rise to pay-what-you-want pricing schemes. In the classic bilateral trade
setting, I show that sequential interactions can be more efficient than normal form mechanisms
when some people are motivated by reciprocity. Reciprocity creates incentives for information
sharing.
The last chapter is co-authored with Manuel Staab. We study the effects of perception biases
and incorrect priors on learning behavior, and the welfare ranking of information experiments.
We find that both types of biases by themselves reduce expected utility in a model where payoff
relevant actions also generate informative signals, i.e. when actions constitute information exper-
iments. However, experiments can be affected to different degrees by these biases. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for when any binary ranking of action profiles can be reversed.
Building on these findings, we show that an agent can be better off suffering from both biases
rather than just one.
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Chapter 1
A Theory of Reciprocity with Trust
1.1 Introduction
People are willing to sacrifice their own material wellbeing to reward those who are kind (positive
reciprocity), and to punish those who are unkind (negative reciprocity). This deviation from pure
selfishness has important economic consequences. After a pleasant dinner with great service, we
leave a generous tip for the waiter even when we don’t expect to return again. We are more likely
to donate to charity when solicitation letters include gifts (Falk (2007)), i.e. we respond to gifts
with counter-gifts. Akerlof (1982) argues that this idea of gift exchange may explain involuntary
unemployment in the labor market: when workers respond to generous wage offers by working
harder, firms are incentivized to raise wages above the market clearing wage. Fehr et al. (1993)
and Fehr and Falk (1999) demonstrate this experimentally. Bewley (1995) provides field evidence
for this view in the form of a large interview study. Employers cite worries about lower morale
(and thus lower effort) as the reason for not cutting wages in recessions. Reciprocity may also give
rise to acts of sabotage when workers punish unfair or unkind behavior. For example, Giacalone
and Greenberg (1997) report a rise in employees’ theft rates after wage cuts. Krueger and Mas
(2004) find that tires produced at the Bridgestone-Firestone plant were ten times more likely to
be defective as a result of a three-year labor dispute.
All these raise the fundamental question as to what constitutes kind and unkind behavior.
Studies highlight that the perception of what is kind (or fair) is not only determined by distri-
butional concerns, e.g. inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), but also by how this payoff
distribution comes about. For example, a one-sided offer is perceived as less unkind if the only
alternative is even more one-sided (Falk and Fischbacher (2006)) and is thus rejected less often
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(Falk et al. (2003)). This underlines that people consider the intentions and motives behind other
people’s actions and not just the respective outcomes that these actions induce.
In his seminal paper, Rabin (1993) (henceforth Rabin) formalizes intention-based reciprocity
for normal form games and suggests a definition of kindness. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
(henceforth DK04) extend intention-based reciprocity to sequential games. In these models,
players form beliefs about the intentions behind the other players’ actions. For instance, upon
receiving a gift, the receiver forms beliefs about whether the giver expects a gift in return or
not. He then evaluates the giver’s kindness based on these beliefs. An action is perceived as
kind (unkind) if it yields an intended payoff that is larger (smaller) than a reference point. The
reference point and thus kindness perceptions differ slightly between the two papers, however.1
In Rabin, an action is only kind if it comes at a personal cost, whereas in DK04, a mutually
beneficial action, i.e. an action that improves both players’ payoffs, can be kind. As a result, a
gift that also benefits the gift-giver, for example due to an expected counter-gift, is only kind in
DK04.
In this paper, I revisit the central issue of when a mutually beneficial action is kind and provide
a new definition of kindness. When an action is perceived to be mutually beneficial, a player’s
motive is unclear: He may be perceived as kind for improving the other player’s payoff, or as
selfish for improving his own. The concept of trust offers a psychologically intuitive mechanism to
solve this ambiguity: Whenever the player puts himself in a vulnerable position by taking such an
action, he is perceived as kind. In contrast, if his action makes him better off than the alternative,
even if it is met by the most selfish response, he cannot be kind. Since players are only willing
to reward kind actions, this distinction helps to explain why some papers in the literature do not
find much positive reciprocity. It also offers new insights into the interaction of rewarding and
punishing actions.
Figure 1.1 lists all studies that cover both the simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma.2
The data highlights that cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma is not unconditional and hence
cannot be explained by a simple model of altruism: in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma hardly
any player 2 cooperates after defection. The sequential prisoner’s dilemma, see also game 1.1 on
page 12, is an example of a social dilemma, in which the first player’s (he) action may improve
both his own and the second player’s payoff if the second player (she) positively reciprocates. In
four out of six studies, it is empirically payoff-maximizing for player 1 to cooperate. The data,
1See also Netzer and Schmutzler (2014), who apply Rabin’s notion of kindness to a sequential gift-exchange.
2All studies are one-shot interactions, incentivized, and feature a participant for each role. I did not include
studies that use deception, i.e. do not have an actual player 1, or that are not incentivized.
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Study cooperation rate N player 1 player 2 after C player 2 after D N Strategy Method
Khadjavi and Lange, 2013 (students) 37.0% 36 63.0% 62.1% 0.0% 46 no
Khadjavi and Lange, 2013 (prisoners) 55.6% 46 46.3% 60.0% 3.4% 54 no
Ahn et al., 2007 32.5% 80 30.0% 35.0% 5.0% 80 yes
Bolle and Ockenfels, 1990 18.6% 59 17.3% 19.7% 4.9% 122 yes
Hayashi et al., 1999 36.0% 50 56.3% 61.1% 0.0% 63 no
Watabe et al, 1996 55.6% 27 82.6% 75.0% 12.0% 68 no
Cho and Choi, 2000 47.5% 59 52.4% 72.7% 0.0% 42 no
Average 40.4% 49.7% 55.1% 3.6%
Simultaneous choice Sequential choice
Figure 1.1: Choice data from prisoner’s dilemmas
hence, suggests that player 2 views player 1’s cooperative choice as kind even if it is in player
1’s best interest. Malmendier and Schmidt (2017) observe a similar behavior in response to gifts.
In their experiment, most participants are aware that the gift was intended to influence their
behavior; yet they still positively reciprocate. Malmendier and Schmidt argue that players feel
obligated to reciprocate. Finally, figure 1.1 also indicates that there is more cooperation in the
sequential prisoner’s dilemma than in the simultaneous one.3
In my model, player 2 perceives cooperation as kind even if she believes that player 1 expects
her to cooperate in response (second order belief). Tempted to defect, player 2 wonders ‘what
if I take advantage of him?’ If she defects, player 1 would be better off had he defected himself,
and therefore exposed vulnerability by cooperating. Player 2 perceives his choice as trusting,
concludes that player 1’s action is kind, which in turn motivates her to cooperate. To determine
whether a mutually beneficial action is kind, player 2 asks the simple question ‘is it trusting?’
DK04, instead, suggest that a mutually beneficial action is kind as long as there exists a
strategy for player 2 for which player 1 is better off by taking the alternative choice.4 It follows
that only a mutually beneficial action that is also player 1’s (payoff) dominant action cannot be
considered kind. While DK04 predict the same behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma as I do, this is
not true in general: In my model, actions tend to be perceived as less kind than in DK04, giving
rise to less positive reciprocity. Not only does this explain why some papers in the literature do
not find much positive reciprocity, it also provides new insights into the interaction of punishing
3While this can be a result of player 2’s knowledge of 1’s action (in contrast to expecting cooperation from player
1, player 2 observes his action), it provides further evidence that player 2 is willing to reward the mutually beneficial
actions: In the simultaneous game, cooperation is, if anything, kinder. By cooperating in the simultaneous game,
player 1 improves player 2’s payoff more than in the sequential game, and does so at his own expense. Despite
these two forces, the sequential games features more cooperation. Note that in a simultaneous version of game 1.1,
player 1 increases 2’s payoff by 2 units when he cooperates, regardless of 2’s choice. Given that player 2 defects
after defection, he only increases 2’s payoff by 2 when she defects after C. When she cooperates after C, he only
increases her payoff by 1.
4In the prisoner’s dilemma, this is satisfied for the strategies ‘always cooperate’, ‘always defect’, and ‘defect
after cooperation and cooperate after defection’.
11
and rewarding actions.
This is best illustrated by Orhun (2018). She is interested in how player 2 responds to
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma when player 2’s available choices after defection vary. In
particular, she compares behavior in the usual prisoner’s dilemma (game 1.1) to behavior in a
prisoner’s dilemma with punishment (game 1.2). In the latter, player 2 has the option to punish
player 1 after he defects. Orhun finds that the availability of the option to punish significantly
alters the players’ perception of the game. On average, player 1 believes that in 41% of the time
player 2 punishes after D, and player 2 holds a second order belief that he thinks she punishes
in 54% of all cases. For these beliefs, cooperation maximizes player 1’s payoff even if player 2
defects after C.5 Relatively to the sequential prisoner’s dilemma, player 2’s cooperation rate after
C drops by 22 percentage points in the one with punishment.
1
2
(1, 1)
c
(−1, 2)
d
C
2
(2,−1)
c
(0, 0)
d
D
Game 1.1: Sequential prisoner’s dilemma
1
2
(1, 1)
c
(−1, 2)
d
C
2
(−2,−1)
p
(0,0)
d
D
Game 1.2: Prisoner’s dilemma with punishment
My model, as far as I am aware, is the only model that predicts full conditional cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma, and defection (after C) and punishment (after D) in the prisoner’s
dilemma with punishment. Similar to the ultimatum game, player 2 punishes in response to
the unkind action D, which leads player 1 to cooperate. While cooperation improves 2’s payoff,
it is not trusting: player 1 is better off even if player 2 defects in response. As a result, she
perceives C as not kind and defects. In DK04, C is always seen as kind, since there is a strategy
(always defect) for which D is optimal for player 1. If anything, their model predicts more, not
less positive reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma with punishment as players tend to punish,
lowering their own alternative payoff.
This example highlights how kindness perceptions are not simply affected by the set of avail-
able choices for player 1, but also by how player 2 responds to these alternative. My model explains
why some papers fail to find much positive reciprocity, i.e. Offerman (2002), Al-Ubaydli and Lee
(2009) and Orhun (2018). Since the standard intention-based reciprocity model of Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) predicts positive reciprocity in such games, Offerman’s (2002) paper was
5The actual payoffs in Orhun’s experiment differ slightly from those in the figures.
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often used (in combination with other papers) to argue that negative reciprocity is stronger than
positive reciprocity. My model highlights that this need not be true. It shows how negative reci-
procity can instead crowd out positive reciprocity. An action can be perceived very differently
when the alternative action is followed by punishment rather than by a selfish response.
By allowing for complex interactions between punishment and rewards, my model provides a
theoretical framework to analyze institutional design and incentive structures when people are
motivated by reciprocity. It explains, for example, the lower demand for rewards in Andreoni
et al. (2003) when players can punish, and how employees reduce their efforts when employers
impose fines for shirking, Fehr and Gächter (2001).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I discuss the related
literature. In section 1.3, I present my model and show that an equilibrium exists. Sections 1.4
and 1.5 characterize the differences of my model to competing theories of Rabin and DK04. The
key difference to Rabin is the addition of trust. When an action is perceived as kinder in my
model than in Rabin, the action is trusting. This allows players to reciprocate mutually beneficial
actions. In contrast to fundamental preferences for trust, a trusting action can be unkind. In
such cases, trust is predicted to be betrayed. The comparison with DK04 highlights how negative
reciprocity can crowd out positive reciprocity. It also suggests yet-to-be-explored games, in which
DK04’s prediction of positive reciprocity appears implausible. In section 1.6, I revisit a variety
of experimental papers and show how my model describes behavior in games, where players can
reward and punish, better. Equilibrium predictions across all models are summarized in section
1.7. The paper ends with concluding remarks, section 1.8. Proofs, as well as the mathematical
detail for most examples can be found in Appendix A.
1.2 Literature Review
Intention-based reciprocity models are built on the general framework of psychological games,
Geanakoplos et al. (1989). Psychological games allow for beliefs to directly affect utility, and
not just indirectly through expectation formation. In Rabin (1993), a player uses her belief
about the other’s action, as well her second order beliefs about her own, to asses whether that
person intends to help or hurt her, whether he is kind or not. This directly affects her preferences.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend intention based-reciprocity to sequential games. Their
key observation is that a player needs to update her beliefs about how kind the other player is as
the game progresses. As discussed in the introduction, a second, possibly more crucial, difference
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to Rabin is their definition of the reference point. In comparison to Rabin’s original model, or
more recent versions that apply his reference point to sequential games (allowing for updating of
beliefs, Netzer and Schmutzler (2014) and Le Quement and Patel (2017)), actions are perceived
as kinder in DK04. The kinder an action, the more a player is willing to sacrifice own material
gains to help him. As a consequence, DK04 predicts more positive reciprocity than models in the
spirit of Rabin.6
Reciprocity models have been very successful in explaining non-selfish behavior in the labo-
ratory. Participants generally reward trust, Berg et al. (1995), choose high levels of costly effort
in response to above market wage offers, Fehr et al. (1993), and reject low offers in the ultima-
tum game, Güth et al. (1982). Studies also highlight the importance of intentions in motivating
non-selfish actions. For example, Blount (1995) compares rejection rates in a normal ultima-
tum game, to one where the offer is made by a random number generator. In stark contrast to
an offer made by a human subject, almost all zero-offers are accepted when they are chosen at
random. Similarly, Falk et al. (2003) show that in an ultimatum game rejection rates for the
same offer differ systematically with the availability of alternative offers. For instance, a split
of (8, 2) is rejected more frequently when player 1 could have chosen (5, 5), than when his only
other alternative is (10, 0). Falk and Fischbacher (2006) report subjective kindness perceptions
of such divisions. Player 2 perceives (8, 2) as very unkind if (5, 5) and (2, 8) are alternatives,
but much less unkind if the only other alternatives are (9, 1) and (10, 0). McCabe et al. (2003)
vary player 1’s choice set in a binary trust game. 65% of responders repay trust if player 1 has
a choice between trusting and not trusting, while only 33% return money if the alternative ‘not
to trust’ is eliminated. These studies highlight that people consider the intentions and motives
behind other people’s actions; they are not motivated by preferences over relative payoffs alone
(Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). A zero-offer is not unkind if it is chosen at random; perceptions of a
seemingly selfish or generous actions depend the set of alternative actions.
Theorists have developed a variety of other reciprocity models. Instead of modelling kindness
in terms of absolute payoffs, it can also be modelled through relative payoffs between agents.
This is done by Falk and Fischbacher (2006). A recent paper in the literature is Celen et al.
(2017), who propose a novel definition of kindness based on the notion of blame. Here a player
puts himself in the other’s position and wonders if she would take an action that is worse or nicer,
and blames him if the latter is true. Examples of models that do not rely on psychological games
are Cox et al. (2007), Cox et al. (2008), Charness and Rabin (2002), Levine (1998), and Gul and
6A formal description of each reference point can be found in section 1.4 and 1.5.
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Pesendorfer (2016), among others. For a good summary see Sobel (2005). These models, like
mine, focus on the internal preferences for reciprocity. As such, they fail to account for social
pressure or social image concerns, and, for example, cannot explain why people avoid, at a cost,
situations in which they are asked to share (Dana et al. (2006), Dana et al. (2007)). Malmendier
et al. (2014) discuss how these issues apply to reciprocity.
By introducing the idea of trust to reciprocity, my model is related to the trust literature,
Berg et al. (1995), Cox (2004), etc. I will show how it relates to Cox et al. (2016), who define
trust for general two-stage games. While trust and kindness often coincide in games, they are
different concepts since they primarily focus on different peoples’ payoffs. As a result, an action
can be trusting but also unkind.
1.3 The Model
Basic idea of reciprocity. Reciprocity models allow for utility to depend on one’s own as well
on another player’s payoff. In a two player game, player 2’s utility takes the simple form of
U2(·) = pi2 (·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
own payoff
+ κ1 (·)× pi1 (·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from reciprocity
In contrast to models of altruism, κ1 > 0, or spite, κ1 < 0, κ1 varies with player 2’s perception
of how kind 1 is towards her. Player 1’s kindness, as perceived by player 2, is defined as an
expression that compares 2’s perceived payoff against a reference point pir2. When the payoff is
larger than the reference point, we say player 1 is kind (κ1 > 0), when it is lower, we say he is
unkind (κ1 < 0).
Game 1.3 captures a simple scenario in which player 1 can improve player 2’s payoff at his
own cost. Suppose that 2’s reference point is her lowest payoff in the game, pir2 = 1. In this case,
player 2 will perceive action C as kind since it makes her strictly better off than the reference
point. Apart from answering the simple question ‘is 1 kind?’ when 2 observes C, she may also
wonder ‘how kind is he’. Since her payoff is either 4 or 5, she needs some criterion to decide
between the two. In intention-based reciprocity models, she uses her beliefs about what player 1
think she would do after C. These beliefs are called second order beliefs and capture the intended
consequences after player 1’s action. For example if she believes 1 thinks she cooperates, she
perceives the kindness of action C as κ1 = 4 − 1 = 3; kindness is simply the difference between
the payoff and the reference point. If instead she believes that 1 believes she defects, she would
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perceive him to be more kind, κ1 = 5 − 1 = 4. Since she prefers to cooperate for the lowest
kindness perception, U2(c) = 4 + (3) · 3 ≥ 5 + (3) · 1 = U2(d), she will positively reciprocate either
way.
1
2
(3, 4)
c
(1, 5)
d
C
(5, 1)
D
Game 1.3: A simple example of kindness
I now proceed to introducing the formal notation and kindness definitions.7 In contrast to
the previous example, the reference point represents a statistic on a subset of payoffs, and not
necessarily all payoffs in the game.
Game. Let the game be a 2-player, finite, multi-stage game, with perfect information
and finite actions. Hence, choices occur sequentially and are fully observed.8
Players, actions, and strategies. Let N = {1, 2} be the set of players, and H be the
set of all non-terminal histories. Terminal histories are denoted by Z. Ai,h describes the (pos-
sibly empty) set of actions for player i ∈ N at node h ∈ H. A history of length l is a sequence
h = (a1, a2, . . . , al), where at = (at1, at2) is a profile of actions chosen at time t (1 ≤ t ≤ l). Player
i’s behavior strategy is denoted by σi ∈ ×h∈H∆ (Ai,h) =: ∆Hi . It assigns at each node h ∈ H a
probability distribution σi(·|h) over the set of pure actions. Define ∆H =
∏
i∈N ∆
H
i 3 σ.
Player i’s material payoff is defined as pii : Z → R. It represents the ‘selfish’ payoff, which
is independent of any feelings of reciprocity, obligation, or behavioral concerns. Since behavior
strategies induce a probability distribution over terminal notes, material payoffs can be redefined
as pii : ∆H → R.
In this paper, I employ the notational convention that i and j always refer to different people.
In all examples, player 1 is male and player 2 is female.
7I opt for a notation that is closer to DK04 than the more recent, general framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009), who extend psychological games to allow for updated higher-order beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans of
actions to directly affect utility. This has the advantage that differences between models are more explicit, and
that a more familiar equilibrium notion is used.
8While the theory can be applied one-to-one to games with simultaneous choice in stage games, the usual
updating process assumed in the literature leads to some unappealing behavior. Footnote 16 discusses this point
further after all concepts are introduced.
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Beliefs and updating. Players form beliefs about their opponent’s strategies (first or-
der belief) and what they think their opponent thinks of their own strategies (second order
belief). Denote player i’s first order belief about j’s behavior strategy σj by αj ∈ ∆Hj , and her
second order belief by βi ∈ ∆Hi . A key observation in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is
that psychological games require updating of beliefs for each history:
Definition 1: For any αj ∈ ∆Hj and h ∈ H, let αj |h ∈ ∆Hj be the updated first-order belief (about
strategies) which assigns probability 1 to all actions of player j in (the sequence) h. Beliefs for
any other history h′ 6= h are left unchanged. βi is updated in the same fashion.
After observing some action aj (or more generally history h), each player updates their first and
second order belief to match this past actions. For instance, suppose player 2 holds the initial
belief that player 1 cooperates in a prisoner’s dilemma, α1(C) = 1. After observing defection,
she updates her belief to α1(C)|D = 0.9 As a result, actions are always seen as intentional, not
as mistakes. Notice that such updating behavior implies that players give up on non-degenerate
probabilistic beliefs (about the past) after observing the other player’s action. Randomized choice
is interpreted not as conscious randomization, but rather as choice frequencies at the population
level.10 True randomization can be introduced by public randomization-devices; for detail see
Sebald (2010).
Define the set ∆Hj |h as the set of j’s strategies that lead to history h with probability 1
(assuming i also plays the respective actions in h with certainty). It follows that αj |h ∈ ∆Hj |h.
Whenever a term features multiple updated beliefs, or also conditions on history h, I simply
condition once at the end, i.e. pii(βi, αj |h) :=pii(βi|h, αj |h | h).
Perceived kindness. Player i forms beliefs about j’s kindness by comparing the payoff
she thinks she obtains, pii(αj , βi), against a reference point piri (βi). The reference point is a
combination of the highest and lowest payoff that player j can induce by using a subset of
strategies Ej ⊆ ∆Hj . Besides second order beliefs, the subset Ej is the essential ingredient
in reciprocity models with intentions. Its definition critically affects all kindness perceptions,
preferences and behavior.
9While these beliefs are non-strategic, they affect kindness perceptions and hence require some form of updating
if unexpected events occurs. The simplest example of this is a sequential prisoners dilemma. Without updating
(C, cc) is an equilibrium. Player 2 cooperates no matter what given her (correct) belief that player 1 is kind due to
C. However, if the first player were to defect, this belief would not be sustainable. By updating the initial beliefs
when defection occurs, the (equilibrium) strategy for player 2 becomes conditional cooperation.
10Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) interpret randomized choices of player i as a common first-order belief of i’s
opponents about i’s strategy. This results in an “equilibrium in beliefs” as in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
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Given that the definition of E1 is central to this paper, let’s look at a simple choice problem in
order to understand why the literature defines the reference point on a subset of payoffs. Suppose
player 1 can either play a1, which leads to payoffs (pi1, pi2) = (10, 10), or a suboptimal alternative
a′1, which results in (−100, 0); A1 = {a1, a′1}. Assume the reference point is the simple average of
player 2’s highest and lowest payoff resulting from actions in E1. If E1 = A1 then pir2 = (10+0)/2
which would imply that player 2 perceives action a1 as kind.11 Although a1 makes player 2 better
off, it is also player 1’s dominant choice. As a result, it is unclear whether player 2 perceives such
selfish action as kind. ‘The fact that my neighbor doesn’t throw stones at my window doesn’t
make him kind.’12 Indeed, if such actions were to have an effect, any level of kindness could be
generated by simply adding dominated payoffs to the game. If instead E1 is defined over the set
of Pareto efficient actions, that is E1 = {a1}, then a1 is neither kind nor unkind as it yields the
same payoff as the reference point, pir2 = 10. Here, the notion of Pareto efficiency reduces the set
A1 to what player 2 considers the ‘sensible set’ E1.
In this paper, I introduce the idea of trust-efficiency to define E1. Trust-efficiency uses a
notion of Pareto efficiency that is generally based on i’s second order belief regarding her own
response, but which is adjusted for her hypothetical thought process of ‘what if I act selfishly?’
Definition 2: A behavior strategy σj ∈ ∆Hj is Pareto efficient given σi ∈ ∆Hi if there is no
other strategy σ′j ∈ ∆Hj that gives at least one player strictly more, without making the other
worse-off, that is pik(σ′j , σi|h) ≥ pik(σj , σi|h) for all h ∈ H, k ∈ {1, 2} with strict inequality for at
least one player.
Define player i’s material best-response as the behavior strategy σmBRi (αj) that maximizes i’s
payoff for all possible histories taking i’s first order belief about j’s strategy αj as given; that is
for all h ∈ H
σmBRi (αj) ∈ arg max
σi∈∆Hi
pii(σi, αj |h).
In case σmBRi (αj) is not unique, abusing notation, let it refer to a pure strategy that also max-
imizes j’s payoff at every h ∈ H (among σmBRi (αj)). Denote the optimal choice at each h that
make up this pure strategy by amBRi,h (αj), that is σ
mBR
i (a
mBR
i,h (αj)|h) = 1. Finally let σi\xh
refer to the behavior strategy that replaces the local choice at h in σi by xh ∈ ∆(Ai,h).13 With
these terms, I can define deviations from the material best response. An action is called generous
11While Ej is technically defined as a subset of behavioral strategies, for all examples, I will indicate which
(pure) actions are part of it.
12The payoffs implicitly assume that the neighbor is not a rebellious teenager, who enjoys breaking windows.
13When xh is (pure) action, xh ∈ Ai,h it is implicitly understood that it refers to σi(xh|h) = 1 and σi(ah|h) = 0
for all other actions.
18
(punishing) if it gives the other player more (less) than what he would get as a result of the
material best-response.
Definition 3: Player i’s action ai ∈ Ai,h at h is generous if pij(σmBRi (αj)\ai, αj |h) >
pij(σ
mBR
i (αj), αj |h). Action ai ∈ Ai,h is punishing if pij(σmBRi (αj)\ai, αj |h) <
pij(σ
mBR
i (αj), αj |h).
Denote player i’s set of generous actions at h by AGi,h(αj) and the respective set of punishing
actions by APi,h(αj).
This brings us to the central definition of Ej , which is called TEj(βi) in my model:
Definition 4 (Trust Efficiency): A behavior strategy σj ∈ ∆Hj is trust-efficient if it is Pareto
efficient given βTEi ∈ ∆Hi , with βTEi defined as
βi(ai|h)TE :=

0 if ai ∈ AGi,h(αj)∑
x∈AGi,h(αj) ∪ amBRi,h (αj) βi(x|h) if ai = a
mBR
i,h (αj)
βi(ai|h) if ai ∈ APi,h(αj)
for all h ∈ H, ai ∈ Ai,h. The set of trust-efficient strategies is denoted by TEj(βi).
To illustrate this definition, take a simple game where player 1 moves first and player 2 responds.
Player 1’s trust-efficient actions are his Pareto efficient actions given player 2’s adjusted second
order-belief, which uses her material best-response instead of any generous action that she thinks
player 1 thinks she takes. For instance, if player 2’s second order belief in the Prisoner’s dilemma
with punishment, game 1.2, is β2(c|C) = 1 and β2(d|D) = 1, then she evaluates the Pareto
efficiency of C and D using β2(c|C)TE = 0 and β2(d|D)TE = 1 instead. While D is not Pareto
efficient given β2, it is given βTE2 . If player 2 defected after C, player 1 would be better off by
defecting himself. Action C makes player 1 vulnerable to being exploited. As a result, player
2 considers both actions to be trust-efficient. This will enable C to be perceived as kind as the
reference point is determined by trust-efficient actions. The trust-efficient set for player 2, in
contrast, is rather trivial, as she faces a simple decision problem at h, which doesn’t depend on
any future player.
βTEi treats generous and punishing actions rather differently; it adjusts beliefs in the first,
but leaves beliefs in the latter unchanged. Suppose, for instance, that player 2 holds the belief
β2(c|C) = 1 and β2(p|D) = 1 in game 1.2. In this case β2(c|C)TE = 0 while β2(p|D)TE = 1;
only C is trust-efficient. The asymmetric treatment of generous and punishing actions captures
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the idea player 2’s perception of player 1’s cooperative action depends on whether she thinks he
avoids punishment or exposes vulnerability.
In a more general environment, i.e. when players move more than once, the material-best
response doesn’t just focus on realized play but also takes the opponent’s overall strategy into
account, i.e. is forward looking. The idea remains the same, in the sense that βTEi transfers any
belief in generous actions to material best-replies for any given node in the game.14
The reference point is a simple convex combination of the highest and lowest material payoff,
with payoffs restricted to the trust-efficient actions.
Definition 5: Let player i’s reference point be
piri (βi|h) := λ · max
σj∈TEj(βi|h)
pii(βi|h, σj) + (1 – λ) · min
σj∈TEj(βi|h)
pii(βi|h, σj)
for some λ ∈ [0, 1].
As a punishing action of player i can make a strategy of player j inefficient, the reference point
may be discontinuous in βi. If this is the case, let piri refer to the smoothed out, continuous
version of the reference point in all subsequent expressions.15
Player i forms beliefs over the kindness of j’s strategy; She compares her perceived payoff
pii(αj , βi) against the reference point piri (βi).
Definition 6: Player i perceives j’s kindness from strategy αj at h according to the function
κj : ∆
H
j ×∆Hi → R with
κj (αj , βi | h) := k (pii(αj , βi), piri (βi) | h)
with ∂k(·)∂pii ≥ 0,
∂k(·)
∂piri
≤ 0, k(pii = piri , ·) = 0, and a continuous k(·).
Example: If k(·) is linear, the function reduces to the usual κj(αj , βi|h) = pii(αj , βi|h)−piri (βi|h).
This function will be used in all examples.
In general, k(·) can describe more general functional forms such as bounding kindness (to 1),
or allowing for dimishing effects as payoffs scale up.
14For simplicity, I opted to not explicitly indicate that βTEi is a function of αj . I hope that this helps making
expressions more easily understood instead of having the opposite effect.
15In contrast to generous actions, I am unaware of a game that actually requires mixed strategies in punishing
actions. In general, when a player prefers to take a punishing action ai and holds beliefs that βi(ai|h) ∈ [0, 1)
then she will also want to punish for βi(ai|h) = 1; the simple, non-continuous reference point is usually enough.
For details on how to smooth out the reference point, see Appendix A in Rabin (1993); in this regard, see also the
discussion of conditional-efficiency in section 1.4.
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Utility and Equilibrium.
Definition 7: The utility of player i at h ∈ H is a function Ui : ∆Hi ×∆Hj ×∆Hi → R defined by
Ui (σi, αj , βi|h) = pii(σi, αj |h) + γi · κj (αj , βi|h) · pij(σi, αj |h) (1.1)
where γi is a non-negative parameter capturing i’s concern for reciprocity.
The equilibrium is defined using the multi-selves approach. An agent (i, h) maximizes i’s condi-
tional utility at h by choosing the local action, taking ‘her’ strategy at all other nodes as given.
This approach is necessary as the agent’s preferences may change over time.
Definition 8: (σ∗, α∗, β∗) is a reciprocity with trust equilibrium (RTE) if for all i ∈ N , for each
h ∈ H, and for any a∗i ∈ Ai,h it holds that
• if σ∗i (a∗i |h) > 0 then a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai,h
Ui
(
σ∗i \ai, α∗j , β∗i |h
)
• α∗i = σ∗i
• β∗i = σ∗i
The equilibrium has the usual feature that players make optimal decisions at every h taking
behavior and beliefs in other unreached histories as given. Moreover, first and second order beliefs
are correct and are updated as the game progresses. The updating process views unexpected
actions as intentional, not as mistakes.16
Proposition 1: An equilibrium exists if κi(·) is continuous for all i ∈ N .
The proof follows the strategy of DK04. The key observation is that behavior at unreached
nodes (or rather second order beliefs about it) has direct effects on preferences due to kindness
perceptions. As a result, the usual backward induction argument fails. Instead, the existence
proof requires that all histories are analysed simultaneously.
16At this point, I should comment on why the model is only defined over games with strictly sequential choices.
The game matching pennies illustrates an interesting issue that occurs when there are simultaneous choices in
sequential games.
L R
T 1,0 0,1
B 0,1 1,0
Suppose both people were to belief that the other player is perfectly randomizing. Ex-ante,
this leads to zero-kindness. Ex-post one player wins, the other loses. The updating process in my model - and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) or Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) - places probability 1 on the observed
actions. Hence, ex-post, the winner considers the loser as kind, and the loser views the winner as unkind. If they
had the opportunity to reward or punish in a subsequent period - they would choose to do so. While they may
want to do so for status concerns, it seems counterintuitive that this is a result of reciprocity when they agreed
ex-ante that kindness is zero.
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Example. Sequential prisoner’s dilemma, game 1.1. Suppose for simplicity that player 1
is selfish,γ1 = 0, and that the reference point is the minimum efficient payoff, λ = 0.17 For any
β2, player 1’s efficient set of actions is TE1(β2) = {C,D}. To understand this, start with player
2’s second order belief that she conditionally cooperates. For such belief C Pareto-dominates
D so that C could not be perceived as kind. However, the efficiency notion, instead, uses 2’s
material best-response after C. Given such response, both actions are Pareto efficient. Player
1 makes himself vulnerable by playing C as subsequent defection would lower his payoff below
what he could have obtained by playing D. This leads player 2 to perceived the mutually
beneficial action C as kind.
At C her choices yield utilities of
U2(c, β2|C) = 1 + γ2 [β2(c|C) + 2(1− β2(c|C))− (−β2(c|D))] · 1, and
U2(d, β2|C) = 2 + γ2 [β2(c|C) + 2(1− β2(c|C))− (−β2(c|D))] · (−1).
These two expressions clarify how the second order belief about behavior at unreached nodes
affects 2’s perception of 1’s kindness. The more 2 believes 1 believes she cooperates at D, the
kinder she perceives him to be.
Since D minimizes 2’s payoff it can never be kind, however. Player 2 defects after D,
σ2(c|D) = β2(c|D) = 0. She cooperates at C if and only if 2γ2 (β2(c|C) + 2(1− β2(c|C))) ≥ 1.
Thus for γ2 ≥ 12 she cooperates. For γ2 < 14 , she defects, and for intermediate values she
randomizes with σ2(c|C) = β2(c|C) = 2 − 12γ2 . Player 1 cooperates if and only if γ2 ≥ 38 . The
intermediate case highlights that an equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist when players
are not purely motivated by material-payoffs, unlike in Zermelo (1913). Player 2 only views 1 as
sufficiently kind (to motivate her to cooperate) when she thinks he thinks she defects, but not
when she thinks he thinks she cooperates.
1.4 Trust and Conditional Efficiency
In this section, I compare my model to the reciprocity models of Rabin (1993) and Netzer and
Schmutzler (2014). By also comparing it to a model of trust, i.e. Cox et al. (2016), I will explain
17Clearly, using the more familiar λ = 1/2 doesn’t add any additional insight to this particular example, but
gives rise to a more complicated looking reference point. Whenever there is no punishment, using λ = 0 is often
better.
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why it is called reciprocity with trust, and how it differs from pure trust.
For the remainder of this paper, the games of interest are two-stage games where player 1
moves first and 2 responds. The focus will be on player 2’s equilibrium response as player 1’s
preference is identical across all models.
In this setting, I will use TE1(β2) to refer to player 1’s trust-efficient actions (instead of
behavior strategies). Moreover, for a1, a′1 ∈ A1, a1 Pareto-dominates a′1 given β2 ∈ ∆H2 , in short
a1 PD(β2) a
′
1, if pik(a1, β2) ≥ pik(a′1, β2) for all k ∈ {1, 2}, with strict inequality for at least one
player. Similarly if a1 dominates a′1 given βTE2 ∈ ∆H2 I use a1 PD(βTE2 ) a′1.
Conditional-efficiency. Rabin (1993) models efficiency conditional on player 2’s response (or
rather the second-order belief thereof) when defining reciprocity for normal-form games. For a
two-stage game, it translates to:
Definition 9 (Conditional Efficiency, Rabin ’93): An action a1 ∈ A1 is conditionally efficient
if it is Pareto efficient given β2 ∈ ∆H2 . Denote the set of conditional efficient actions by CE1(β2).
The fundamental difference between Rabin’s original model and mine is his definition of efficiency.
He simply uses second order beliefs to determine whether an action is efficient, which will be
consistent with actual choices in equilibrium. In my model, I start with second order beliefs to
determine efficiency, but use material-best replies instead of any beliefs in generous actions.
Since Rabin focused on normal form games, his model featured no belief updating, however.
Netzer and Schmutzler (2014) and Le Quement and Patel (2017) apply the notion of conditional-
efficiency to sequential games, allowing for such updating. For this paper, I define a conditional
Reciprocity Equilibrium (conRE) as an equilibrium that takes all ingredients from section 1.3,
but replaces trust-efficiency with conditional efficiency.
The difference between the two efficiency notions is best illustrated by revisiting the prisoner’s
dilemma. From earlier, we know that player 2 defects after defection, β2(c|D) = 0. The second
order belief about how player 2 responds after cooperation is crucial, however. If 2 thinks that
1 believes she defects, β2(c|C) = 0, then both C and D are efficient: C is better for 2, while
D is better for 1. If she thinks he believes she cooperates, β2(c|C) = 1, C is the only efficient
action as it is mutually beneficial. In general, C is the only efficient action if it also maximizes
player 1’s payoff, i.e. β2(c|C) ≥ 1/2. As the reference point is based on the efficient actions only, it
follows that when both actions are Pareto efficient, β2(c|C) < 1/2, she perceives action C as kind,
κ1(C, β2(c|C)) = 2−β2(c|C)−0. For β2(c|C) ≥ 1/2 only action C is efficient and so the reference
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point is identical to her (perceived) payoff, κ1(C, β2) = 2 − β2(c|C) − (2 − β2(c|C)) = 0. While
player 2 benefits from C, she attaches zero kindness to 1’s action. A reciprocity model based on
the conditional-efficiency notion adopts the cynical perspective that an action can only be kind
when it occurs at 1’s expense. This places a strict limit of how much player 2 can cooperate in
equilibrium. Even when she is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, γ2 ≥ 1/3, it must be that she
cooperates with slightly less than 1/2 probability. For γ2 < 1/3, both RTE and conRE coincide.18
The prisoner’s dilemma example suggests that (a) trust-efficiency features a more generous
reference point, and that (b) the difference between trust-efficiency and conditional-efficiency is
trust. I will now explore each idea and show how they relate to each other.
Proposition 2: Let β2 be an equilibrium belief for either RTE or conRE (or both). Then
min
a1∈TE1(β2)
pi2(a1, β2) ≤ min
a1∈CE1(β2)
pi2(a1, β2).
This proposition confirms the notion that actions are perceived as kinder in my model. When
positive reciprocal responses make actions inefficient, they remain efficient under trust-efficiency.
Since a lower minimum efficient payoff translates into a lower reference point, actions are
perceived as kinder.19 I will now show under which conditions the reference points differ. To
do so, I introduce a notion of trust and illustrate how it relates to the notion of trust- and
conditional-efficiency.
Trust. Cox et al. (2016) define trust for two-stage games as follows: For any a1, a′1 ∈ A1, a1 is
more trusting than a′1 if and only if
pi1(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) < pi1(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 ) and max
a2∈A2,a1
pi1(a1, a2) > pi1(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 ).
The first condition captures vulnerability. Given 2’s selfish responses, player 1 is worse off by
playing a1 than a′1. The second condition requires that there is a response to a1 that makes
player 1 better off than the selfish outcome after a′1. For the purpose of this paper, I use a slight
variation of their definitions, namely:
18Netzer and Schmutzler (2014) make a similar observation in a gift-exchange game, where a firm is known to
be selfish. They highlight that a high wage offered by a firm (that moves first) isn’t kind if the firm expects the
worker to reciprocate by exerting high effort. If a ‘low wage’ leads to ‘low effort’ and ‘high wage’ to ‘high effort’,
and the payoff set from the second dominates the first, the efficient set collapses to a singleton. This makes any
high-wage offer not kind. Their goal is to highlight the limits of reciprocity when one player is known to be selfish.
In contrast, this paper is motivated by trying to understand when cooperation is possible if both are (known to
be) reciprocal - whenever selfishness of player 1 is assumed in this paper, it is mainly done to simply derivations.
19All results in this paper are based on equilibrium beliefs. For an example that highlights what can happen
when only rationalizability is required, see Appendix 1.10.1, game 1.11. The example underlines that RTE is best
used as an equilibrium model.
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Definition 10: Let a1, a′1 ∈ A1. a1 is more trusting than a′1 if and only if
pi1(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) < pi1(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 ) and max
a2∈A2,a1
pi1(a1, a2) > pi1(a
′
1, β2).
This definition keeps the critical first condition that focuses on the relative material best-response
payoffs, while relaxing the second condition to only require a1 to potentially do better than
a′1 given β2.20 Cox et al. (2016) remark that some definitions of trust allow for the possibility
that the second player can be better off, but chose not to include it as it would reflect gifts or
generosity, not trust. I will argue later, that player 2’s payoff is rather relevant to predict when
trust is reciprocated or betrayed.21
Proposition 3: Let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE and let player 1 only have two actions, A1 = {a1, a′1}.
If TE1(β∗2) = {a1, a′1} and CE1(β∗2) = {a1} then a1 is more trusting than a′1.
The proposition can be read as ‘RTE is conditional efficiency plus trust’. While a1 Pareto
dominates a′1 given β∗2 player 2 is tempted by her selfish option (after a1) and understands that
if she took it, player 1 would have been better-off under the alternative. This makes a1 trusting.
From a mechanical standpoint, note that it is not the trusting action that becomes efficient, but
the alternative action that was less trusting. Consequently the trusting action appears kind,
which allows for the possibility of it being rewarded.
When generalizing this result to |A1| ≥ 2, it is useful to introduce notation for the efficient
action that minimizes 2’s payoff. Denote this action for the respective efficiency notions, TE and
CE, by
M
TE1(β2)
1 = arg min
a1∈TE1(β2)
pi2(a1, β2) and M
CE1(β2)
1 = arg min
a1∈CE1(β2)
pi2(a1, β2).
Since the maximum payoff is always efficient and thus is identical across models, the reference
point differs if and only if these two actions are different.22
Proposition 4: Let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE. If MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 6= MCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 then any action a1 ∈ A1
that Pareto-dominates MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 given β
∗
2 is more trusting than M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 .
By proposition 2, we know that MTE11 induces a weakly lower payoff than M
CE1
1 . Hence, when
20This definition is not meant to capture the best-definition of trust (which may want to hold constant expected
behavior off-path), but rather, to be a useful language for describing selfish payoffs. For most games in the
experimental literature, this definition implies Cox et al. (2016)’s definition.
21They also define 2’s action as trustworthy after a1 if it gives 1 (weakly) more than the payoff he would get if
2 acted selfishly when 1 chooses the least-trusting action relative to a1.
22In general it does not need to be true that CE1(β2) ⊆ TE1(β2). Game 1.12 in Appendix 1.10.2 illustrates a
case where action a1 ∈ CE1(β2) but is not in TE1(β2). It also makes clear why such cases aren’t problematic.
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the minimum efficient payoff is strictly lower under trust-efficiency, the proposition states that it
is due to trust. This reiterates that RTE can be interpreted as conditional efficiency plus trust.
Since the proposition only describes when preferences are different, it is not clear whether the
equilibrium itself must be different. This is tackled next.
Proposition 5: Let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE. If MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 6= MCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 then (σ
∗, α∗, β∗) cannot
be a conditional Reciprocity Equilibrium.
Whenever trust plays a role, an RTE cannot be an equilibrium in the Rabin model. To understand
this proposition, recall that when player 2 conditionally cooperates in the prisoner’s dilemma,
cooperation is the only efficient choice for player 1 given the notion of conditional-efficiency. In
this case, it cannot be perceived as kind and so player 2 cannot cooperate in response. The
proposition generalizes this observation. Whenever there is an equilibrium where trust-efficiency
yields a different minimum payoff than conditional-efficiency (for the same second order belief),
the respective action that induces 2’s minimum payoff for trust-efficiency is followed by a positive
reciprocal response. But such response isn’t feasible in a conditional Reciprocity equilibrium as
this action is not perceived as kind.
If the minimum payoff is the same, on the other hand, preferences are identical across both
models so that the equilibrium is also a conditional RE.
1.4.1 Trust Does Not Imply Efficiency
Cox et al. (2016) intentionally define trust using only player 1’s payoffs. As a result, it is a very
different notion than efficiency and kindness. It turns out that a choice can be trusting, but also
unkind and Pareto dominated. When players are motivated by reciprocity, such trust is likely to
be betrayed. Game 1.4 illustrates this idea.
In this example action A makes player 2 strictly worse off. Since pi1(A, σmBR2 ) = 0 < 1 =
pi1(B, σ
mBR
2 ) and maxa2∈A2,Api1(A, a2) = 2 > 1 = pi1(B, σmBR2 ) action A is more trusting than
B. As 2’s second order belief must assign probability one to r, B Pareto dominates A for any
second order belief of how she responds after B. It follows that the only efficient action is B
despite the fact that A is more trusting than B. As a result, player 2 always takes her selfish
action rn. She betrays player 1’s trust after A and does not reward the mutually beneficial action
B.
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Game 1.4: Trust doesn’t imply efficiency
1.5 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger ’04
In this section, I compare the reciprocity with trust model to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
- which is the standard intention-based reciprocity model for sequential games. I will argue that
their model classifies ‘too many’ actions as efficient, giving rise to a reference point that is often
too low, and thus predicting too much positive reciprocity. Once again, the games of interest will
be two-stage games.
Definition 11 (Unconditional-efficiency, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger ’04): An action a1 ∈ A1 is
unconditionally-efficient, if it is Pareto-efficient for at least one strategy of player 2, σ2 ∈ ∆H2 .
Denote the set of unconditional efficient actions by UE1.
Efficiency no longer takes (the second order belief about) 2’s strategy as given, but instead requires
that it isn’t Pareto-dominated by some a′1 ∈ A1 for all possible strategies of player 2. We can
think about this from an ex-ante perspective: Without knowing how player 2 might respond,
any action that is dominated for all possible responses is eliminated. Define a unconditional
Reciprocity Equilibrium (unRE) as an equilibrium that takes all ingredients from section 1.3, but
replaces trust-efficiency with unconditional efficiency.
Returning once again to the prisoner’s dilemma, it should be clear that both actions are
unconditionally efficient, UE1 = {C,D}. If player 2 always defects, C is better for 2, while D
is better for 1. Consequently, the equilibrium predictions of RTE and unRE are identical. In
general, unconditional efficiency is less restrictive than trust-efficiency. While trust-efficiency is
based on a particular strategy, βTE2 , unconditional efficiency only requires the existence of any
strategy for which player 1’s action is not Pareto-dominated.
Proposition 6: For any β2 it holds that TE1(β2) ⊆ UE1 and thus
min
a1∈UE1
pi2(a1, β2) ≤ min
a1∈TE1(β2)
pi2(a1, β2).
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Compared to trust-efficiency, actions tend to be perceived as kinder when unconditional efficiency
is used. As a result unRE predicts more (less) positive (negative) reciprocity than RTE.
We now turn to game 1.5 and 1.6. In game 1.5, A Pareto-dominates B regardless of player
2’s action; A is not kind. In game 1.6, A is no longer the only unconditionally-efficient action. B
is efficient because it yields the largest payoff for player 1 if, for example, player 2 were to play
strategy ln. Consequently A is kind, which makes player 2 want to reciprocate by using strategy
rm in equilibrium. Notice, however, that B gives player 2 strictly less than A. As a result, it
cannot be kind and so player 2 will always choose m after B.
1
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Game 1.5
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Game 1.6
This example highlights the fundamental problem of the unconditional-efficiency notion: Since
unconditional-efficiency is independent of what players actually do (or want to do), it opens up
for the possibility of adding various unused choices to create kindness. Note that this example
doesn’t require equilibrium beliefs. Since player 2 never plays n, player 1 cannot believe that
she does, and so player 2 must hold the second order belief that she plays m (after B): n is not
rationalizable, yet affects kindness perceptions.23 While she may view action B as greedy, it is
unlikely that n’s existence motivates player 2 to play l. This suggests that DK04’s approach of
modelling efficiency without any link to second order beliefs leads to a model that predicts too
much positive reciprocity. In the next subsection, I will explore how this example generalizes.
1.5.1 General Comparison
I now proceed to describe in which cases the reference point in the RTE differs from DK04. There
are two main classes of payoffs, one that generalizes the previous example and one that is linked
to games where player 2 punishes in some nodes of the game. The latter case sheds light on why
some experimental papers don’t observe much positive reciprocity.
23An action a2 ∈ A2(h) cannot be rationalizable if there exists no second order belief β2 under which she wants
to take such action. For a full definition of rationalizability in psychological games, see Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009).
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The easiest way to compare RTE to DK04 is by looking at games where player 1 has only two
actions, |A1| = 2. Moreover, I make the following equilibrium selection assumption:
Assumption 1: Player 2 doesn’t punish after a1 ∈ A1 if there is an alternative action a′1 ∈ A1
with pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ).
The assumption eliminates very pessimistic beliefs that could theoretically lead to punishing
behavior after an action a1 that makes player 2 better off than under alternative a′1 if she takes
her material best-response after each.24 25 Note that since player 1 only has two actions, only one
of the two can be seen an unkind and punished. The assumption does not eliminate punishment
in general. It can be shown that an equilibrium still exists even when the above is assumed.26
Proposition 7: Let player 1 have two actions, A1 = {a1, a′1}, and let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE. If
assumption 1 holds, UE1 = {a1, a′1} and TE1(β∗2) = {a1} then one of the following holds:
1. pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ) and pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ), or
2. pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) < pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ) and pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ).
The first case is the most extreme. When player 2 uses her material best-response after both ac-
tions, a1 Pareto dominates a′1. Both players are better off. Here, it appears difficult to rationalise
why a1 is perceived as kind. One example of this was game 1.6. There are various other ways in
which additional actions lead to the same result.27
The second case is slightly more interesting. Under material best-replies, both action are
indeed efficient: Player 1 would prefer a′1 over a1. As player 2 considers a′1 unkind, however, she
punishes him in response to a′1, making it Pareto-dominated. Moreover, she understands that
by choosing a1, player 1 avoids punishment. While he improves her payoffs, she views player
1’s action as selfish because it is not trusting. This example highlights the interaction between
rewards and punishment and is explored in more detail in the next section.
The proposition generalizes to |A1| > 2, yet requires a more involved assumptions given the larger
set of actions. It is discussed in Appendix B.
24 Take a game with A1 = {a1, a′1}. a1 induces payoffs for player 2 of 1 or −1 (depending on 2’s response),
while a′1 leads to payoff 0. Let λ = 1/2. Suppose 1’s payoffs are such that both actions are (always) efficient.
Let β˜ be the second order belief that she takes the action that leads to a payoff of 1. In this case κ1(a1, β˜) =
(β˜ − (1 − β˜) − (β˜ − (1 − β˜) + 0)/2) = β˜ − 1/2. If 2 believes 1 thinks she punishes after a1, then she may want
to punish if it lowers 1’s payoff sufficiently. While β˜ = 1 represents ‘normal’ beliefs, β˜ = 0 takes an extremely
negative view player 1 aims to hurts player 2. For most normal interactions such belief appears unlikely.
25While the assumption is written in terms of behavior, it could have also been written in terms of the equivalent
beliefs, which implies such behavior.
26See Appendix A, Lemma 10 for detail.
27For instance a′1 may be become efficient if there exists generous action after a1 that results in a lower payoff
for player 2 than her selfish payoff after a′1. Alternatively, it may be due to a punishment action after a1, which
once again leads to a lower payoff for 2 than her selfish payoff after a′1.
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1.6 Applications
This section revisits games in the literature where player 2 can reward and punish. Game 1.7 is
taken from Offerman (2002) and represents a perfect example for part 2 of proposition 7. The
second player has the option, at a cost of 1 unit, to reward (r) or to punish (p) player 1 by 4
units. Player 1 can be helpful (H) or selfish (S). In a SPNE with selfish players, γ1 = γ2 = 0,
player 1 plays S and player 2 always acts cool, cc.
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(11, 6)
c
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Game 1.7: Offerman (2002)
The key observation for this game is that when player 2 punishes after S, H Pareto dominates
S for both β2 = rp and β2 = cp. As a result, only H is trust-efficient and therefore not kind.
Player 2’s optimal response to H is c.
In one treatment, Offerman (2002) allows player 1 to make a choice himself, while in the other,
player 1’s choice is made for him by a computer He finds clear evidence of negative reciprocity
but limited, not statistically significant, evidence of positive reciprocity: 83.3% of the second
movers punish the selfish choice (vs. 16.7% in the ‘random treatment’), whereas 75% of second
players reciprocate helpful choices (vs 50% in the ‘random treatment’). Offerman concludes
that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality and explains this with
self-serving attribution.28 Al-Ubaydli and Lee (2009) repeat Offerman’s experiment employing
a structural approach, in which the reciprocity model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) is used
to account for asymmetries due to inequity aversion. They also find that negative intentions
are more likely to be followed by punishment than positive ones, and subscribe to Offerman’s
conclusion of self-serving attribution. My analysis emphasizes that this conclusion does not need
to be correct, since it neglects to account for the interaction between punishment and rewards. It
is because player 2 punishes in response to the selfish choice, that the helpful action is no longer
28Intentional harm hurts player 2’s self-esteem and therefore induces punishment. However, she attributes being
treated well by players or nature to being ‘a good person deserves help’. As a result, there is no need to reciprocate.
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perceived as kind.29
The Offerman result was surprising because both actions are efficient in DK04, and thus
C is perceived as kind. Moreover, DK04’s model predicts that either player 2 rewards H and
punishes S, or always acts neutral. This is due to the fact that the game is fully symmetric,
and that their reference point put equal weights on the maximum and minimum efficient payoff.
Simply relaxing the parametric specification of equal weights, i.e. for example to λ > 1/2, is not
the solution as we will see next. In a recent experimental paper, Orhun (2018) observes similar
behavior as in Offerman. Instead of replacing player 1’s choice with a computer, she varies the
set of choices in the game. In particular she varies player 2’s choice in a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma after defection, see game 1.8 and 1.9. In the game 1.8, player 2 has the usual option to
cooperate, whereas in game 1.9 she can punish player 1 instead.
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Game 1.8: Sequential prisoner’s dilemma
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Game 1.9: Prisoner’s dilemma with punishment
The option to punish significantly alters the players’ perception of the game. On average, player
1 believes that in 41% of the times player 2 punishes after D, and player 2 holds a second order
belief that he thinks she punishes in 54% of all cases. Under these beliefs, cooperation is player
1’s payoff maximizing choice. Orhun finds that cooperation rates (after C) fall significantly from
57% in game 1.8 to 35% in game 1.9.30
Orhun remarks that DK04 cannot predict the drop in cooperative behavior. Indeed, it cannot
be explained for any possible weighting assigned to the minimum and maximum payoff in the
reference point. If anything, the option to punish increases the kindness perception of C by
lowering the minimum efficient payoff. In contrast, RTE predicts this exact change in behavior.
Given that player 2 punishes C PD(βTE) D, so that C is not perceived as kind. With reciprocal
players RTE predicts (C, cd) in the usual prisoner’s dilemma and (C, dp) in the prisoner’s dilemma
with punishment. I am unware of any other model that makes the same prediction.31
29In the random treatment, neither outcome is kind or unkind, and player 2 always plays c.
30Unfortunately, she doesn’t compare this to what player 2 would have done in a dictator game.
31I should point out that a conditional Reciprocity model can explain the drop in cooperation rates, but cannot
explain that cooperating is optimal for player 1 in the basic prisoner’s dilemma.
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For example, it is unclear how type-based models, i.e. Levine (1998) or Gul and Pesendorfer
(2016), could explain player 2’s response. Whenever it is optimal for player 1 to cooperate
in both games, player 2’s belief about 1’s type must be the same. As a result, she must also
cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma with punishment.32
I conclude this section with a game in the spirit of Andreoni et al. (2003). We will see
that in game 1.10, each reciprocity equilibrium, RTE, conRE, unRE, makes a different
equilibrium prediction.
Andreoni et al. are interested in the incentive effects of voluntary rewards and punishments,
and how this can be used to shape economic institutions. In their experiment, player 1 decides
how much of his endowment to give to player 2. The choice set of player 2 varies by treatment.
She either has no choice (dictator game), can reward, punish, or reward or punish the sender.
They find that offers are lowest in the dictator game, second lowest in treatment that only allows
for punishment, second highest in the treatment that only allows for rewards, and highest in the
treatment that allows for both rewards and punishment. In general, punishment eliminates very
selfish offers, while rewards incentivise high offers. Like all papers in this section, they observe
that the option to punish lowers the demand for rewards. This pattern remains significant even
for the most generous offers. The authors find this behavior puzzling and conjecture that an
explanation may require a definition of kindness that changes with the treatment.
From our discussion in the previous paragraphs, it should be clear by now that this is exactly
the behavior RTE predicts. When the most selfish offers are met with punishment, they become
inefficient, giving rise to an increase in the reference point. As a result, more generous offers
appear less kind and the demand for rewards is lower relative to a game in which player 2 cannot
punish.
Instead of varying the choice sets as in the previous section, I will solely use game Game
1.10, which is a simplified, nonlinear version of the continuous game in Andreoni et al. (2003), to
highlight the different predictions of RTE, conRE, and unRE. For simplicity, player 2’s choices
are very limited, favoring relevance of actions over symmetry.33
For a selfish player 1 and a reciprocal player 2, with γ2 = 1, the RTE is (K, rnp), the unRE is
32This argument takes as given that the result is not driven by very spiteful types who prefer to (D,dp) over
(C,dp).
33The equilibrium predictions remain the same in the fully symmetric game that features mediocre (r) and strong
rewards (r+) as well as punishment (p) after each action. The equilibrium prediction for a dictator treatment
would be the most selfish offer S. In the reward-only treatment both RTE and unRE predict the highest offer K
with is fully rewarded (r+). In the punish-only treatment, all reciprocity models predict that player 1 offers N to
avoid punishment after S.
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Game 1.10
(K, r+rp) and the conRE is σ1(N) = 1 and σ2(r|K) = 1/2− , σ2(n|K) = 1/2 + , σ2(n|N) = 1,
σ2(p|S) = 1, with a small, positive .
All predictions feature punishment in response to the selfish offer S. In both the conditional
Reciprocity Equilibrium and RTE player 2 responds to action N with a neutral response due
the fact that N Pareto dominates S, while unRE allows for some positive reciprocity.34 After
action K unRe predicts the largest reward. In RTE K is perceived as relatively less kind since
the efficient minimum is pi2(N,n) = 2 and not 0. As a result, player 2 rewards less. Even at the
top, punishment crowds out rewards. Player 2 is the most cynical in conRE. She rewards with
less than 1/2 probability after K, as otherwise K would be in player 1’s material interest - in
which case it wouldn’t be kind. As a result, player 1 plays N , compared to K in RTE and unRE.
My theory can also be used to explain how incentive structures affects the responder’s be-
havior. Fehr and Gächter (2001) show that sanctions set by employers undermine voluntary
cooperation in gift-exchange games. The mechanism is similar: sanctions affect the minimum
efficient wage offer as they enforce higher levels of effort, altering the reference point. This lowers
kindness perceptions and positive reciprocity.35
34At closer inspection, this example highlights one negative feature of the conRE and RTE model. Punishment
after S not only lowers K’s kindness but also makes the neutral action N unkind. The same is true, for example
in an ultimatum game, where equal splits will be perceived as unkind when low offers are punished. This feature
isn’t very appealing. More generally, punishing very unkind actions can make other unkind action even more
unkind, resulting in an increased demand for punishment. This feature can be avoided by using an efficient set
that is based on the material best-replies for unkind actions and trust-efficiency to determine how kind a seemingly
kind action really is. For all games of interest, kindness for the later notion is below that of the first. Lastly, set
kindness to 0 when trust-efficient kindness is negative, while it is positive under material-efficiency.
35Fehr and Gäechter have two treatments. In the first, they run a simple gift-exchange where firms set wages
(and suggest a desired work level) and workers respond by choosing effort levels ∈ [1, 10]. They find that effort
is increasing in the generosity of the wage. In a second treatment, they allow firms to set a costly sanction that
has to be paid when workers shirk. It is exogenously verified with probability 1/3 if the employee shirks. This
essentially allows firms to (rationally) enforce an effort level of 4, larger than the minimum effort level of 1 without
sanctions. Firms make use of such sanctions. However, it reduces voluntary cooperation - even below the rational
level. To understand how my model works in this setting, start with a second order belief that she responds with
the minimum rational effort. In this case, the minimum efficient wage offer in treatment 1 is wminT1 = 1, while
in the incentive treatment it is wminT2 = 4. For these second order beliefs, an actual offer of w = 4 is potentially
kind in treatment 1, while it is unkind in the second treatment. Since the reference point is higher in the second
treatment, wage offers are perceived as relatively less kind. This can induce the worker to actually lower his effort
below the rational effort for low enough wage offers. Quantitatively, it is unclear, however, why effort levels remain
so extremely flat for all wage offers, see Figure 3 in Fehr and Gächter (2000).
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1.7 Summary of Equilibria
After comparing the Reciprocity Equilibrium with Trust to the conditional and unconditional
Reciprocity Equilibrium, I now summarize the general equilibrium prediction across all models.
Proposition 8: If (σ∗, α∗, β∗) is a conditional and unconditional Reciprocity Equilibrium, then
it is also an RTE.
I have argued that kindness perceptions in RTE are less cynical than in conditional RE, but
lower than in unconditional RE. When the equilibrium coincides for the two extreme kindness
perceptions, it must hence also be an equilibrium in my model.
Figure 1.2 provides a graphical summary of how equilibrium predictions differ across all thee
models. Intersection 1 is the visual equivalent of proposition 8. The equilibrium can coincide for
three reasons. First, player 1’s action is unambiguously kind. His action improves 2’s payoff at his
own expense. In this case, kindness perceptions are identical for each model. Second, player 2 is
simply not motivated (enough) by concerns for reciprocity, γ2 ≈ 0, in which case different kindness
perceptions become irrelevant. The selfish SPNE is nested in each model. Third, perceptions
may differ but player 2 may simply not have relevant choices to respond differentially; her action
set could be rather limited, or positive and negative reciprocal actions could be too costly.
Equilibria in intersection 2 feature actions that are mutually beneficial, yet are perceived as
kind due to trust. RTE coincides with unconditional RE, whereas it cannot be an equilibrium for
conditional RE, area 3. A simple example of this is the trust game or the sequential prisoner’s
dilemma.
Intersection 4 captures equilibria where actions are perceived as less kind in a RTE than in
a unRE, area 5. This can be the result of either unused actions (at any history), or punishing
actions.
While it is useful to have a single model that can explain and predict strictly positive reciprocal
responses, as well as purely selfish payoff-maximizing choices (intersections 2, 4), area 6 highlights
that RTE also makes unique predictions in more complex games. Game 1.10 is an example of
this.
1.8 Discussion
The starting point behind this paper was the idea that if two reciprocal player achieve full
cooperation in the simultaneous version of social dilemma, then they should also be able to
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achieve this in the sequential version. This is consistent with experiments on the prisoner’s
dilemma, see figure 1.1. To that end, I have proposed a new way of modelling reciprocity with
intentions. By adding the idea of trust to reciprocity models, kindness perceptions become less
cynical than in Rabin (1993). This allows player 2 to fully reciprocate actions that improved both
her own and player 1’s payoff.
Netzer and Schmutzler (2014) argued, using the conditional Reciprocity Equilibrium, that
when a firm is known to be selfish, a worker does not respond to a high wage with high effort as
in this case a high wage would be in the firm’s best interest.36 When the second player knows
that player 1 is surely self-interested, it becomes easy for her to decide whether player 1 took an
action for his own benefit, or also with her in mind. To capture this, the model can be extended
in a way that trust-concerns are no longer relevant when a player is sufficiently confident that her
opponent is selfish. It would represent a similar mechanism to the one put forward by Rotemberg
(2008) for altruism. In this regard, the extension would adopt ideas from the literature of type-
based reciprocity, Levine (1998), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and Gul and Pesendorfer
(2016). While these models can often be simpler to solve, it is unclear how they could explain the
behavior in Orhun (2018). As a result, I view type-based and intention-based reciprocity models
as complements.
We have also observed that actions tend to be perceived as less kind in my model than in
36While all examples in this paper featured a ‘selfish player’ player 1, this was simply done for analytical
convenience.
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).37 Linking efficiency (more closely) to actual behavior has
the advantage that the reference point is affected less by unchosen actions. In terms of directions
for future research, it would be interesting to test games like 1.5 and 1.6 in the lab.
My model also provides new insights into the interaction of rewards and punishment, and
how the latter can crowd out the former. It helps to explain why some papers fail to find much
positive reciprocity, i.e. Offerman (2002) and Al-Ubaydli and Lee (2009), and provides a potential
solution to the positive reciprocity puzzle, Orhun (2018). Intention-based reciprocity models are
often criticised for being complex and having little predictive power due to multiple equilibria.
This may not necessarily be a drawback, however, since reciprocity is complex by nature. Rather,
its complexity makes it ideal for analyzing institutional design and incentive structures.
37Game 1.6 actually originated from my work on incomplete information. It turns out that due to the uncon-
ditional efficient set, kindness perceptions in DK04 can become independent of the prior belief over types. This
gives rise to implausible behavior. For more detail, see Chapter 2.
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1.9 Appendix A: Proofs
1.9.1 Model
Proof of proposition 1. Define the local best response correspondence ri,h : ∆H → ∆(Ai,h) by
ri,h(σ) = arg max
xi,h∈∆(Ai,h)
Ui (σi\xi,h, σj , σi|h)
and best response correspondence r(σ) : ∆H →∏(i,h)∈N×H ∆(Ai,h) by
r(σ) =
∏
(i,h)∈N×H
ri,h(σ)
As
∏
(i,h)∈N×H ∆(Ai,h) and ∆
H are topologically equivalent, we can define an equivalent function
r˜ : ∆H → ∆H and look for a fixed point. A fixed points under r˜ satisfy the RTE conditions since
player (i,h) maximizes her utility, and first and second order beliefs are correct (and are updated
along the path given h).
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem applies in this setup. To see this, notice the local choice set
∆(Ai,h) is compact, convex and non-empty. Next, ri,h is non-empty as Ui is continuous in (i, h)’s
own choice (xi,h), the set is compact and hence attains a maximum. ri,h is convex as Ui is
indeed linear in (i, h)’s own choice. Upper hemi-continuity of ri,h follows from the fact that Ui is
continuous (pii, pij , and κi are continuous).
Since these properties extend from ri,h to r˜i,h and r˜, all conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem are satisfied. It follows that an RTE exists.
1.9.2 Trust
conRE - prisoner’s dilemma.
For β2(c|C) = 0 player 2 wants to cooperate if U2(c, β2|C) = 1+γ2(2−0)·1 > 2+γ2(2−0)·(−1) =
U2(d, β2|C) - which is exactly the same inequality as in the RTE model. In contrast, she wants to
defects when β2(c|C) ≥ 1/2, U2(c, β2|C) = 1 < U2(d, β2|C) = 2. It follows that for γ2 < 1/3 the
equilibrium is identical to my model as σ2(c|C) < 1/2. Yet for a player 2 with γ2 ≥ 1/3 it must
be that she cooperates with slightly less 1/2 probability. To find the exact probability, a small
technical adjustment needs to be introduced to ensure continuity at β2(c|C) = 1/2. In particular,
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we take a very small  > 0, such the kindness of C is
κ1(C, β2) =

2− β2(c|C) if β2(c|C) ≤ 1/2− (
3
2 + 
) 1/2−β2(c|C)
 if 1/2−  < β2(c|C) < 1/2
0 if β2(c|C) ≥ 1/2
Derivation for interior part: Let f(b) at b, f(1/2) = 0. To connect the two for x ∈ [b, 1/2] take
f c(x) = f(b)− (x− b)f(b)/(1/2− b). And plug in.
The exact equilibrium probability depends on how we close the discontinuity in the kindness
function. In equilibrium
(
3
2 + 
) 1/2−β2(c|C)
 2 = 1 or β2(c|C) = 12 − 3+2 which goes to 1/2 as
→ 0.
essential lemmas and properties of PD(·)
Before proceeding to the proofs of this section, it is useful to establish some properties of the
PD(·) operator and the respective efficient sets CE1 and TE1.
Lemmas for conditional efficiency, CE1(β2).
Lemma 1: PD(β2) is transitive.
Proof of lemma 1. If a1 PD(β2) a′1 and a′1 PD(β2) a′′1 then pik(a1, β2) ≥ pik(a′1, β2) and
pik(a
′
1, β2) ≥ pik(a′′1 , β2) for all k with strict inequalities for some. Consequently pik(a1, β2) ≥
pik(a
′′
1 , β2) for all k with strict inequalities for some.
Lemma 2: The conditionally efficient action MCE1(β2)1 that minimizes 2’s payoffs,
M
CE1(β2)
1 ∈ arg mina1∈CE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2), also maximizes 1’s payoffs, MCE1(β2)1 ∈
arg maxa1∈CE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2).
Proof of lemma 2. Suppose it doesn’t, that is there is some a1 ∈ A1 that is better for player 1,
while not being worse for player 2. This would imply that a1 PD(β2) M
CE1(β2)
1 , leading to the
contradiction that MCE1(β2)1 is not conditionally efficient, M
CE1(β2)
1 /∈ CE1(β2).
Lemma 3: If a1 /∈ CE1(β2), then there ∃a′1 ∈ CE1(β2) that a′1 PD(β2) a1.
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Proof of lemma 3. By definition of being dominated, there must exist a′1 ∈ A1 that a′1 PD(β2) a1.
If a′1 itself is not efficient, a′1 /∈ CE1(β2), then there must be an action a′′1 ∈ A1 that a′′1 PD(β2) a′1.
Since PD(β2) is a transitive operator a′′1 PD(β2) a1. If a′′1 is also not efficient, repeat the
argument. As there are a finite amount of actions, and thus only a finite amount of in-efficient
actions, it must be that there exist some a′′′1 ∈ CE1(β2) that a′′′1 PD(β2) a1.
Lemmas for trust-efficiency, TE1(β2).
Lemma 4: PD(βTE2 ) is transitive.
Proof of lemma 4. Suppose a′1, a′′1 , a′′′1 ∈ A1, a′1 PD(βTE2 ) a′′1 and a′′1 PD(βTE2 ) a′′′1 . If no action
is followed by generous responses, the operator is identical to PD(β2), which is transitive. If any
of the actions is followed by generous responses, the material best response is used. Denote the
payoffs vector by pi = (pi1, pi2) and let Ia1 be the indicator function that takes value of 1 if a1 ∈ A1
is followed by a generous response. Write a′1 PD(βTE2 ) a′′1 as Ia′1pi(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 )+(1−Ia′1)pi(a′1, β2) ≥
Ia′′1 pi(a
′′
1 , σ
mBR
2 )+(1−Ia′′1 )pi(a′′1 , β2) and a′′1 PD(βTE2 ) a′′′1 as Ia′′1 pi(a′′1 , σmBR2 )+(1−Ia′′1 )pi(a′′1 , β2) ≥
Ia′′′1 pi(a
′′′
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) + (1− Ia′′′1 )pi(a′′′1 , β2) which shows that a′1 PD(βTE2 ) a′′′1 (clearly, any respective
strict inequality remains strict).
Lemma 5: If a1 /∈ TE1(β2), then there ∃a′1 ∈ TE1(β2) that a′1 PD(βTE2 ) a1.
Proof of lemma 5. Repeat proof of lemma 3 together fact that PD(βTE2 ) is transitive by lemma
4.
Proofs for trust-section
Lemma 6: Let M1 := arg mina1∈E1⊆A1 pi2(a1, β
∗
2). In any reciprocity equilibrium based on E1,
β∗2 cannot attach a positive probability to any generous action after a1 ∈ A1 if pi2(a1, β∗2) ≤
pi2(M1, β
∗
2).
The lemma applies for RTE, conRE, and DK04. In equilibrium, any action that induces a payoff
that is (weakly) lower than the lowest efficient payoff cannot be kind, and hence player 2 must
respond either by a material best-response or a punishing action.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose β∗2 attaches positive probability to the generous action a˜2 after a1,
β∗2(a˜2|a1) > 0. Since a1 yields less than the minimum efficient payoff, pi2(a1, β∗2) ≤ pi2(M1, β∗2),
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it must be that κ1(a1, β∗2) ≤ κ1(M1, β∗2) ≤ 0. As a result player 2 prefers the material best-
response over a˜2: U2(a˜2, β∗2 |h = a1) = pi2(a1, a˜2) + γ2κ1(a1, β∗2)pi1(a1, a˜2) < pi2(a1, amBR2,a1 ) +
γ2κ1(a1, β
∗
2)pi1(a1, a˜2) ≤ pi2(a1, amBR2,a1 ) + γ2κ1(a1, β∗2)pi1(a1, amBR2,a1 ) = U2(amBR2,a1 , β∗2 |h = a1).
Lemma 7: Let β2 be an RTE-belief. If a1 ∈ TE1(β2) and a1 PD(βTE2 ) a′1 with pi2(a′1, β2) ≤
minx1∈TE1(β2) pi2(x1, β2) then a1 PD(β2) a
′
1.
Proof of lemma 7. By lemma 6, 2 cannot respond with a generous action after a′1. If 2 re-
sponds to a1 either selfishly or with a punishing action, the statement is vacuously true - the
payoff for each action is the same given β2 and βTE2 . If 2 responds with a generous action,
a1 PD(β
TE
2 ) a
′
1 implies that pi1(a1, β2) > pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) ≥ pi1(a′1, β2). Combine lemma 6,
pi2(a1, β2) > minx1∈TE1(β2) pi2(x1, β2), as otherwise player 2 wouldn’t want to take a generous
action, together with the assumption minx1∈TE1(β2) pi2(x1, β2) ≥ pi2(a′1, β2) to get the result.
Corollary 8: Let β2 be an RTE belief. Then mina1∈TE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2) ≤ mina1∈CE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2).
Proof of corollary 8. By lemma 7 any action a′1 /∈ TE1(β2) that gives player 2 less than
her minimum efficient payoff mina1∈TE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2) cannot be in CE1(β2). But then
mina1∈CE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2) must be weakly larger.
Lemma 9: Let β2 be an conditional Reciprocity equilibrium belief. Then
mina1∈TE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2) ≤ mina1∈CE1(β2) pi2(a1, β2).
Proof of lemma 9. Suppose MCE1(β2)1 induces a lower payoff than M
TE1(β2)
1 . By lemma 5, there
exists an action a1 ∈ TE1(β2) that a1 PD(βTE2 ) MCE1(β2)1 . Moreover a1 must be followed by
a generous response as otherwise a1 PD(β2) M
CE1(β2)
1 , which would imply that M
CE1(β2)
1 /∈
CE1(β2) (note that lemma 6 requires that 2 cannot be generous after M
CE1(β2)
1 ). Using
both observations together, a1 must satisfy pi1(a1, β2) > pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi1(M
CE1(β2)
1 , β2) and
pi2(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) > pi2(M
CE1(β2)
1 , β2) > pi2(a1, β2). But since pi2(M
TE1(β2)
1 , β2) > pi2(M
CE1(β2)
1 , β2)
it cannot be that MTE1(β2)1 induces the minimum payoff given TE1(β2).
Proof of proposition 2. Follows directly from corollary 8 and lemma 9.
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Proof of proposition 3. Since a1 PD(β∗2) a′1 a′1 must induce the minimum payoff. By lemma 6, it
must be that player 2 (i) takes the material best-response after a′1, in which case pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) <
pi1(a
′
1, β2) = pi1(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 ), or (ii) punishes (possibly mixing over punishment and material best-
responses), which yields pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) < pi1(a′1, β2) < pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ). Lastly, by dominance of a1,
it is clearly true that there exist some payoff pi1(a1, a2) > pi1(a′1, β2).
Proof of proposition 4. Identical to the proof of |A1| = 2. By lemma 6, it must be that player
2 either (i) takes the material best-response after MTE1(β2)1 , in which case pi1(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) <
pi1(M
TE1(β2)
1 , β2) = pi1(M
TE1(β2)
1 , σ
mBR
2 ), or (ii) punishes (possibly mixing over punishment and
material best-responses), which yields pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) < pi1(M
TE1(β2)
1 , β2) < pi1(M
TE1(β2)
1 , σ
mBR
2 ).
Since it a1 Pareto dominates M
TE1(β2)
1 given β the second condition is also satisfied.
Proof of proposition 5. First, I show that MCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 .
If |A1| = 2 and thus |CE1(β∗2)| = 1, clearly MCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 as it is the only condi-
tionally efficient action, and thus, by definition, must Pareto-dominate all other actions.
If |CE1(β∗2)| ≥ 2, suppose it is not true thatMCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 . In this case there must
exist (at least) another action a1 ∈ CE1(β∗2) (lemma 3) that satisfies a1 PD(β∗2) MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 . Since
M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 induces player 2’s minimum payoff in CE1(β
∗
2), it must be that pi2(M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) <
pi2(a1, β
∗
2) as well as pi1(M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(a1, β
∗
2) (lemma 2). But since pi1(a1, β∗2) >
pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) and pi2(M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) > pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) (proposition 2), it follows that
M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 .
Finally for MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 ∈ TE1(β∗2), β∗2 must assign positive probability to a generous action
after MCE1(β
∗
2 )
1 as otherwise M
CE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
TE
2 ) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 . By lemma 6, this cannot occur in a
conditional Reciprocity Equilibrium.
1.9.3 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger ’04
Proof of proposition 6. Since unconditional efficiency doesn’t just require an action to be Pareto-
dominated for some response (β2), but for all responses, it must be that TE1(β) ⊆ UE1. Next
observe that mina1∈X pi2(a1, β2) is (weakly) lower the larger the set X.
Lemma 10: When player 1 has only 2 actions, A1 = {a1, a′1}, and assumption 1 holds, an RTE
exists.
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Proof of lemma 10. Suppose pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ). Eliminate all punishing actions from
player 2’s set of actions after a1, that is Anew2,a1 = A2,a1 \ AP2,a1 . By proposition 1, an equilibrium
still exists for this restricted set of actions. Moreover, in any RTE, player 2 cannot take a
generous action after a′1 (or be considered kind). To see this, suppose she does. Since only
one of the two actions can be kind, this would imply that player 2 takes her material best-
response action after a1 for sure. But since any generous action a2 ∈ AG2,a′1 leads to a payoff
of pi2(a′1, a2) < pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ) < pi2(a1, σmBR2 ), it must be that a′1 is perceived as unkind. As a
result, she must either punish or take her material best-response after a′1. Note further that,
in equilibrium, a1 is either kind or is at least not unkind. This equilibrium is also an RTE for
the unrestricted set of actions. Since a1 is not unkind, player 2 prefers to take a generous or
material best-response over a punishing action. The existence of punishing has no impact on the
equilibrium responses.
Proof of proposition 7. By lemma 6, player 2 cannot respond generously after a′1, hence
pik(a
′
1, β
∗
2) ≤ pik(a′1, σmBR2 ) for all k. Since a1 is the only efficient action, it must be that
pik(a1, β
∗
2) = pik(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) for all k. Case (1) thus follows immediately if player 2 doesn’t punish
after a′1, as in this case a1 PD(β∗2) a′1. If player 2 punishes after a′1 then by assumption 1 it must
be that pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ) < pi2(a1, σmBR2 ). If pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ) < pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) then we are still in case
(1); if instead pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ) > pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) we are in case (2).
1.9.4 Applications
For this section assume λ = 1/2.
Game 1.7.
RTE: If β2 = cp then 2 punishes after S if U2(c, β2 = cp|S) = 6 + γ2(5 − 14)11 ≤
5 + γ2(5 − 14)5 = U2(p, β2 = cp|S) or γ2 ≥ 1/54. It is cheap to punish and S is rather
unkind. Notice that believing that 2 punishes, makes S appear less kind, and punish-
ment easier to sustain. If we start with selfish beliefs, β2 = cc, punishment requires
U2(c, β2 = cc|S) = 6 + γ2(6 − (14 + 6)/2)11 ≤ 5 + γ2 · (−4) · 5 = U2(p, β2 = cp|S) or γ2 ≥ 1/24.
Thus for any γ2 > 1/24, punishment is the unique equilibrium belief, and there are multiple
equilibria for γ2 ∈ [1/54, 1/24]. If player 2 punishes her optimal choice after H is c.
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DK04: player 2 rewards H and punishes S, or always acts neutral.
Suppose β2 = cc, then 2 reciprocates after H in DK04 if U2(r, β2 = cc|H) =
13 + γ2(14 − (14 + 6)/2)12 ≤ 14 + γ2(4)8 = U2(c, β2 = cc|H) or γ2(4)4 ≥ 1, and punishes
after S if U2(p, β2 = cc|S) = 5 + γ2(6 − (14 + 6)/2)7 ≤ 6 + γ2(−4)11 = U2(c, β2 = cc|S)
and hence again γ2(4)4 ≥ 1. Clearly, the same holds true if β2 = rp, where
κ1(H,β2 = rp) = 13 − (13 + 5)/2 = 4 = −κ1(S, β2 = rp) = −(5 − (13 + 5)/2) = 4.
The symmetry in responses clearly only holds when λ = 1/2 - which is assumed in all papers I
am aware off.
Game 1.10.
Suppose γ2 = 1. Notice that even for the kindest beliefs (lowest max, highest min), β2 = r+rn, 2
wants to punish after S, U2(p, β2|S) = γ2(1− (2 + 1)/2) · 1 = −γ2/2 > U2(n, β2|S) = 1 + γ2(1−
(2 + 1)/2)4 = 1− 2γ2 (This true for γ > 0.4).
When 2 punishes after S, N PD(· · p) S and so conRE and RTE opt for the selfish response
after N . For unRE, 2 reciprocates after N as U2(r, r+rp|N) = 1.5 + γ2(1.5 − (2 + 0)/2)5 >
U2(n, r
+rp|N) = 2 + γ2(1.5− (2 + 0)/2)3 or γ2 ≥ 1/2.
Finally after K, 2 reciprocates strongly for unREL: U2(r+, r+rp|K) = 2+γ2(2−(2+0)/2)5 =
2+5γ2, U2(r, r+rp|K) = 2.5+4γ2, and U2(n, r+rp|K) = 3+2γ2, that is she prefers r+ for γ2 ≥ 1/2,
r for 1/2 > γ2 ≥ 1/4.
For RTE U2(r+, rnp|K) = 2 + γ2(2.5 − (2.5 + 2)/2)5 = 2 + γ25/4, U2(r, rnp|K) = 2.5 + γ2,
and U2(n, rnp|K) = 3 + γ2/2 and so she prefers r+ only for γ2 ≥ 2 (recall γ2 = 1 was assumed),
and prefers for r for 2 > γ2 ≥ 1. Note that indifference is always broken in favor of the more
extreme as any randomization increases perceived kindness of K.
The Equilibrium behavior for conRE follows the solution from the sequential prisoners’s
dilemma. The key ingredient, again, is to smooth out the discontinuity.
1.9.5 Summary of Equilibria
Proof of proposition 8. By proposition 6 we know that that mina1∈UE1 pi2(a1, β∗2) ≤
mina1∈TE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2). Moreover by lemma 9, it must also be that mina1∈TE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2) ≤
mina1∈CE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2).
If mina1∈CE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2) = mina1∈UE1 pi2(a1, β
∗
2), together with the observation that
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mina1∈TE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2) is sandwiched in between the two, the minimizing action must be iden-
tical in all three. In that case, preferences in all three models are identical, and (σ∗, α∗, β∗) is
an RTE. Note that there is no need to look at player 1. Player 2’s efficient set E2(h) at h ∈ H
represent a simple decision problems and thus all three efficiency notions coincide, leading to the
same preferences for player 1 given 2’s identical response across models.
If instead, mina1∈CE1(β∗2 ) pi2(a1, β
∗
2) < mina1∈UE1 pi2(a1, β
∗
2), yet player 2 prefers the same
actions, then she must also prefer the same action given a reference point in between. If this
isn’t immediately obvious, simply take the utility difference of any a2, a′2 ∈ A2(h), which can be
written as κ1(a1, β∗2)(pi1(a2)−pi1(a′2)) ≥ pi2(a′2)−pi2(a2). If this inequality holds for two different
kindness levels, it must also hold for some convex combination of the two.
1.10 Appendix B: Further Detail
1.10.1 RTE is an Equilibrium Concept
Game 1.11 highlights why imposing equilibrium is often necessary for models with second order
beliefs. If player 2 is sufficiently reciprocal, she wants to play c if β2 = d. In contrast, when
β2 = c, then she clearly wants to play d. But this indicates that both combinations of action and
belief are rationalizable. Player 1 can think she plays c for sure since he thinks she thinks β2 = d,
and vice versa. Most importantly, this example shows that player 1 can hold a belief that player
2 reciprocates, minimizing her payoff in the process.
Clearly, this can never be an equilibrium belief and isn’t very sensible. But without imposing
a more restrictive utility function, such beliefs are indeed rationalizable. This suggests that
imposing equilibrium is often needed - which I have done throughout the paper. It should be
clear that when there are more than two choices, even more behavior can be rationalizable.
1
2
(2, 0)
c
(0, 2)
d
C
(1, 1)
D
Game 1.11
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1.10.2 Relationship Between Efficient Sets
Game 1.12 highlights that it does not need to be true that CE1(β2) ⊆ TE1(β2), even if β2 is a
RTE-belief. Clearly β2 = lm is an equilibrium (M is always efficient, the minimum payoff −10).
CE1(lm) = {J,K,M}. However, given the selfish responses, βTE2 = rn, J PD(rn) K, so that
TE1(lm) = {J,M}.
1
2
(2, 1/2)
l
(1, 1)
r
J
2
(3, 0)
m
(1/2, 1/2)
n
K
(10,−10)
M
Game 1.12
1.10.3 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger ’04, |A1| ≥ 2
If player 1’s action set is finite, |A1| ≥ 2, it is helpful to split up the proposition into two ideas.
Proposition 9: Let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE. If MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 6= MUE11 then
M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
UE1
1 .
This result highlights that whenever the reference point in DK04 differs from my model, the
action that induces the minimum payoff under trust-efficiency Pareto-dominates the respective
action that induces the minimum payoff in theirs.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows: MTE11 can be part of the reference point for
two reason: (1) It minimizes 2’s payoff while maximizing 1’s payoff. When MUE11 leads to even
lower payoffs for 2, the only way to not be dominated is by being even better for player 1 than
MTE11 . (2) If M
TE1
1 doesn’t maximize 1’s payoff, it is actually dominated by some other action,
but remains efficient due to trust. As MUE11 leads to lower payoffs for player 2, it would also be
efficient due to trust if it were to make player 1 better off than MTE11 . But since none of the two
cases are true, it must be Pareto-dominated by MTE11 .
Proof of proposition 9. When the efficient set is a singleton, that is TE1(β∗2) = {MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 },
player 2 must respond with her material-best response to MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , that is pik(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) =
pik(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) for all k, and cannot act generously to any other action (lemma 6). In
this case, conditional-efficiency and trust-efficiency coincide. By lemma 3, it follows that any
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non-conditionally efficient action must be Pareto-dominated by MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 given β
∗
2 .
If |TE1(β∗2)| ≥ 2 then MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 is either conditionally efficient (β
∗
2) or trust-efficient
(βTE2 ).
In the first case, MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 ∈ CE1(β∗2), by lemma 2, MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 must be the action that yields
player 1 his highest payoffs. Given that MUE11 induces an even lower payoffs for player 2, the
only way for MUE11 to not be Pareto-dominated is when pi1(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2), in
which case MUE11 ∈ CE1(β∗2), a violation.
In the second case, let a1 be the action that a1 PD(β∗2) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 (but not using β
TE
2 ). a1
has the property that
pi1(a1, β
∗
2) > pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(a1, σ
mBR
2 ) and pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) > pi2(a1, β∗2) >
pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2). Hence if M
UE1
1 isn’t Pareto-dominated by M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 given β
∗
2 then it is not
βTE2 -dominated by a1 either as pi1(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2).
Moreover, there does not exists another action a′1 that a′1 PD(βTE2 ) M
UE1
1 . Suppose there is,
then by lemma 5, a′1 ∈ TE1(β∗2).
Suppose first that a′1 is not followed by any generous action, so that the beliefs for 2’s action
after a′1, βTE2 (·|a′1) and β2(·|a′1) coincide. Moreover, since MUE11 induces a lower payoff for player
2 than MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 and M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 represents player 2’s minimum efficient payoff, β
TE
2 changes
nothing (relative to β∗2) after these actions either. a′1 then satisfies pik(a′1, β∗2) > pik(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2)
for all k and therefore
pi1(a
′
1, β
∗
2) > pi1(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2). If pi2(a′1, β∗2) > pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) then
a′1 PD(β
TE
2 ) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 . If instead pi2(a
′
1, β
∗
2) < pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) then M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 doesn’t in-
duce the minimum efficient payoff. Both are contradictions.
Next, suppose a′1 is followed by a generous action. a′1 now satisfies pik(a′1, σmBR2 ) >
pik(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) for all k and thus pi1(a′1, β∗2) > pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ) > pi1(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) > pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2).
If pi2(a′1, β∗2) > pi2(a′1,M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 ) then a
′
1 PD(β
TE
2 ) M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 as pi2(a
′
1, σ
mBR
2 ) > pi2(a
′
1, β
∗
2).
If instead pi2(a′1, β∗2) < pi2(a′1,M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 ) then M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 doesn’t induce the minimum pay-
off. It follows that a′1 cannot exist, but then M
UE1
1 ∈ TE1(β∗2), a violation. It follows that
M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 PD(β
∗
2) M
UE1
1 .
As in the |A1| = 2 case, I need to make some assumptions with regards to punishment. When
there are more than 2 actions, the multiple equilibrium problem becomes even more involved:
Player 2 may react very differently to different unkind actions depending on whether she thinks
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he thinks she punishes.
Assumption 2: Take any a1, a′1 ∈ A1. If player 2 has a punishing action p ∈ A2,a1 after a1 then
she also has the same punishing action available to her after a′1. That is there exists a p′ ∈ A2,a′1
with pi1(a′1, p′) − pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ) = pi1(a1, p) − pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) < 0 and pi2(a1, p) − pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) =
pi2(a
′
1, p
′)− pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ) < 0.
This first assumption simply ensures that player 2 always has the same punishment actions
available to her.38
Assumption 3: Suppose assumption 2 holds. If pi2(a1, σmBR2 ) ≥ pi2(a′1, σmBR2 ) for any a1, a′1 ∈
A1 then player 2 punishes player 1 less after a1 than a′1; That is if she takes p′ ∈ A2,a′1 after a′1
then she doesn’t take an action p ∈ A2,a1 that pi1(a1, p)−pi1(a1, σmBR2 ) < pi1(a′1, p′)−pi1(a′1, σmBR2 ).
While this assumption is written in terms of what player 2 does, it could equivalently be written
in terms of what player 1, and thus what player 2 believes she does. The respective assumed
behavior would follow.
Proposition 10: Let (σ∗, α∗, β∗) be an RTE. If MTE1(β
∗
2 )
2 6= MUE12 then
M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
2 PD(β
∗
2) M
UE1
2 . Moreover if assumption 2 and 3 holds, then one of the follow-
ing holds:
1. pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) > pi1(M
UE1
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) and pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) > pi2(M
UE1
1 , σ
mBR
2 ),
or
2. pi1(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) < pi1(M
UE1
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) and pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) > pi2(M
UE1
1 , σ
mBR
2 ).
The proposition mirrors the binary case. The key difference between the two settings is that after
M
TE1(β
∗)
2 , player 2 may actually punish now. This is the reason why we need a more complete
assumptions on punishment choices and behavior than in the simple binary-case - where player
2 doesn’t punish after the only efficient choice.
Proof of proposition 10. When the efficient set is a singleton, that is TE1(β∗2) = {MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 }, the
proof is identical to the binary case, |A1| = 2, except with references to assumptions 2 and 3.
If |TE1(β∗2)| ≥ 2, then player 2 may punish after MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 . If she doesn’t, repeat the argu-
ment of the binary case, |A1| = 2. If she does then pik(MTE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) > pik(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , β
∗
2) >
pik(M
UE1
1 , β
∗
2) for all k.As player 2 doesn’t punish more when her selfish payoff is larger,
assumption 3, together with the availability of punishment choices assumed in 2, leads to
38Clearly, this is the strongest possible assumption and could be relaxed.
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pi2(M
TE1(β
∗
2 )
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) > pi2(M
UE1
1 , σ
mBR
2 ) - otherwise she would have needed to punish M
UE1
1
more at a larger cost to herself as she would never use ‘inefficient’ punishment. As before, the
level of player 1’s payoffs determines the case.
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Chapter 2
A Theory of Reciprocity with Trust,
Incomplete Information
2.1 Introduction
In many social interactions, people do not have full information about other people’s social
motivations or their material payoffs. A person, who is motivated by reciprocity, may worry that
his counterpart is not reciprocal or altruistic, but instead selfish or potentially spiteful. Upon
observing company-wide wage cuts during a recession, workers don’t necessarily know whether
their company is taking advantage of its bargaining position, or whether such cuts are necessary
for the company’s survival. In case of the former, a reciprocal worker would feel obliged to punish
the firm, whereas in the latter, he may keep on working normally. To incorporate such concerns,
this chapter extends the theory of reciprocity with trust, which was developed in chapter 1, to
incomplete information.
While intention-based reciprocity is frequently used to analyze games of complete information,
it is rarely applied to incomplete information environments. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) intro-
duce intention-based reciprocity to mechanism design by adapting Rabin (1993) to normal form
games with incomplete information. Related work focuses on ex-post implementation (Netzer
and Volk (2014)) and mechanisms that are robust to social-preferences (Bierbrauer et al. (2017),
Bartling and Netzer (2016)). Von Siemens (2013) analyzes a simple two-stage game where a
principal chooses how much to control a worker and introduces incomplete information about the
worker’s type. Le Quement and Patel (2017) examine how reciprocity can improve information
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transmission in cheap talk.
In contrast to type-based models, intention-based reciprocity such as Rabin (1993) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) requires more care when moving from complete to incomplete
information. Type-based models assume heterogeneity in people’s level of altruism and model
reciprocity by assuming that people care more about those who are more altruistic (Levine (1998),
Gul and Pesendorfer (2016)).1 In this type of models, generous actions are rewarded because they
signal a high level of altruism. Adding private information about material payoffs simply adds
another dimension to such signalling games.2 Intention-based models, instead, rely on an en-
dogenous reference point to model kindness. The key challenge when moving from complete to
incomplete information is defining an appropriate reference point for this new environment.
In this chapter, I adopt the perspective that players with different information are different
individuals. Consequently, I define the reference point for each type of player separately, incorpo-
rating the idea of trust that was developed in Chapter 1. This paper contributes to the literature
by providing the first general model of intention-based reciprocity for sequential games with in-
complete information. After defining the model, I apply it to a pricing game with incomplete
information about the buyer’s valuation. When the buyer is sufficiently reciprocal, the seller,
who makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, suggests a price below the price ps that would be profit
maximizing if the buyer acted selfishly. High-valuation buyers reciprocate by voluntarily paying
more than the suggested price, although less than ps. By suggesting a low price, the seller can
sell to more low-valuation customers, without suffering the full revenue loss from high-valuation
customers. This application highlights how reciprocity can give rise to pay-what-you-want pricing
schemes, where the seller allows the buyer to choose the price she wants to pay (Kim et al. (2009),
Gneezy et al. (2012)).
For the next application, I revisit the classic bilateral trade problem. With discrete types, I
show how simple sequential interactions can achieve full efficiency in cases where normal form
mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance, can-
not. The sequential interaction takes the following simple form: the (selfish) seller informs the
(reciprocal) buyer about his cost and the buyer responds by deciding whether to trade or not,
and if she does, at what cost. In this setting, reciprocity creates incentives for information shar-
ing. When the seller reveals that he has low costs, high-valuation buyers reward his kindness by
1Alternatively, people may simply care how they are perceived (as in self- or social image concerns, Bénabou
and Tirole (2006)) or how they are perceived by people they care for (Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)).
2See, for example, Bassi et al. (2014), who examine a work-place screening problem. Sally (2002) revisits
Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem in his framework of sympathy.
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sharing the surplus. The resulting free-flow of information improves efficiency by also enabling
low-valuation buyers, who would not trade if everyone were to use their selfish strategies, to
trade. More generally, this type of reciprocal information sharing can explain how cheap talk
improves efficiency in bargaining (Valley et al. (2002)) without having to rely on honest types
(Saran (2011), Saran (2012)) or lying aversion (Abeler et al. (2016)). Le Quement and Patel
(2017) make a similar observation in the one-sided incomplete information environment of cheap
talk (Crawford and Sobel (1982), Cai and Wang (2006)).
In the final section, I discuss how my model relates to alternative models of intention-based
reciprocity in general and comment on different approaches to modelling kindness from an interim
perspective.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 begins by introducing two simple
decision problems highlighting what additional aspects a theory of reciprocity needs to address in
incomplete information environments. The model is formally developed in section 2.2.2. Section
2.3 features the applications on pricing with incomplete information about the buyer’s valuation
(2.3.1) and bilateral trade (2.3.2). Differences to the literature are discussed in section 2.4. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Kindness and Incomplete Information
I begin this section by introducing two examples to outline the new features that incomplete in-
formation adds to kindness considerations. The examples come in the form of a decision problem,
in which an uninformed player 1 chooses between two actions.3 The payoffs for player 1 and for
a passive player 2 depend on the state of nature. In contrast to player 1, player 2 is aware of
nature’s state. In view of reciprocity models for complete information, I will suggest how player
2 may perceive player 1 and will discuss several modelling approaches.
Game 2.1 can be interpreted as the reduced-form game, in which player 1 makes player 2 a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. Player 2’s valuation for the good is either high (θ¯) or low (
¯
θ) and she
buys whenever her valuation is equal to or greater than the price.
3If player 1 also had private information, his kindness towards player 2 is conditional on his information, i.e. I
adopt an interim perspective to kindness.
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Game 2.2
When players have private information, I adopt the perspective that players with different
information are different individuals.4 A high-valuation player 2 may thus perceive player 1 as
kind (towards her type) when he selects the low price L. This is subject to one caveat, however:
in simple choice problems with complete information, all intention-based reciprocity models posit
that a person who chooses an allocation that maximizes the other person’s payoffs isn’t kind when
it also maximizes his own payoffs, i.e. he chooses (pi1, pi2) = (1, 1) over the only other alternative
(0, 0). Translating the same idea to incomplete information means that if action L maximizes
player 1’s expected payoff, it cannot be kind. That is, for Pr(θ2 = θ¯) ≤ 1/2, the high-valuation
player 2 doesn’t consider player 1 kind. A low-valuation player 2 considers player 1 neither kind
nor unkind as her payoffs are independent of his actions.
While kindness towards each type is computed separately, any particular player 2 may ap-
preciate the fact that player 1’s behavior could also have benefited a different type of player 2
(either as a hypothetical case or due to player 1 repeatedly matching with short-lived player 2s).
For example, suppose that player 1 had a third choice, vL, which lowered prices even further. In
this case, not only would the high-valuation type θ¯ be even better off, she would also understand
that player 1 is kind towards
¯
θ. Although I won’t model this type of overall kindness in the main
section, I will comment on it when discussing the applications (section 2.3). For now, the focus
is on the kindness towards each type.
Game 2.1 has the feature that player 1’s action affects player 2’s payoff in similar ways: If an
action a1 improves θ2’s payoff relative to a′1, it also (weakly) improves a player 2’s payoff whose
4While the literature on social preferences has investigated settings of more than 2 players (Güth and van
Damme (1998), Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Bolton and
Ockenfels (2006), among others) there is very general data with regards to what people perceive as kind or unkind
in these settings, apart from a few specific settings. Charness and Rabin (2002) feature two 3-player games where
a third player strongly punishes the greed of the first player. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) show the predominance
of third-party punishment both in the dictator game and the prisoner’s dilemma. Engel and Zhurakhovska (2014)
show that when cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma inflicts harm on a passive outsider, people cooperate less.
Although experimental subjects cooperate more when they expect others to cooperate more, they find that the
greater the cost to outsider, the weaker this effect becomes. In Malmendier and Schmidt (2017), gifts induce
reciprocity at the detriment to a third party.
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type is θ′2 6= θ2. Clearly, this does not need to be true in general. In game 2.2, for instance, action
L improves
¯
θ’s payoff relatively to R, and vice versa for θ¯. Player 1’s payoffs are independent of
θ. Notice how this example nests two very different decision problems of complete information,
Pr(θ2 = θ¯) ∈ {0, 1}. When Pr(θ2 = θ¯) = 0, R is unkind and L is neither kind nor unkind. In
contrast, when Pr(θ2 = θ¯) = 1, R is kind and L is unkind.5
There are three possibilities to define the ‘efficient set’ in this context: defining the efficient
set (1) based on player 1’s and player 2’s expected material payoffs, (2) jointly for all types of
player 2 that have a non-zero probability, and (3) separately for each type of player 2.
The first approach is employed in Netzer and Volk’s (2014) (and the online appendix of
Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016)) interim kindness definition. It can be useful when player 2 cares
about player 1’s kindness towards all types of player 2. As this paper aims to describe kindness
towards each type first (and only then potentially averages across types), it appears natural to
also build the reference point at the type level.6 In section 2.4.2, I will revisit the differences
between theirs and my approach.
Approach (2) closely resembles the idea of Pareto-efficiency. An action is part of E1 as long
as it is not dominated by another action, for at least one type. This would imply that for all
Pr(θ2 = θ¯) ∈ (0, 1), a type
¯
θ would perceive L as kind - even as the likelihood of θ¯ becomes
vanishingly small. Not only is the discontinuity at 0 not a great technical feature, it also doesn’t
appear very plausible.7
The third approach adopts the viewpoint that when determining the immediate kindness of
player 1 towards a θ2-type player, only such type’s payoffs are relevant, and not the payoffs of
other types. This means that the presence of θ¯ does not affect the kindness perceptions of a
¯
θ-type.
It also avoids extreme discontinuities around zero-probability beliefs.8 A possible disadvantage of
this approach is that R is judged more harshly by a
¯
θ type as the reference point is only based on
the efficient action L, even when action R appears to be a sensible strategy, i.e. especially when
θ¯ is rather likely. As mentioned previously, it should be highlighted in this regard that player
5Specifically, the efficient set in the former is E1 = {L} since L Pareto dominates R, and E1 = {L,R} in the
latter case since both actions are Pareto-efficient.
6Using both approaches at the same time appears less sensible. For instance, in game 2.2 only L is efficient in
approach (1) when Pr(θ2 = θ¯) < 1/2. In this case, the inefficient action R is perceived as unkind by type
¯
θ (0 <
1) but kind by type θ¯ (1 > 0).
7This version is closely related to DK04’s efficient set definition for more than 2 players. It would be interesting
to empirically explore kindness in three player games further. For example, what happens to the classic 2 player
example, where a action a1, that induces payoffs of (pi1, pi2) = (1, 1), isn’t seen as kind if the only alternative
action a′1 induces (0, 0), when a third player is introduced. It would appear that if a1 induces payoffs of (1, 1, 0)
vs. (0, 0, 1/2) (for a′1), player 2 would still not perceive player 1 as kind when he chooses a1.
8Such discontinuities could also be used to blow up kindness perceptions, i.e. by introducing actions that are
dominated for player 1 and almost all types of player 2, with arbitrarily low payoffs for most types. This is
reminiscent of the original argument for restricting the set of payoffs in complete information settings, in order to
avoid the influence of irrelevant, Pareto-dominated actions.
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1’s kindness towards other types can still be incorporated by averaging his kindness towards all
player 2 types. In this paper, I will pursue this approach when modelling kindness.9
2.2.2 The Formal Model
Game. Let the game be a 2-player, finite, multi-stage game, with perfect but incomplete
information and finite actions.
Players, information sets, and strategies. Let N = {1, 2} be the set of players.
Each player has a realized type θi ∈ Θi which captures their private knowledge about payoff
relevant aspects of the game. It may include information about player i’s ‘selfish’ utility
over an outcome or about her (own) concern for reciprocity.10 Let Θi be a finite set and let
θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 be distributed according to F (·). For simplicity, I assume that
players do not get further information about the state of nature θ.
Denote player i’s information sets by Hi, with a typical information set being called h ∈
Hi. The set of decision nodes are X and the set of terminal nodes are Z. Ai,h describes the
(possibly empty) set of actions for player i ∈ N at h ∈ Hi. A history of length l is a sequence
h = (a1, a2, . . . , al), where at = (at1, at2) is a profile of actions chosen at time t (1 ≤ t ≤ l). At
times, it is useful to explicitly refer to the information set h ∈ Hi by using both history and type,
(θi, h) = h ∈ Hi.
A system of beliefs µ specifies the beliefs (about decision nodes) at each information set h.11
Instead of writing beliefs in terms of abstract decision nodes, it is more useful to express them as
conditional probabilities about the other person’s type. That is, let µi(θj |h) describe player i’s
belief that j has type θj at information set h instead of µ(x) when x = ((θi, θj), h) ∈ h. Let the
set of all possible belief systems be M.
Player i’s behavior strategy is denoted by σi ∈ ×h∈Hi∆ (Ai,h) =: ∆Hi . It assigns each in-
formation set h ∈ Hi a probability distribution σi(·|h) over the set of pure actions. Define
∆H :=
∏
i∈N ∆
H
i 3 σ. Given σ let Pσ(x), Pσ(z), and Pσ(h) denote the respective probabil-
ities that node x, z, and information set h is reached.12 Define the conditional probabilities
9Fehr and Schmidt (2006) aptly point out that for n-player games (n>2) it is often not immediately clear what
the correct reference group is, highlighting a lack of theoretical and empirical work with regards to this issue.
Recently, Mcdonald et al. (2012) suggest that the reference group may vary, resulting in non-monotonic behavior
in ultimatum games when a third party with fixed endowment is present. Clearly, more empirical research is
needed with regards to this fundamental question.
10It may also describe concerns for alternative other-regarding preferences such as altruism, spitefulness, etc.
11Formally, µ : X → [0, 1] and satisfies ∑x∈h µ(x) = 1 for each h ∈ H.
12As usual, I omit the prior belief for these terms.
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Pσ(x|h′, µ), Pσ(z|h′, µ), and Pσ(h|h′, µ) in the same fashion.
Player i’s material payoff is defined as pii : Z → R. It represents the ‘selfish’ payoff, which is
independent of any feelings of reciprocity, obligation, or behavioral concerns. Finally, define the
expected utilities as usual: pii(σ|µi,h) refers to player i’s expected utility at information set h
given belief µi, while pii(σ|µi, θi) refers to i’s initial expected utility knowing θi.13
In this paper, I employ the notational convention that i and j always refer to different people.
In all examples, player 1 is male and player 2 is female.
Beliefs and updating. In addition to the player’s beliefs about her opponent’s type,
she also forms a belief about her opponent’s strategy (first order belief) and what she thinks her
opponent thinks of her strategy (second order belief). Denote player i’s first order belief about
j’s behavior strategy σj by αj ∈ ∆Hj , and her second order belief by βi ∈ ∆Hi . Player i also
forms beliefs about her opponent’s system of belief µj ∈Mj , which is called µ˜ij ∈Mj .14
As in the complete information setting, the updating of beliefs about strategies is required.
Beliefs are updated to match the observed actions for all types that a player considers likely. A
history h = (a1, . . . , al) is said to be an immediate predecessor to h′, h 1 h′, if and only if
h′ = (a1, . . . , al, al+1).15
Definition 1: For any αj ∈ ∆Hj and h = (θi, h) ∈ Hi, let αj |h ∈ ∆Hj be the updated first-order
belief about strategies. It updates αj as follows: First, take history h and its immediate predecessor
h′, h′ 1 h = (a1, . . . , al), and set αj(alj | (θj , h′)) = 1 (and respectively to 0 for all other actions)
for any θj with µi(θj |(θi, h)) > 0. Do the same for h′ and its immediate predecessor h′′, etc. βi
is updated in the same fashion, using the respective belief system µ˜ij.
Just like in the complete information setting, a player adjusts her beliefs about the other person’s
strategy to match realized play. The only addition is that they only do so for types they consider
likely.
To illustrate this idea, suppose that in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, player 1 is either
altruistic (θ1 = a) or spiteful (θ1 = s) and that player 2 initially believes that both types
cooperate, α1(C|θ1) = 1 for all θ1 ∈ {a, s}. Upon observing defection, if she believes that he is
13pii(σ|µi,h) =
∑
z∈Z P
σ(z|µi,h)pii(z).
14As in the complete information setting, I opt not to use belief hierarchies as seen in Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009). One reason for this is to keep models consistent across chapters. A much more relevant reason is that both
my theory of reciprocity with trust for complete information and this extension to incomplete information are
equilibrium models. As a result, epistemological questions that require belief hierarchies are simply not a concern.
Overall, the benefits of a more complicated, cumbersome model along the line of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
appear to outweigh the cost.
15Alternatively, define it via the predecessor relationship of nodes. For x = (θ, h), x′ = (θ, h′) ∈ X, h 1 h′ if
x 1 x′.
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the spiteful type, µ2(θ1 = s|D) = 1, she updates her belief about his actions, leaving her beliefs
about the altruist’s action unchanged.
This type of updating, once again, implies that players must give up on probabilistic beliefs.
If player 2, for instance, were to think that both types randomize and therefore considers each
type possible after a1, µ2(θ1|a1) > 0 for all θ1 ∈ {a, s}, she will update her beliefs about strategies
for each to match observed play.
Whenever a term features multiple updated beliefs, or also conditions on h, I simply condition
once at the very end i.e. pii(βi, αj |µi,h) :=pii(βi|h, αj |h | µi,h).16
Perceived Kindness. As in the complete information setting, player i forms beliefs
about j’s kindness by comparing the payoff she thinks she will obtain against a reference
point. The reference point is a convex combination of her minimal and maximal payoff in the
trust-efficient set. Since this model computes kindness at the type level, that is between a type
θj towards a type θi, each of the following terms will be defined for such a pair of types.
The trust-efficient set relies on the classification of actions into material best-responses, gen-
erous actions, and punishing actions. Define player i’s material best-response as the behavior
strategy that maximizes her payoff at every information set, that is
σmBRi (αj , µi) ∈ arg max
σi∈∆Hi
pii(σi, αj |µi,h) ∀ h ∈ Hi.
In case σmBRi (αj , µi) is not unique, abusing notation, let it refer to a pure strategy that also
maximizes j’s payoff at every h ∈ Hi (among σmBRi (αj , µi)). To simplify notation, I will omit µi
from this term whenever it is sensible. Denote the optimal choice at each h that makes up this
pure strategy by amBRi,h (αj , µi), that is σ
mBR
i (a
mBR
i,h (αj , µi)|h) = 1. Finally let σi\xh refer to the
behavior strategy that replaces the local choice at h in σi by xh ∈ ∆(Ai,h).17
Deviations from the material best response are defined next. An action is called generous
(punishing) towards j with type θj if it gives such type more (less) than what he would get as a
result of the material best-response.
Definition 2: Player i’s action ai ∈ Ai,h at h ∈ Hi is generous towards θj if
pij(σ
mBR
i (αj , µi)\ai, αj |θj ,h) > pij(σmBRi (αj , µi), αj |θj ,h).
Action ai ∈ Ai,h is punishing towards θj if pij(σmBRi (αj , µi)\ai, αj |θj ,h) <
16Whenever h is not at the very end, i.e. if h(βi|h, σj), it solely refers to the updating of the respective term.
17When xh ∈ Ai,h represents a pure action, it is implicitly understood that it refers to σi(xh|h) = 1 and
σi(ah|h) = 0 for all other actions.
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pij(σ
mBR
i (αj , µi), αj |θj ,h). Denote player i’s set of generous actions towards θj at h by
A
G,θj
i,h (αj , µi) and the respective set of punishing actions by A
P,θj
i,h (αj , µi).
Consequently, define the trust-adjusted second order belief towards θj as follows:
βi(ai|h)TE(θj) :=

0 if ai ∈ AG,θji,h (αj , µi)∑
x∈AG,θji,h (αj ,µi) ∪ amBRi,h (αj ,µi)
βi(x|h) if ai = amBRi,h (αj , µi)
βi(ai|h) if ai ∈ AP,θji,h (αj , µi)
for all h ∈ Hi, ai ∈ Ai,h.
β
TE(θj)
i adjusts i’s second order belief to the hypothetical belief that i takes her material
best-response instead of a generous action.18 While an action is usually (weakly) generous
towards all types, this does not need to be true in general. Defining the idea of trust towards
θj thus captures the most extreme case where i never takes the action that is generous towards
θj .19 Player j’s trust-efficient strategies for the pair (θi, θj) are his Pareto-efficient strategies
given βTE(θj)i .
Definition 3 (Trust Efficiency): A behavior strategy σj ∈ ∆Hj is trust-efficient towards θi for θj
if there doesn’t exist a σ′j ∈ ∆Hj that
pij(σ
′
j , β
TE(θj)
i |µ˜ij , θj) ≥ pij(σj , βTE(θj)i |µ˜ij , θj) and pii(σ′j , βTE(θj)i |θi, θj) ≥ pii(σj , βTE(θj)i |θi, θj)
with a strict inequality for at least one player. The set of trust-efficient strategies for the pair
θ = (θi, θj) is denoted by TEθj (βi, αj , µi, µ˜ij).
Notice that in definition 3, player j’s payoffs are expected payoffs, evaluated by i via µ˜ij , while
i’s payoffs are conditional on the pair of types. It implies that any action that is dominated in
expectation for player j, which is also worse for θi, is not efficient. For example, in game 2.1, this
means that L is the only efficient action if Pr(θ2 = θ¯) ≤ 1/2, in which case L cannot be kind. By
conditioning i’s payoff on (θi, θj), R is never efficient for θ2 =
¯
θ in game 2.2, while for θ2 = θ¯,
both actions are efficient.
18I opt for the simpler specification that relies on µi, interpreting βTEi as simply reflecting i’s thought process
of ‘what would happen if she took her material best response’. One could also define it using the more involved
second order belief about types, i.e. i’s belief about µ˜ji, µ˜iji, instead of µi.
19In general, generosity depends on the other person’s response. In the ultimatum game, for instance, an offer
of 30% is generous to someone who accepts all offers but punishing to another person who is known to only accept
offers of at least 50%.
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The reference point is a simple convex combination of the highest and lowest material payoff,
with payoffs based only on the trust-efficient actions.
Definition 4: Let player i’s reference point for a given pair θ = (θi, θj) at h = (θi, h) ∈ Hi be
piri (βi|h, αj , µi, µ˜ij , θ) := λ · max
σj∈TEθj (βi|h,αj ,µi,µ˜ij)
pii(βi|h, σj |θ) + (1 – λ) · min
σj∈TEθj (βi|h,αj ,µi,µ˜ij)
pii(βi|h, σj |θ)
for some λ ∈ [0, 1].
As a punishing action of player i can make a strategy of player j inefficient, the reference point
may be discontinuous in βi. If this is the case, let piri refer to the smoothed out, continuous version
of the reference point in all subsequent expressions.20 Combining all terms yields i’s perception
of j’s kindness:
Definition 5: Player i with θi perceives the kindness of a θj-player from strategy σj at history
h = (θi, h) ∈ Hi, with θ = (θi, θj), according to
κj(αj , βi, µi, µ˜ij | θ,h) := k (pii(αj , βi|θ,h), piri (βi|h, αj , µi, µ˜ij , θ))
with ∂k(·)∂pii ≥ 0,
∂k(·)
∂piri
≤ 0, k(pii = piri , ·) = 0, and a continuous k(·).
Example: If k(·) is linear, j’s kindness perceptions reduces to the usual κj(·| θ,h) = pij(·)−pirj (·)
for the pair θ. This function will be used in all examples.
Definition 6: The utility of player i at h = (θi, h) is
Ui (σi, αj , βi, µ˜ij | µi,h) = pii(σi, αj |µi,h)
+ γi
∑
θj∈Θj
µi(θj |h) · κj(αj , βi, µi, µ˜ij |(θi, θj),h) · pij(σi, αj |θj ,h)
where γi is a non-negative parameter capturing i’s concern for reciprocity.
Player i’s expected utility combines her usual expected material payoff with her expected utility
from reciprocity. A type θj ’s payoff is weighted by how kind i perceives him to be. The total
expected utility from reciprocity averages across all possible θj types. This averaging treats types
20In contrast to generous actions, I am unaware of a game that actually requires mixed strategies in punishing
actions. In general, when a player prefers to take a punishing action ai and holds beliefs that βi(ai|h) ∈ [0, 1)
then she will also want to punish for βi(ai|h) = 1; the simple, non-continuous reference point is usually enough.
For details on how to smooth out the reference point, see Appendix A in Rabin (1993).
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as separate players and ensures that i wants to be kind to the ‘right’ person, namely the type
that is kind towards her.21
Equilibrium. The equilibrium uses the familiar concept of sequential equilibrium and further
requires the following to be correct: first and second order beliefs about strategies, beliefs about
types, and beliefs about the other person’s beliefs about types.
Definition 7: An assessment (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ, ) is sequentially rational if for all i ∈ N , for each
h ∈ Hi, and for any ai ∈ Ai,h it holds that
if σi(ai|h) > 0 then ai ∈ arg max
a′i∈Ai,h
Ui (σi\a′i, αj , βi, µ˜ij |µi,h) .
Let ∆H,0 denote the set of all completely mixed behavioral profiles. If σ ∈ ∆H,0, then any decision
node x ∈ X is reached with strictly positive probability, so that beliefs over x ∈ h can be defined
in the usual way: µi(x) = Prσ(x)/Prσ(h).
Definition 8: An assessment (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ, ) is consistent if µ = limn→∞ µn = Prσ
n
(x)/Prσ
n
(h),
σ = limn→∞ σn for σn ∈ ∆H,0, and σi = αi = βi, µi = µ˜ji for all i ∈ N .
Definition 9: An assessment (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ, ) is a sequential Reciprocity with Trust Equilibrium
(sRTE) if it is sequentially rational and consistent.
Sequential rationality requires that at each information set h ∈ Hi player i maximizes her utility,
taking her future behavior as given. Consistency ensures that she holds correct beliefs.
Proposition 1: An equilibrium exists if κi(·) is continuous for all i ∈ N .
The proof proceeds according to the usual logic: First it is shown that a perfect equilibrium with
reciprocity preferences exists (Selten (1975)). This in turn implies the existence of a sequential
Reciprocity with Trust Equilibrium.
21If player i, instead, forms expectation about j’s kindness and expectations about j’s payoffs, and then mul-
tiplicatively connects both, it can lead to questionable interactions across types of players. To see this, suppose
that j is either selfish or reciprocal, and that player i moves first in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Given that
the selfish-type’s payoff is large when i cooperates, even a relatively small average kindness due to the reciprocal-
player may induce player i to cooperate. After all, the overall utility from reciprocity is relatively large. This
goes against the idea that people want to be kind to those who are kind to them, and possibly punish those they
consider unkind.
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2.3 Applications
2.3.1 Pricing and Incomplete Information
For the first application, I analyze a simple pricing game with incomplete information about the
buyer’s valuation. In addition to accepting or rejecting the seller’s offer, the buyer can reward
the seller with a tip. We will see that if the buyer is sufficiently reciprocal, the seller effectively
allows the buyer to set her own price.
Let there be a selfish seller and a reciprocal buyer, whose reference point is her minimum
efficient payoff, i.e. λ = 0. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for a single, indivisible good
at a price p ≥ 0. His cost of producing the unit is c = 0. The buyer has private information
about how much she values the object. Her valuation is either high or low, v ∈ {vl, vh}, with
Pr(v = vh) = q and vh > vl. In addition to rejecting or accepting the offer (a ∈ {0, 1}), she can
also tip the seller, t ∈ [0, t¯] with t¯ > vh. Her material payoff is piB(a, t, p|v) = a · (v − p)− t.
If both buyer and seller were purely motivated by material payoffs, then the buyer will never
tip and will accept the offer if and only if p ≤ v. The seller sets the price at the high valuation,
p = vh, if q ≥ vlvh =: q¯ and at the low valuation, p = vl, otherwise.
The very same selfish behavior by the buyer is clearly also a trust-efficient response. It follows
that when q < q¯, a low price is never kind since it is in the seller’s material interest. In this case,
the seller sets p = vl, which is accepted by any buyer, with tips being zero for any γB > 0.22
For the remainder of this section, assume that there are sufficiently many high types, that
is q ≥ q¯. Clearly, the seller never sets the price above vh and the high valuation buyer accepts
if and only if p ∈ [0, vh]. This is commonly understood by both players.23 Denote the second
order belief about tips by t′′(p) ∈ [0, t¯]. The utility of a high-valuation buyer from tipping t after
observing a price p ∈ [0, vh] is
UB(t, t
′′(p)|p, vh) = vh − p− t+ γB · κS(t′′(p) | p, vh) · (p+ t− c)
with κS(t′′(p) | p, vh) = vh−p− t′′(p)−0.24 Since UB(t, p|vh) is linear in t (and tips being weakly
positive), it must be that in equilibrium γB · (vh− p− t′′(p)) ≤ 1. This results in two cases: first,
22The example highlights the potentially strong informational requirement that the equilibrium model places on
the buyer. It requires the buyer to fully understand the incomplete information environment the seller is facing in
order to infer the seller’s reasonable, efficient actions. When the seller takes an inefficient action, the buyer does
not revise her beliefs about the seller’s view on the environment, but treats the action as inefficient.
23I disregard the potential alternative equilibrium, where a high-price is inefficient due to being punished, i.e.
rejected, which in turn can motivate the buyer to reject it.
24Notice that the reference point, which is the minimum efficient payoff, is 0 and arises from p = vh. It takes as
given that the buyer doesn’t tip in response.
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if the seller’s kindness from p is too low even when t′′(p) = 0, vh− p ≤ 1/γB , the buyer will never
tip. If instead vh − p > 1/γB , the optimal tip t′′(p) will make the buyer indifferent between any
tip.25 In equilibrium, the tip is
t(p) = max{0, vh − p− 1/γB}.
When the seller sets a sufficiently low price and the buyer’s concern for reciprocity (γB) is large
enough, she rewards him with a tip. The tip is decreasing in the price. The seller’s total revenue
from a high-valuation buyer is Rev(p|vh) = p+t(p) = max{p, vh−1/γB} if p ≤ vh and 0 otherwise.
If the seller sets the price too high, the buyer will accept the offer but won’t consider him kind.
If the price is low enough, any decrease in price is matched one-for-one with an increase in tip.
In this case, the seller gets a constant total payment which is below the price p = vh that is profit
maximizing when everyone acts selfishly. The total payment from a high type must necessarily
be below vh for otherwise the seller isn’t kind. However, he may be able to improve his expected
revenue as we will see next.
Proposition 2: The expected revenue is maximized at p = vl if vh−1/γB > vl and (1−q)·vl ≥
q/γB.
The first condition is a necessary condition. It requires that the high-valuation buyer is sufficiently
reciprocal to tip the seller at a price of p = vl. The second condition ensures that the expected
gain from selling to the low-valuation buyer, (1 − q)vl, exceeds the expected loss, q/γB , from
selling the good to the high-valuation buyer at vl instead of vh.26 Reciprocity concerns among
high-valuation buyers allow the seller to profitably sell to more buyers. By lowering the price,
the seller sells to more types of customers without having to bear the full loss of revenues from
‘existing’ high-value clients, who voluntarily pay more.27
This simple game captures three observations that are consistent with the empirical literature
on pay-what-you-want pricing. First, most people pay more than the minimum required price,
which is usually set at 0. Second, most people tend to pay less than the previously used fixed
price. Third, companies tend to serve more customers (Kim et al. (2009), Regner and Barria
(2009), Gneezy et al. (2010), Gneezy et al. (2012)). Consistent with proposition 2, a pay-what-
you-want strategy also appears to be both profitable and sustainable over longer periods in some
25To see why, suppose t′′(p) = 0. In this case, she wants to give the maximal tip t¯. But then consistency requires
t′′(p) = t¯ > vh, in which case she doesn’t want to tip at all.
26Clearly the necessary condition is also sufficient at q = q¯. At this prior, the seller is indifferent between selling
at vl or vh even without any tips. With reciprocal types, he makes an additional tip on the high-value type.
27Notice that in the limit, γB →∞, the seller extracts all surplus.
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environments.28
Before concluding this simple application, I would like to quickly explore an extension of
the kindness function. The payment data in the empirical studies on pay-what-you-want pricing
actually reveals that a small fraction of customers pay more than the original price when they
get to choose their own price; for instance, see Kim et al. (2009). While this can be due to many
reasons beyond reciprocity, it can be captured by allowing consumers to care not only about the
seller’s kindness towards them, but also about his kindness towards other types of customers who
are possibly less well-off.29
This type of reciprocity preferences would incentivize the seller to lower the price even further,
enabling poorer customers to participate at a per-unit price below his marginal cost.30 To explore
these ideas in more detail, a continuous type distribution would be useful. Clearly, the above
analysis extends to this setting as well, yielding a very similar equilibrium condition for tips.
Having buyers who also care about other buyers will push the seller’s price further towards ‘zero’.
Similar to my simple, discrete setting, the continuous setup is unlikely to yield an actual price
of zero. This, however, shouldn’t be too surprising. The real reason behind pricing an item
at p = 0 instead of a small but positive price is likely due to a discontinuity in kindness and
trust perceptions at 0. Moreover, pay-what-you-want pricing schemes also tend to have some
restrictions in practise: restaurants require drinks to be paid separately (Kim et al. (2009)) and
music labels require consumers to pay for the cost of shipping the CD (Regner and Barria (2009)).
2.3.2 Bilateral Trade
After looking at a game with one-sided incomplete information, I now turn to two-sided incomplete
information in the classic bilateral trade problem. I focus on a particular binary-type example
that is taken from Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) (henceforth BN16).
There is one indivisible object. The seller’s cost is
¯
c = 0 or c¯ = 80, the buyer’s valuation is
28The longest evidence comes from Gneezy et al. (2012) in form of a two-year time series on payments, customers,
and revenue of an Austrian restaurant following the introduction of a pay-what-you-want pricing scheme. While
average payments decrease, customers and revenue increases over time. Hence, behavior doesn’t seem to be driven
by a novelty effect - which was likely an important factor in the famous example of the band Radiohead, who
initially allowed fans to download their 2007 album In Rainbows and pay as much as they want. It is noteworthy
that they did require fans to cover the credit-card fee of 45p, recovering their marginal download costs from selfish
types.
The profitability of these schemes tends to vary across settings. In Kim et al. (2009), total revenues increased
for a lunch-buffet at a restaurant, but fell for a movie theatre as well as for beverages in the cafe of a delicatessen
shop. Gneezy et al. (2010) reports lower profits for souvenir pictures in an amusement park. When 50% of the
pay-what-you-want price was given to charity, however, it dwarfed profits of the regular fixed price (with and
without payments to charity). Lastly, also in Gneezy et al. (2012), profits from souvenir pictures on a tour boat
are the same for posted prices and the pay-what-you-want scheme.
29See, for example, reporting for The Guardian by Carroll (2018).
30For instance, the high-value type could weight the seller’s payoff with the new kindness function
κS(t
′′(p) | p, vh)new :=κS(t′′(p) | p, vh) + δκS(a′′, t′′(p) | p, vl) for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1).
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¯
v = 20 or v¯ = 100. Types are independent and equally likely. If players are fully selfish, then
it can be shown that Myerson and Satterthwaite’s famous impossibility result holds - there is no
social choice function f which is materially Pareto-efficient, satisfies incentive compatibility (IC)
and the participation constraint (PC), and is budged balanced (BB).
BN16 show that when both player are strictly reciprocal, i.e. no one is selfish, there are
simultaneous mechanisms that satisfy IC, PC, and BB, and trade occurs whenever it is materially
efficient. In addition to sending a message about their type, each player is given a button that, if
pressed, allows one to profit at the expense of the other. This button generates kindness whenever
it is not used. For reciprocal players, not pressing the button becomes mutually reinforcing and
furthermore can incentivise them to maximize joint payoffs, i.e. to honestly reveal their types.31
Clearly, a selfish player would always use such button in a simultaneous game. As a result,
BN16’s mechanism is limited to environments where the fraction of selfish types is small. When
firms and consumers interact, this requirement is likely violated. In this section, I will explore
whether sequential interactions may improve efficiency relatively to simultaneous moves, without
relying on artificial buttons.
Suppose the buyer and the seller interact in the simplest sequential form. First, the seller
makes a claim about his cost, mS ∈ {¯c, c¯}. After observing his message, the buyer decides whether
to trade or not and if so at what predetermined price. To do so, she announces her valuation,
mB ∈ {
¯
v, v¯}, and trade occurs if and only if mB ≥ mS . Let the probability of trade and the
resulting price (prob of trade, price) be as shown in Figure 2.1.
S
B
(1, 14)
mB =
¯
v
(1, 74)
mB = v¯
mS =
¯
c
B
(0, 0)
mB =
¯
v
(1, 84)
mB = v¯
mS = c¯
Figure 2.1: Probability of trade and prices
If players were selfish, both types of buyers respond to a low-cost message by trading at the
lowest possible price, i.e. mB(v | mS =
¯
c) =
¯
v for all v. After a high-cost message, only high-
valuation buyers trade, mB(v¯ | mS = c¯) = v¯ and mB(
¯
v |c¯) =
¯
v. In equilibrium, all types of
31Observe that the revelation principle no longer holds in this setting.
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sellers pool by claiming to have high-costs.32 Due to the lack of trade among the pair (
¯
c,
¯
v), this
particular sequential interaction is inefficient.
The buyer’s material best-response can be used to determine the trust-efficient actions. In
this setting all actions are efficient: given the buyer’s material best-response, each seller prefers
mS = c¯ while each buyer is better off when mS =
¯
c.33
For simplicity, assume that the seller is selfish and the buyer is reciprocal with obligation
preferences, i.e. λ = 0.34
Proposition 3: For γB ∈ [1/10, 1/6], truth-telling is a sequential Reciprocity with Trust Equilib-
rium.
For the high-cost seller, announcing his type is a dominant strategy, mS(c¯) = c¯, since any price
after the alternative mS =
¯
c is less than his cost and trade always takes place. Given that a high
cost message minimizes the buyer’s payoffs, it is never kind. Consequently, any type of buyer
will respond with her material best-response, i.e. she will announce her type: mB(v¯ | c¯) = v¯ and
mB(
¯
v | c¯) =
¯
v. In contrast, a low-cost message is indeed perceived as kind as it maximizes the
buyer’s payoff. A sufficiently reciprocal high-valuation buyer, γ ≥ 1/10, is therefore willing to
reveal her type, mB(v¯ |
¯
c) = v¯. The low-value buyer sends an honest message, mB(
¯
v |
¯
c) =
¯
v, if
her concern for reciprocity is not too large, ie. γB < 1/6. If γB is too large, a low-valuation buyer
wants to exaggerate her type in order to reward the seller.35 Whenever the buyer honestly reveals
her type, it is also in the low-cost seller’s best interest to be honest ((14 + 74)/2 ≥ 84/2). It
follows that truth-telling is a sequential Reciprocity with Trust Equilibrium for γB ∈ [1/10, 1/6].
The buyer’s concern for reciprocity gives rise to full efficiency.36
While this is a game of incomplete information, the overall mechanism is, not surprisingly,
identical to the one in games of complete information - see the sequential prisoner’s dilemma in
Chapter 1 for instance. By revealing his low costs, the low-cost seller improves the buyer’s payoff
irrespective of her type. Given the buyer’s equilibrium response, it is also in his own material
best interest to be honest, which makes his action mutually beneficial. The buyer perceives him
to be kind since his action exposes vulnerability: if the high-value buyer were to take her material
32The expected profit of a low-cost seller is (84− 0)/2 > 14− 0.
33Notice that even for a high-cost seller, a low cost message is Pareto-efficient as it makes the buyer better off.
One way to avoid such classifications would be to require that any player’s payoff is at least equal to their outside
option.
34As usual, this aims to capture a setting where many sellers (buyers) are selfish (reciprocal).
35Notice that such behavior would quickly lower the seller’s kindness towards her.
36Indeed, this is true for any γB ≥ 1/10. As in the extension for the previous pricing game, a high-value
type may also appreciate the fact that the low-cost seller enables the low-valuation buyer to trade, increasing her
kindness perception from mS =
¯
c even further. Such preferences would make it even easier to motivate the buyer
to reveal the truth.
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best-response, the seller would be better off claiming to have a high cost instead. Consequently,
she is happy to share some of the surplus with him. The sequential interaction exploits the
asymmetry between the selfish seller and the reciprocal buyer by requiring the selfish seller to
act first, which provides him with the opportunity to signal kindness and trust. Reciprocity once
again ensures that the buyer doesn’t exploit the seller’s trust.
This example highlights how reciprocity creates incentives for information sharing. More gen-
erally, this type of reciprocal information sharing can explain how cheap talk improves efficiency
in bargaining (Valley et al. (2002)) without having to rely on honest types (Saran (2011), Saran
(2012)) or lying aversion (Abeler et al. (2016)). Le Quement and Patel (2017) make a similar
observation in the one-sided incomplete information environment of cheap talk (Crawford and
Sobel (1982), Cai and Wang (2006)).
There is one critical dimension in which reciprocity in settings of information sharing differs
from reciprocity in games of complete information: in many games of complete information,
negative reciprocity can be a tremendous force to ensure compliance by punishing selfish actions.
Punishment becomes more difficult to justify if it is unknown whether someone’s claim is truthful
or not. After all, punishment may inflict harm not only on someone who lies for selfish gains but
also on an honest person.37 As people tend to give others the benefit of the doubt (Mitzkewitz
and Nagel (1993), Rapoport et al. (1996), Güth and Huck (1997)) it is doubtful that punishment
can be a driving force for creating efficiency - unless lies are likely to be discovered.
2.4 Discussion
In this section, I first discuss how my model relates to alternative models of intention-based
reciprocity. Afterwards, I comment on some of the finer details of modelling kindness from the
ex-ante and interim perspective.
2.4.1 Alternative Intention-Based Reciprocity Models
The first chapter featured an extensive comparison of the different intention-based reciprocity
models. The essential difference to Rabin’s (1993) conditional-efficiency model, extended to
incomplete information, remains to be the fact that a person i does not consider another person
j to be kind if j’s action also benefits himself.38
37Indeed, to dissuade people from lying, one must be willing to punish honesty of others.
38For an example, see Le Quement and Patel (2017). One way to extend Rabin’s model to sequential games of
incomplete information is simply by using the actual belief βi instead of βTEi in the definition of a trust-efficient
65
For the remainder of this subsection, I will explore why extending Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger’s (2004) model to incomplete information leads to arguably implausible behavior. This is
ultimately due to the fact that a dominated action by player 2 may make an action by player 1
efficient. We will see that this can give rise to kindness perceptions that are independent of the
prior belief over types.
Take a simple pricing game between a buyer and a seller. There are two types of buyers with
valuation v ∈ {vl, vh}, with Pr(v = vh) = q. A selfish seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer for a
single unit at p ∈ {vl, vh} and has zero cost, c = 0. Upon observing the offer, the buyer decides
whether to accept or not.
Suppose the buyer acts in her best material interest. A buyer with high valuation always
buys; a buyer with low valuation buys if and only if p = vl. As a result, the seller sets a price
p = vh if q > vl/vh and p = vl otherwise. Given that the buyer can only accept or reject the offer,
it seems natural that a high-valuation buyer would only view the seller as kind when he sets a
low price p = vl and acts against his own interest, i.e. when q > vl/vh. Indeed, this is exactly
what my model predicts (for more details, see the pricing game section in 2.3.1).
When the seller’s efficient actions are modelled via the unconditional efficient set, this is no
longer true, however. To see this, recall that a price p is unconditionally-efficient if it is Pareto
efficient for at least one strategy of player 2, σ2 ∈ ∆H2 . According to this definition, both prices
are efficient. p = vh is Pareto efficient due to the strategy where all types of buyers accept a
price of p = vh (and all accept p = vl). Notice that since a high-price is never kind, no low-
valuation buyer would use such a strategy. Just like in game 1.6 (Chapter 1) this strategy is
non-rationalizable, yet it affects the efficient set. Since p = vh is efficient for any q ∈ [0, 1], a
high-valuation buyer always views the seller as kind when he charges a low price: kindness no
longer depends on the prior belief. This is particularly implausible when q is close to 0.
An efficiency notion based on material best-replies, actual choices (or second order beliefs
thereof), or trust, avoids this problem and is thus more useful for incomplete information settings.
2.4.2 Modelling Choices for Kindness Perceptions
For their application of intentions to mechanism design, Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) define
kindness for normal-form games from an ex-ante perspective. A player’s kindness is the difference
between the ex-ante expected payoff and the ex-ante reference point. Efficiency is similarly defined
from the ex-ante perspective, in the spirit of Rabin (1993). Netzer and Volk (2014) model kindness
behavior strategy.
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(still for normal-form games) at the interim stage.39 The kindness of player j with θj towards
player i describes the difference between the expected payoff he gives to player i and her reference
point. Both the reference point and the efficient set are defined in terms of i’s expected payoff
(conditional on θj). Player i perceives j’s kindness towards her by taking expectation over j’s
types.
The key difference between their notion of interim-kindness and mine (apart from the obvious
difference that their model is defined for normal form games and in terms of conditional efficiency)
is how a particular type θi perceives j’s kindness. In their model, kindness perceptions are
independent of i’s realized type, whereas in mine, j’s action is only judged in terms of how it
affects θi’s (perceived) payoff. This difference leads to the testable implication of whether a type
θi rewards or doesn’t reward an action that is only kind to her hypothetical alternative selves.A
more minor difference between the two models arises from the fact that their efficient set is defined
in terms of interim expected payoffs, and not in terms of the pair (θi, θj). In many cases, there
won’t be any difference between both approaches. A notable exception is game 2.2, section 2.2.1,
which describes a game where player 1’s actions affect the payoffs for the two types of player 2
in opposite directions.40
For many applications, the private information encoded in θi will capture not only material
payoffs but also social preferences. By treating different types as different players, a selfish
player and a reciprocal player are treated as separate beings. As a result, player i’s utility
correctly weights her action’s consequences on the selfish and the reciprocal player’s payoffs by
their respective kindness towards her and each type’s likelihood. This captures the original idea
of reciprocity that a person wants to help (hurt) the person she considers kind (unkind). This is
not the case if i perceives j’s kindness as the average of his behaviors across types and then uses
this kindness term to weight j’s expected payoff.41
39The interim-stage approach can also be found in the online appendix B.1 of Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016).
40Le Quement and Patel’s (2017) model on cheap-talk only features one-sided information at the side of the
sender. The sender’s kindness is modelled conditional on his type. Their model is similar to mine in the sense that
it is sequential and the receiver updates her beliefs about the state of the world based on the sender’s message.
She then computes the expected kindness given her updated belief, which they call ex-post perceived kindness.
They also define an ex-ante kindness that is independent of the message by averaging across the states and the
expected messages.
41To see this, suppose that player i moves first in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Given that the selfish-type’s
payoff is large when i cooperates, even a relatively small average kindness due to the reciprocal player may induce
player i to cooperate as her overall utility from reciprocity is relatively large.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter extends the theory of reciprocity with trust, which was developed in chapter 1, to
incomplete information. It captures the realistic feature that in many cases one does not have
full knowledge about others’ material payoffs or their social motivations. In two applications of
this model, I showed how reciprocity can give rise to pay-what-you-want pricing schemes and how
it can foster information sharing in bilateral trade.
Incomplete information about material payoffs gives rise to a particularly interesting question:
If player j is genuinely trying to help player i, does i consider j kind even when j’s help has
no positive effect on her, or more extremely, his help actually hurts her? This paper adopted
a ‘selfish’ approach to kindness perceptions: player i only considers player j’s impact on her
particular payoffs when she evaluates his kindness, neglecting any impact that he could have had
on other hypothetical types of her. My approach is similar to the consequentialism of intention-
based reciprocity models in complete information, in which one is judged by his actual actions.
How a person actually reacts to such actions, and thus how reciprocity should be modelled in
incomplete information, remains an empirical question.There has been very little research on what
people consider kind in these games. I hope that my model inspires future empirical research on
this fundamental topic.
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2.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. The proof follows the usual logic of first showing that there exist an
-constrained (reciprocity) equilibrium, that requires totally mixing strategies (with minimum
probabilities of ). Taking limits ( → 0) results in the perfect equilibrium (with reciprocity
preferences). From there, I use the usual argument to construct a sequential (Reciprocity with
Trust Equilibrium) equilibrium.
Define the minimum trembles at h ∈ Hi for player i for the local strategy by i,h. An
-constrained reciprocity equilibrium is the totally mixed strategy profile σ that is sequentially
rational, with correct beliefs, but requires that at each h, each action (ai,h ∈ Ai,h) is played
at least with probability i,h, that is σi (ai,h|h) ≥ i,h. Denote the restricted strategy space by
∆H,.
A (trembling hand) perfect reciprocity equilibrium is any limit of an -constrained reciprocity
equilibrium σ as → 0. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 8, def 8.5A)
1. I first argue that a -constrained reciprocity equilibrium σ exists:
Define the local best response correspondence ri,h : ∆H, → ∆(Ai,h) by
ri,h(σ
) = arg max
xi,h∈∆(Ai,h)
Ui
(
σi\xi,h, σj , σi , µj |µi,h
)
and best response correspondence r(σ) : ∆H, →∏(i,h)∈N×H ∆(Ai,h) by
r(σ) =
∏
(i,h)∈N×H
ri,h(σ
).
Along the sequence of totally mixed strategies, µ is uniquely pinned down; it is without loss to
drop it from the definition of r(·).
As
∏
(i,h)∈N×H and ∆
H, are topologically equivalent, I can simply define an equivalent
function r˜ : ∆H, → ∆H, and look for a fixed point. A fixed point under r˜ satisfy the conditions
of the -constrained reciprocity equilibrium as it maximizes each player’s expected utility of
player at h, and first and second order beliefs about strategies are correct (the same holds true
for µi, µij).
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem applies in this setup. To see this, notice that at any
information set h the local choice set ∆(Ai,h) is a subset of a simplex. As a simplex is compact,
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convex and non-empty, so is the -restricted subset (for  sufficiently small). ri,h is non-empty as
Ui is continuous in her own local choice, the set is compact and hence attains a maximum. ri,h
is convex as Ui is indeed linear in i’s own choice. Upper hemi-continuity of ri,h follows from the
fact that Ui is continuous. Since these properties extend from ri,h to r˜i,h, and r˜, all conditions
of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem are satisfied, which completes the first step of the proof that
r˜(σ) has a fixed point.
2. A (trembling hand) perfect reciprocity equilibrium exists:
By compactness of the strategy space, it it follows by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem that the
sequence {σ} has a convergent subsequence as  → 0, which proves the existence of a perfect
reciprocity equilibrium.
3. A perfect reciprocity equilibrium implies a sequential Reciprocity with Trust Equilib-
rium.
This follows immediately from the usual argument. In a sRTE σ must be sequentially rational
given the set of beliefs (α, β, µ˜, µ), and the assessment (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ) must be consistent. All that
is left to do is to construct a sequence of beliefs µn → µ. Along the convergent subsequence of
totally mixed strategies σn, beliefs µn are uniquely defined by Bayes’ rule. µ simply refers to
the limit of the respective convergent subsequence from earlier. By construction, (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ) is
consistent. As each player is taking her best response at each information set along the sequence,
together with the fact that Ui is continuous, (σ, α, β, µ˜, µ) is sequentially rational.
Proof of proposition 2. To improve upon the expected revenue of p = vh, ERev(p = vh) = q · vh,
it is necessary that both types buy since the total payment p + t(p) from the high type is lower
than vh. As a result, any pice p ∈ (vl, vh) cannot be optimal.
Since q · vh > vl, it is necessary that the total payment from the high-type exceeds the low
valuation, that is vh − 1/γB > vl. (This condition directly implies that for any p ≤ vl, the
high-value buyer will tip the seller.)
Selling below p < vl cannot be optimal as the seller loses revenue from the low-valuation buyer
(the transfer from the low valuation seller is t(p) = max{0, vl − p − 1/γB}) relatively to p = vl
without affecting the revenue from the high-valuation buyer.
Lastly, expected revenue from vl exceeds vh if ERev(p = vl) = q·(vh−1/γB)+(1−q)·vl ≥ q·vh,
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which can be rewritten as (1− q) · vl ≥ q/γB .
Proof of proposition 3. Kindness of a low-cost seller: Suppose the buyer holds the second order
belief that she honestly reveals her type at each node. Denote this belief by βhonestB . Moreover,
she holds the correct belief that µB(
¯
c|mS =
¯
c) = 1. Since all messages are trust-efficient for the
seller, and the buyer is assumed to have obligation preferences, her reference point is equal to her
minimum payoff, which is induced by the high cost message. In particular pirB(β
honest
B |(¯c,¯v)) = 0
and pirB(β
honest
B |(¯c, v¯)) = 100− 84 = 16. Hence each kindness term is
κS(β
honest
B |mS = ¯c, (¯c,¯v)) = 20− 14− 0 = 6
κS(β
honest
B |mS = ¯c, (¯c, v¯)) = 100− 74− 16 = 10.
The buyer’s utility from each message is
UB(mB = v¯, β
honest
B |mS = ¯c, v) = v − 74 + γB · κS(β
honest
B |mS = ¯c, (¯c, v)) · (74− 0)
UB(mB =
¯
v, βhonestB |mS = ¯c, v) = v − 14 + γB · κS(β
honest
B |mS = ¯c, (¯c, v)) · (14− 0).
She prefers mB = v¯ over mB =
¯
v if γB · κS(βhonestB |mS = ¯c, (¯c, v)) ≥ 1. It follows that
truth-telling is an equilibrium if γB ∈ [1/10, 1/6].
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Chapter 3
The Benefits of Being Misinformed1
3.1 Introduction
We commonly observe situations in which people take actions in line with hypotheses that seem
to be contradicted by empirical evidence. Furthermore, these actions often produce additional
information that should highlight the initial mistake. For example, a significant number of people
refuse even essential vaccinations despite the very strong evidence of their benefit and despite the
measurable increase in outbreaks of the related disease as a consequence of this refusal.2
For this purpose, we revisit the comparison of experiments as in Blackwell (1951) under the
assumption that information processing is not always flawless and might be impeded by systematic
mistakes. We do this in a setup that captures the fundamentals of Bayesian updating and its
consequences on utility: First an agent takes an action that directly affects his payoff but also
provides information about the payoff relevant state of the world. The agent then takes another
action before payoffs are realized. Motivated by the psychological and experimental literature
on beliefs and perceptions, the information processing can be ‘imperfect’ in two ways: an agent
might initially hold an incorrect prior affecting the type of signals he receives and the agent might
misinterpret the signals.3 We find that both types of biases by themselves are welfare decreasing.
The potential welfare loss can be ordered according to the magnitude of the bias. Next, we
provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a given binary ranking of action profiles
can be reversed by a perception bias. Building on these findings, we can show that it is not
1This chapter is joint work with Manuel Staab.
2See, for instance, Wallace (2009).
3For example: Bruner and Potter (1964), Darley and Gross (1983), Fischoff et al. (1977) and Lichtenstein et al.
(1982).
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always true that adding another type of bias to a pre-existing one makes an agent even worse-off.
In particular, if the agent tends to misperceive signals, then pushing the agent’s prior further
away from the truth can beneficial if it causes the agent to prefer an action whose signal is less
ambiguous and thereby less likely misinterpreted. Our setting thus provides a novel channel for
the long known observation by Hirshleifer (1971) that information may not always be welfare
improving.
On the other hand, when the agent’s prior is incorrect and signals are useful in the sense
that they inform decision-making, the agent will always be worse off from misperception. Only
in the extreme case, where it’s optimal for an agent to always take a fixed action irrespective of
any signal, increasing the agent’s degree of misperception can be beneficial. It follows that no
straight-forward welfare ordering can be established if both types of misperception are present.
We further explore the implications of an agents awareness over the bias. We provide conditions
under which sophistication regarding the misperception of signals can help or harm the agent’s
welfare.
To provide an illustration, let’s look at a student who decides whether to become an en-
trepreneur. The literature highlights that entrepreneurship is ex-ante not very profitable. Landier
and Thesmar (2009) show that entrepreneurs tend to be overly optimistic with respect to their
company’s future growth prospects. Moreover, their optimism is positively correlated with higher-
education, and more optimistic entrepreneurs tend to choose more short-term debt. Suppose the
payoffs from being an entrepreneur depend on the student’s ability. The student can either quit
university immediately in order to start his business, or wait and finish his degree first. While
graduating is inherently useful, it also provides him with a signal about his abilities. Finally,
when he starts his business, the student also has to decide how much to borrow.
A student who is very overconfident in his abilities will find it optimal to start his business
immediately, yet may not be overconfident enough to borrow much. In contrast, a slightly less
overconfident agent will pursue the more ‘sensible’ path of completing his studies. When the
student also suffers from biases in perception, he may (a) misinterpret the signal as confirming
his superior ability or (b) over-interpret the signal strength. As a result, the student may come
out of university feeling even more confident in his ability, which can persuade him to start a
business as well as taking on larger risks, i.e. a bigger amount of debt. While both businesses
fail with equal probability, the initially less over-confident agent may end up being worse off in
expectation. The more over-confident agent managed to avoid the signal and thereby was not in
a position to misinterpret it.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we summarize the relevant literature.
This is followed by a basic description of our model in section 3.3 and the characterization of
the unbiased choice problem in section 3.4. Section 3.5 introduces biased perception and biased
priors into the model and relates our setting to Blackwell (1951). This is followed by our main
results in section 3.6. We conclude with a short investment example in section 3.7 and a final
discussion in part 3.8.
3.2 Literature
Blackwell (1951) formalizes when an information experiment is more informative than another.
Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) transfer these statistical ideas to the realm of economics. The
key conclusion is that no rational decision maker would choose to ‘garble’ his information, i.e.
voluntarily introduce noise into his experiments.
Having more information, however, may not always be better in an economic settings. Hirsh-
leifer (1971) highlights that public information may destroy mutually beneficial insurance possi-
bilities. The recent behavioral literature takes this idea further: Papers on overconfidence have
shed light on how holding incorrect beliefs can be useful. These benefits arise from strategic in-
teraction between agents. Ludwig et al. (2011) show that overconfidence can improve the agents
relative and absolute performance in contests by inducing higher efforts. De La Rosa (2011) stud-
ies the effect of overconfidence on incentive contract in a moral hazard problem. When agents
overestimate the probability of success as well as their marginal contribution to success, it be-
comes easier for the principal to induce effort. It turns out that the efficiency gains from slight
levels of overconfidence can improve the agent’s welfare.
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) show that Blackwell garbling of information may increase the
current self’s payoff when individuals are time-inconsistent. Benabou and Tirole (2002) develop
this idea further. In their model, a time-inconsistent agent can take on a project with deferred
and uncertain benefits but immediate losses. Due to time-inconsistency a time-0 self prefers that
the project is undertaken in the next period, but anticipates a lack of motivation by her next
period’s incarnation. Having the opportunity to either perfectly learn the true success rate or to
stay uninformed, she may prefer to stay uninformed if her prior motivates the time-1 agent to
work. While these two papers are phrased as a decision problem, an agent with time-inconsistency
plays a game among his different selves, which is the fundamental driver of these results.
Other papers analyze how various behavioral shortcomings can be improved upon by overcon-
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fidence. These papers aim to provide a motivation why overconfidence exists in the first place.
In Compte and Postlewaite (2004), failing to recall past failures can improve welfare as it coun-
teracts the fear of failure. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) highlight that agents prefer to hold
incorrect, too optimistic beliefs about the future, when they derive immediate benefits from these
expectations.
Our paper is also related to the enormous literature on mistakes in updating expectations.
Given our focus on how basic biases in information processing interact, we shall keep references to
specific biases short. In our model, agents have the tendency to misperceive information, which
represents a generalisation of the confirmatory bias in Rabin and Schrag (1999). In their paper,
they show how confirmatory bias, the tendency to misinterpret new information as supportive
evidence for one’s currently held hypothesis, can not only lead to overconfidence in the incorrect
hypothesis, but even cause someone to become fully convinced of it.
There have been many studies that suggest people hold incorrect beliefs. On average, people
tend to have unrealistically positive views of their traits and prospects. To mention a few, see
Weinstein (1980) for health and salaries, Guthrie et al. (2001) for rates of overturned decisions
on appeal by judges, and Fischoff et al. (1977) as well as Lichtenstein et al. (1982) for estimates
of ones’ own likelihood to answer correctly. Recent papers include Landier and Thesmar (2009),
for entrepreneurs, as well as Malmendier and Tate (2005) linking CEO overconfidence to a higher
likelihood of pursuing risky actions, for instance acquisitions. Benoit and Dubra (2011) argue
that a lot of the empirical evidence is also consistent with Bayesian updating under correct priors
and thus may not demonstrate overconfidence. In response, laboratory experiments robust to
this criticism were carried out by Burks et al. (2013), Charness et al. (2014), and Benoit and
Moore (2015), again documenting overconfidence.
3.3 The Setting
We consider a two period model with two states of the world Ω = {A,B}. The agent has a finite
set of actions X = X1 ×X2. In the first period, he chooses an action from X1 and subsequently
receives a signal about the state. The quality of the signal depends on the action he chooses.
He then decides on a second action from X2 and receive a payoff determined by the action
profile as well as the state of the world. The probability that a particular state materializes is
Pr(ω = A) = p ∈ (0, 1) and Pr(ω = B) = 1 − p respectively. Denote the agent’s prior belief
that the state is A by µ. This belief may or may not coincide with the correct p. Let u(x1, x2|ω)
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denote the payoff if x1 is taken at t = 1, x2 at t = 2 and the state is ω, with u(x1, x2|ω) ∈ R.
We make the following assumptions on payoffs which guarantee that in each state there is a
unique best action profile:
Assumption 1: There exist action profiles:
1. (xA1 , xA2 ) ∈ X such that u(xA1 , xA2 |A) ≥ u(x1, x2|A) for any (x1, x2) ∈ X.
2. (xB1 , xB2 ) ∈ X such that u(xB1 , xB2 |B) ≥ u(x1, x2|B) for any (x1, x2) ∈ X.
To avoid trivial scenarios, we exclude cases in which those two profiles have any common com-
ponent. It will also be implicitly assumed that X only contains actions that are not completely
payoff equivalent and ties are broken deterministically. Additionally, payoffs are assumed to be
bounded:
Assumption 2: There exists a K ∈ R such that K > max{u(xA1 , xA2 |A), u(xB1 , xB2 |B)}.
After period one, an agent receives a private signal s ∈ S. For each action x1 ∈ X1, there
is a binary set of potential signals S(x1) = {a(x1), b(x1)} ⊂ S. The probability distribution
over those signals is conditional on the action as well as the state of the world meaning that x1
defines a probability measure on S × Ω. Let pi(x1, ω) ≡ Pr(s = a(x1)|ω, x1) and consequently
1 − pi(x1, ω) ≡ Pr(s = b(x1)|ω, x1). Let the signal structure be symmetric between states, i.e.
pi(x1, A) = 1 − pi(x1, B), and let signals be weakly informative in the sense that a-signals are
more likely than b-signals in state A. We call (x1, {xa, xb}) an action profile where xa, xb ∈ X2
represent the actions taken after an a(x1) or b(x1) signal. Such an action profile is said to be
signal-sensitive if xa 6= xb. A simple action profile is such that xa = xb meaning the second-period
choice is not conditional on the signal. It is for brevity denoted by (x1, x2).
We can think of the first action as an experiment that delivers information about the realized
state. The agent can react accordingly and adjust his action in the second period. Notice,
however, that an experiment is only useful if it is not too costly. For instance, it could perfectly
reveal the state but reduce the attainable utility to an extent that it would be better to choose
a noisier experiment.
3.4 Unbiased Choice Problem
We reverse-engineer the agent’s decision problem step by step which serves to clarify the later
results. First we look at optimal actions in the second period and then focus on the optimal
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choice of experiments in the first period. The discussion is rather technical and the descriptions
necessarily somewhat dry. But it allows for more constructive proofs later. Readers impatient
for key results may skip ahead and return to this section as needed for later understanding.
3.4.1 Period 2 Cutoff-Strategy
The expected utility of an action x2 ∈ X2 from the second period’s perspective depends on the
posterior after receiving the signal. Furthermore, it can also depend directly on the action in
the previous period. Let µ(s) be the posterior after receiving a type-s signal. An agent chooses
action x2 at t = 2 given a posterior µ(s) and an action x1 at t = 1 if
E [u(x1, x2)|µ(s)] ≥ E [u(x1, x)|µ(s)] ∀x ∈ X2
The expected payoff from any given action in period 2 is monotonic in beliefs. Starting from some
0 < µ < 1, an increase in µ strictly increases the expected payoff from (xA1 , xA2 ) and decreases the
one from (xB1 , xB2 ). In fact, for any (x1, x2) ∈ X with u(x1, x2|A) 6= u(xj , xk|B), the expected
payoff is either strictly in- or decreasing in µ. We can order actions at t = 2 according to expected
payoffs based on µ(s). This gives rise to a cutoff-type decision rule.
To illustrate this, consider the period 2 expected payoff of xA2 given the action xB1 in period
1 and some posterior µ(s):
µ(s)u(xB1 , x
A
2 |A) + (1− µ(s))u(xB1 , xA2 |B).
Similarly, the expected payoff from xB2 is
µ(s)u(xB1 , x
B
2 |A) + (1− µ(s))u(xB1 , xB2 |B).
If u(xB1 , xA2 |A) > u(xB1 , xB2 |A), there exist some µ∗(s) ∈ (0, 1) such that for all µ(s) > µ∗(s),
the expected payoff from choosing xA2 is larger than from xB2 . Equally, for all µ(s) < µ∗(s), the
expected payoff from xB2 exceeds the expected payoff from xA2 as u(xB1 , xA2 |B) < u(xB1 , xB2 |B). An
equivalent argument shows that the same is true for any other x2 ∈ X2 such that u(xB1 , x2|A) >
u(xB1 , x
B
2 |A). For µ large enough, the expected payoff from x2 exceeds the one from xB2 and vice
versa for µ small enough. Iterating this argument over all available actions at t = 2 and each t = 1
action allows us to conclude that the region in which a given x2 is chosen must be connected.
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Result 12 in Appendix C shows this formally.
We can now derive the conditions under which a given action is chosen in period 2 for at least
some beliefs. For any x1 ∈ X1 there is a xa ∈ X2 such that u(x1, xa|A) ≥ u(x1, xk|A) for all
xk ∈ X2. xa is optimal for µ(s) = 1 and will be chosen if µ(s) is high enough. The equivalent
is true for some action in state B. If the actions are identical across states then this is the best
possible action for all µ(s). Otherwise, there might be different optimal actions for intermediate
beliefs.
Consider the threshold belief µa,j for which the expected payoff from (x1, xa) is exactly equal
the one from (x1, xj):
µa,ju(x1, xa|A) + (1− µa,j)u(x1, xa|B) = µa,ju(x1, xj |A) + (1− µa,j)u(x1, xj |B)
We can rearrange the equation to
µa,j
(1− µa,j) =
u(x1, xj |B)− u(x1, xa|B)
u(x1, xa|A)− u(x1, xj |A) .
Since by definition u(x1, xa|A) is the highest utility in state A for x1, the equation highlights
that u(x1, xj |B) > u(x1, xa|B) is a necessary and sufficient condition for this threshold to exist.
We can then simply order actions according to payoffs in both states and ignore actions that are
dominated in both states. Starting from µa = 1, for which xa is the best action, we can compare
the potential cutoffs for all actions xi ∈ X2 that are not strictly dominated. The action with the
highest µa,i will be the one chosen for some range of beliefs. We then continue to iterate this
process from this action until there is no more action that has a higher payoff in state B.
Result 1: For every x1 ∈ X1, there exists a partition Px1 of [0, 1] such that for every two
consecutive elements pi and pi+1 of the partition, there is an action x2 ∈ X2 such that
E[u(x1, x2)|µ] ≥ E[u(x1, x)|µ] for all x ∈ X2 and pi < µ < pi+1.
Result 1 follows directly from the previous argument and Result 12. It highlights how the choice
in period 2 depends on the posterior, which in turn is determined by the signal. Differences in the
posterior are only welfare relevant if they fall in different elements of the partition. For binary
signals, there are at most 2 different choices in period 2 and thus potentially 4 different utility
outcomes. Since those are pinned down for every x ∈ X1 by Px, we can collapse the problem to
a comparison of experiments in period 1, fixing the corresponding optimal period 2 choices.
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3.4.2 Choice in Period 1
In the first period, the decision maker simply maximizes his expected utility:
max
x1∈X1
E
[
u
(
x1, {x∗a(x1), x∗b(x1)}
)|µ]
where {x∗a(x1), x∗b(x1)} are the optimal period 2 actions following x1 ∈ X1. The period 1 choice
balances the information value of an experiment as well as the immediate utility derived from it.
A very informative action leads to very different posteriors and, keeping in mind the partition,
to different actions in period 2. When the experiment is uninformative, the posterior µ(s) equals
the prior µ and falls into the same bracket of the partition.
Taking x1 as given, let µ(s) be the posterior after receiving a type-s signal and x∗s be the
corresponding optimal action. We can write the expected utility as
[µ(a)u(x1, x
∗
a|A) + (1− µ(a))u(x1, x∗a|B)]Pr(s = a|x1, µ)
+ [µ(b)u(x1, x
∗
b |A) + (1− µ(b))u(x1, x∗b |B)]Pr(s = b|x1, µ).
Recall that the probability of receiving an a(x1) signal in state A is pi(x1, A) ≥ 12 which is also
equal the probability of receiving the signal b(x1) in state B. Using Bayes’ rule, we can rewrite
the expected utility expression as:
µ [pi(x1, A)u(x1, x
∗
a|A) + (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, x∗b |A)]
+(1− µ) [pi(x1, B)u(x1, x∗a|B) + (1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, x∗b |B)]
(3.1)
This is the objective function for the utility maximization problem at µ. It is a weighted average
of receiving the "correct" signal and thus choosing the correct action and the probability of
receiving the "incorrect" signal and thus choosing the action that yields the lower utility in the
realized state. A higher informativeness in the sense of pi(x1,A)1−pi(x1,A) reduces the likelihood of such
a mistake. An agent might then be confident enough in the signals that he chooses actions that
have a higher variation between states.
We finish this section with a key property of the unbiased agent’s problem. Some of the later
results arise from a violation of this.
Result 2: The maximum expected utility at t = 1 as a function of µ is convex in µ.
The previous discussion is best illustrated with a simple example:
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Example 1: In each period, there are three actions {xA, xI , xB} = X1 = X2. The ac-
tions xA, xB yield uninformative signals with pi(xA, A) = pi(xB , A) = 0.5. Action xI provides
an informative signal with pi(xI , A) = 0.75. Utilities are symmetric in states such that
u(xA, xA|A) = 5 = u(xB , xB |B), u(xI , xA|A) = u(xI , xB |B) = 4 while all other combinations
yield 0 utility. xI represents a pure information experiment that is only useful because it
indicates the true state and thus the appropriate action at t = 2.
In this setting, the agent never chooses a combination of xA and xB . If the agent takes the
information experiment in period 1 then he will choose between xA and xB in period 2 depending
on whether his posterior is greater or smaller than 12 .
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Figure 3.1: Utility frontier
Figure 3.1 illustrates the expected utility outcomes. Actions xA (orange) and xB (red) are
optimal for extreme enough beliefs. For intermediate beliefs, the informativeness of xI (blue) is
more valuable. The posterior can fall into both partition elements such that xA or xB is chosen
at t = 2 conditional on the signal. His maximum expected utility, indicated by the bold line, is
clearly convex in µ.
3.5 Biased Perception
We now turn to our main area of investigation: scenarios in which the agent might misinterpret
parts of his environment. In particular, he might not always perceive information accurately
or might commit systematic mistakes when observing signals. We call this a perception bias.
Furthermore, the agent could have a prior that is deviating from the true probability distribution
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over states. We call this somewhat loosely a bias in prior.
The perception bias adds noise to the signal; a form of Blackwell garbling. It weakens the
correlation between the signal and the state and thus reduces the information value of experiments
in period 1. The agent arrives at incorrect posteriors following the initial signal and may choose
suboptimal actions in the second period. The bias in prior might lead to a suboptimal choice of
experiment in period 1 with potential consequences for the subsequent choices.
The perception bias could be due to an agent’s unwillingness to change their preferred hypoth-
esis or a systematic mistake in interpreting information. Initially, we take no stand regarding the
source and exact form of the bias. Unless stated otherwise, we make the crucial assumption that
the agent is naive in the sense that he is unaware of this perception problem. He computes his
posterior and chooses his actions as if he was receiving signals according to the true underlying
structure. In a later section, we discuss how this is related to a setting where agents have no
perception bias but simply a distorted view about the accuracy of signals. We argue that they
overlap but are not identical. We also explore the implication of a sophisticated agent, who is
aware of his perception problem.4
To illustrate the setting, imagine the following thought experiment. A doctor orders a medical
test. The outcome can be either negative or positive. On top of any inaccuracies of the test itself,
suppose there is a certain chance the lab technician enters the incorrect result in the patient’s
file. The attending doctor never misperceives information if the technician does his job perfectly.
However, there will be an information loss if, for instance, the technician mistakenly enters a
positive result if the test actually came back negative. It is as if the doctor misperceives the
signal. The distortion does not have to be balanced but is independent of the state of the world:
the lab technician does not have any knowledge about the truth other than through the test
result he observes. If the doctor is unaware of his technician’s potential mistake, we refer to him
as naive; if he takes his mistakes into account, we call him sophisticated. As mentioned before,
we mostly maintain the assumption of a naive doctor. An incorrect prior regarding the condition
of the patient might simply lead to an unnecessary test (or failure to conduct a necessary one).
Let st be the signal observed by the technician conducting the experiment x1, and s the signal
received by the doctor. Then
Assumption 3: Pr(s, st|ω, x1) = Pr(st|ω, x1) · Pr(s|st, x1) ∀ω ∈ {A,B}.
Define the signal probability distortion function d as a function that converts the true signal
4Note that a distinction between a sophisticated and naive agent would be meaningless for a bias in prior.
81
probabilities into (potentially different) probabilities that capture the likelihood with which the
agent actually perceives the signals. In particular, d ((pi, 1− pi), S(x1), µ) gives the vector of prob-
abilities for a and b signals for a belief µ, signal structure S(x1), and the undistorted probability
structure (pi, 1− pi). We can break this down into two functions, da and db, one for each type of
signal. Let the probability of correctly transmitting an a signal when performing the experiment
x1 be ka(x1, µ), and let kb(x1, µ) be the corresponding probability for a b signal. Notice that the
likelihood of mistakes may depend on the prior of the agent as well as the type of signal. We can
then write the signal probability distortion function as:
d ((pi, 1− pi), S(x1), µ) =
 da(pi, x1, µ)
db(1− pi, x1, µ)
 =
ka(x1, µ)pi + (1− kb(x1, µ))(1− pi)
kb(x1, µ)(1− pi) + (1− ka(x1, µ))pi
 (3.2)
for any pi ∈ [0, 1] with the obvious restriction that da(pi, x1, µ) + db(1− pi, x1, µ) = 1. An increase
in the magnitude of the bias means a reduction of ka(x1, µ), or kb(x1, µ), or both.
Result 3: The signal probability distortion function d takes the form of equation (3.2). It is state
independent in the sense that ka(x1, µ) and kb(x1, µ) are state independent.5
For convenience, we can represent the actual experiment as well the distorted one by a Markov
matrix. In this notation, an experiment is characterized by a 2 × 2 Markov matrix K, where
element Kij refers to the probability of receiving a signal s = j in state ωi. Denote the unbiased,
information experiment arising from x1 by Px1 with the structure:
Px1 =
 pi 1− pi
1− pi pi

The agent’s perception bias is represented by a Markov matrix MPx1 :
MPx1 =
 ka(x1, µ) 1− ka(x1, µ)
1− kb(x1, µ) kb(x1, µ)

The resulting probability structure of the experiment Px1MPx1 captures exactly the idea behind
5Notice that the true probability of receiving a certain signal is obviously still conditional on the state. If we
want to think of this distortion as confirmation bias along the lines of Rabin and Schrag (1999), with an agent
being biased towards hypothesis B and thus misinterpreting a signals as b signals with probability δ, but never
the other way around, we set: ka(x1, µ) = 1− δ, kb(x1, µ) = 1.
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the signal probability distortion function:
Px1MPx1 =
 da(pi, x1, µ) db(1− pi, x1, µ)
da(1− pi, x1, µ) db(pi, x1, µ)

3.5.1 Blackwell ’51
We now take a small detour to Blackwell’s seminal research on the comparisons of experiments
(Blackwell (1951), Blackwell and Girshick (1954)).6 This digression is useful as it highlights
the general principles behind information experiments. We will also see how Blackwell’s general
results translate to settings where agents are biased - both naive, or sophisticated with respect
to their perception mistakes.7
In Blackwell’s comparison of experiments, an agent compares statistical information exper-
iments. Our setting is slightly more general in the sense is that experiments not only yield
information but may also have direct payoff consequences. Upon receiving a signal from an in-
formation experiment, the agent maximizes his utility. Denote the value function of experiment
P by V (P ).
Definition 1: Let P and Q be two experiments. We say that experiment P is more informative
than Q, denoted by P ⊃ Q, if there is a 2× 2 Markov matrix M with PM = Q.
This definition highlights how the information experiment P is garbled into Q by the matrix M ;
it is as if noise was added to P to create a less informative experiment Q. From this statistical
notion, Blackwell derives his famous result:
Result B1: Let P and Q be two experiments. V (P ) ≥ V (Q) if and only if there is a 2×2 Markov
matrix M such that PM = Q.
Simply put, a more informative experiment implies a higher utility. Surprisingly, the converse
is also true: If one experiment yields a higher expected utility than another, it must be more
informative.
In Blackwell’s setup the agent is rational. He fully understands the signal generating structure
of the two experiments and correctly perceives each signal. The garbling matrix doesn’t represent
the agent’s misperception but is a tool to order the experiments by informativeness.
6Both are phrased very much in the language of a statistician. For an economist’s take on this see Marschak
and Miyasawa (1968) who translated the setup into a utility-framework.
7For further details about the general setting of Blackwell, please see the Appendix B. All statements generalise
to n-signals and n-states. These can also be found in the Appendix.
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In order to talk about a Blackwell setting when agents misperceive information, we need
a new function representing the agents’ expected utility from the experiments. Suppose the
unbiased, true information experiment is P but the agent misperceives some signals according
to matrix M . As a result, the agent faces an information experiment PM . We denote the
expected utility of a naive agent, who is unaware of his perception bias, by Vn(P,M). The first
argument always indicates the original signal generating process and the second argument the
agent’s misperception. This agent believes the information experiment is P and thus chooses his
action as if he was rational facing P . If the agent is sophisticated, that is he is cognisant of his
misperception M , we write his utility as: Vs(P,M).
At this point, all tools and notation are developed, the stage is set for agents who are unbiased,
sophisticated or naive with respect to their signal processing.
3.6 Biases and Their Implications
We start with the statement that the agent is always worse off with a perception bias than
without. This observation follows from the original Blackwell result on the ordering of information
experiments.
Result B2: Take two experiments O and P , with O ⊃ P , and let M be a Markov matrix with
OM = P . Then V (O) ≥ V (OM) = Vs(O,M) ≥ Vn(O,M).
The first inequality shows the welfare effect for sophisticated agents, which follows immediately
from the Blackwell result. In the Blackwell setting, the agent has a choice between the original
and the garbled experiment. Since it is impossible to reverse one’s bias, a biased agent does
not actually have this choice and so will always be worse off. The second inequality says that a
naive agent is (weakly) worse off than a sophisticated given the same bias. This arises from two
observations. One, both the sophisticated and the naive receive the same signals with the same
likelihoods. Two, for each signal, the sophisticated is aware of its lower information value, which
allows him to make better decisions. It follows that:
Proposition 1: Take any information experiment P . A sophisticated agent’s utility from P is
(weakly) larger than the naive agent’s utility, but weakly worse than an agent that doesn’t suffer
from any misperception.
For our specific choice problem, a stronger statement is possible. We say that the magnitude of
the bias increases if ka, kb, or both, decrease, i.e. when the off-diagonal of the garbling matrix M
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increases.
Result 4: Any signal distortion function where da(pi(x1, ω), x1, µ) 6= pi(x1, ω) for some ω ∈ Ω
(weakly) reduces the expected utility if x1 ∈ X1 is chosen at µ = p. It strictly reduces the expected
utility if the action profile is signal sensitive. The welfare loss is increasing in the magnitude of
the bias.
Any perception bias is bad news for an agent who conditions his choices on signals. It leads
to more "mistakes" in period 2 choices. As the misperception increases, i.e. da moves further
away from pi, the mistakes increase and the expected utility falls. The welfare consequences of a
perception bias can thus be ordered for a given direction of bias.
Looking at this from the perspective of the distortion function d, the following Result 5 shows
that we can interpret an increase in the magnitude of the bias as a reduction in the differences
of the signal probabilities across states. As the bias increases, the likelihood of receiving a given
signal converges across states. Given the previous result, this leads to a welfare loss.
Result 5: An increase in the magnitude of the bias for some x1 ∈ X1 and µ leads to decrease in
da(pi(x1, ω), x1, µ)− da(1− pi(x1, ω), x1, µ).
Using the earlier example, we can illustrate the welfare consequences of a bias for a signal
sensitive action profile:
Example 2: Take the setting from Example 1 and suppose that the agent has a confir-
mation bias towards B. This implies that he perceives b(xI) too often, i.e. ka(S(xI), µ) = 1− δ,
but never misperceives a(xI), i.e. kb(S(xI), µ) = 1. The following graph plots the utility frontier
for δ = 0.2 which increases the likelihood of receiving a b signal in state B from 1− pi(xI , B) to
1− pi(xI , B) + 0.2pi(xI , B) and in state A accordingly.
The utility frontier, as seen in Figure 3.2, is strictly lower for any interval in which xI is actually
chosen and identical otherwise. It does not affect the expected utility for more extreme priors,
even if xI was chosen as the posterior will always remain in the same partition regardless of the
signal realization. In contrast, the effect is strictly negative for the interval in which the agent
conditions the choice on the signal.
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Figure 3.2: Utility frontier with confirmation bias
3.6.1 Biased Prior
We now introduce an alternative source of suboptimal choice: the agent holds an incorrect prior,
namely µ 6= p. The prior may be wrong as a consequence of a variety of behavioral and or
updating mistakes in the past. If µ = p the agent will take optimal choices. If, however, µ 6= p,
then the true expected utility does not necessarily match the one evaluated by µ.
Equation (3.1) illustrates how a different µ can lead to different choices. An inaccurate µ puts
too much weight on one of the states and thus favours actions appropriate for that state. As it
realizes with a different probability p, the choice might be suboptimal. It follows:
Result 6: For any µ ≥ p, expected utility is (weakly) decreasing in µ. Equivalently, for µ ≤ p
expected utility is increasing in µ.
3.6.2 Interaction of Biases
So far, we have learned that, in isolation, both biases have a negative effect on outcomes. Addi-
tionally, an increase in the magnitude of the biases exacerbates the problem. One might expect
that the interaction of both reduces expected utility even further, a ‘double whammy’. However,
it turns out that this is not the case. To the contrary, an agent with both, a biased perception
and a biased prior, can be better off than an agent who only suffers from one of the two. The
fundamental reason behind this is that the perception bias shuﬄes the otherwise straight-forward
ranking of experiments at different priors to a different degree. We analyse both directions,
i.e. fixing one bias and increasing the other - and determine when a welfare ordering can be
established.
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Adding a Biased Priors to a Biased Perception
In this section, we assume that the agent’s perception is biased ‘from the start’. This can either
be specific to the experiment - i.e. some experiments generate signals that are more likely to be
misperceived than others - or the same across all experiments. We investigate how a bias in prior
interacts with the misperception. Breaking the established pattern, we first present an example
and then generalize this insight.
Example 3: Reconsider the setting of Example 2 with an agent exhibiting confirmation
bias. If the agent is unaware of the bias, the utility frontier is not convex in µ. This arises due
to the merely perceived indifference between action xB and xI - given optimal period 2 actions -
at µ = 0.4. Both achieve an expected utility of 3. The "true" expected utility from xI is only
2.88 because the agent perceives b(xI) too frequently and thus takes the period 2 action xB more
often in state A than he would without the bias. The agent should strictly prefer action profile
(xB , xB). The equivalent situation applies to (xA, xA) and µ close to 0.6.
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Figure 3.3: Non-convex utility frontier
Now consider the following: if the true p is just below 0.6, then the actually attainable
expected utility of an agent with any µ > 0.6 is strictly higher compared to his expected
expected utility with µ = p. The choice (xA, xA) which would be suboptimal for a fully rational
agent, actually yields a strictly better outcome than the "rational choice" xI . The agent with a
biased prior and perception bias fares better than an agent with only perception bias because his
suboptimal choice has a signal structure that is less (or not at all) affected by the perception bias.
To understand the conditions under which such a situation can arise, we introduce the
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following relation between action profiles:
Definition 2 (Worst-case dominance): An action profile (y1, {ya, yb}) worst-case dominates
(x1, {xa, xb}) at µ ∈ (0, 1) if
min
s∈{a,b}
µu(x1, xs)|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xs|B) < E[u(y)|µ].
In words, worst-case dominance compares an action profile y to the scenario where the agent
gets the ‘worst’ signal realisation for the profile x; meaning the signal that leads him to make
the worst choice in his contingent plan {xa, xb} evaluated by the expected utility. Clearly, this
worst signal depends on the prior. If the prior is sufficiently close to 1, the worst signal is b and
for a prior close to 0, the worst signal is a. Notice that y may or may not be preferred to x when
worst-case dominance holds.
The usefulness of this definition lies in the fact that the concept is independent of the state of
the world and enables us to identify which action profiles can be made worse relative to another
profile.
Result 7: For any signal sensitive action profile y that worst-case dominates x at µ ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a distortion d with associated distortion matrices Mx, My such that
Ed[u(x)|µ] < Ed[u(y)|µ].
If an action profile is worst-case dominated, it is possible to create a distortion that would rank
another profile strictly higher in terms of expected utility. Nevertheless, the result is quite weak
since it might require a distortion that targets a specific type of signal: the signals S(x1) generated
by experiment x1. Depending on the scenario, this is hard to justify in practice in a literal way.
But we can think of it as a particular experiment yielding harder-to-interpret results while another
experiment has very straight-forward outcomes. In this context, worst-case dominance tells us
something about how the ranking of alternatives can change when one experiment generates very
ambiguous signals. We can now state the result that tells us the precise condition when adding
a bias in prior can make an already perception-biased agent better off.
Proposition 2: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ and any action profile
y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ, there exists a distortion d with associated distortion matrices
Mx,My such that Ed[u(y)] > Ed[u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ if and only if y worst-case dominates x
at µ.
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At least for a relatively unrestricted class of distortions d, we can always find one that makes
an agent with an incorrect belief µ′ 6= p better-off than an agent with a correct belief as long
as there is sufficient potential variation in payoffs. The next corollary shows that this does not
hinge on distorting only one experiment. With a notion very similar to worst-case dominance, we
can extended the result to a setting where all signals are distorted equivalently. In the context
of our example of a lab technician that might enter incorrect results, the tendency to make such
a mistake is now equalized across tests rather than one test being more prone to transcription
errors than another.
Definition 3 (Simple dominance): An action profile (y1, {ya, yb}) simply dominates (x1, {xa, xb})
at µ ∈ (0, 1) if
µu(x1, xa)|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xa|B) < µu(y1, ya)|A) + (1− µ)u(y1, ya|B), or
µu(x1, xb)|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xb|B) < µu(y1, yb)|A) + (1− µ)u(y1, yb|B), or both.
This definition breaks each action profile down into the simple profiles that can be derived from
it and compares their expected utility. While simple dominance is not directly comparable to
worst-case dominance, the idea is similar. Simple dominance compares the expected utility at
µ of each of the two simple profiles derived from the action profiles that are being contrasted.
Worst-case dominance compares the expected utility of an action profile with the expected utility
of the worst simple profile generated from the action profile it is contrasted against.
Returning to our example, simple dominance compares two treatment methods fixing a par-
ticular test result without taking into account the information value. If one method is inferior
in at least one of those cases, we can find a type of mistake the lab technician could commit
equally across those tests such that the treatment optimal in the absence of mistakes is inferior if
the mistake is present. In contrast, worst-case dominance compares a test under ideal conditions
with one where the lab technician commits the worst possible type of mistake from an ex-ante
perspective.
Corollary 8: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ and any action profile
y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ, there exists a distortion d with associated matrices Mx = My
such that Ed[u(y)] > Ed[u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ if and only if y simply dominates x at µ.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 8 provide a tight characterisation for utility reversals, accounting for
first period action’s direct utility effect. The reason behind these results is that the naive agent
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has an incorrect view about the information value from x1 relatively to some alternative y1. This
is captured in the following result:
Result B3: Take two experiments O and P , with perception biases MO, MP . For the naive
agent, neither the ordering (according to informativeness) of O and P nor the ordering of OMO
and PMP determines, or is determined by the agents expected utility ranking of the experiments,
Vn(O,MO) and Vn(P,MP ).
To understand this statement, recall that with rational agents, Blackwell’s result B1 says that if
O is more informative than P , then the agent is better off from O. For naive, the fundamental
underlying experiment O can be more informative than P , yet may yield lower utility as he
ultimately faces a different experiment due to his perception bias. However, even if we take into
account what the naive’s effective experiments are, OMO and PMP , it is still possible that the
more informative experiment OMO can have lower utility. This is due to the fact that the agent
does not recognize the true information value of the experiments. It follows that Blackwell’s main
result on the comparison of experiments does not holds for biased agents.
Given the fact that there is no first period action in Blackwell, this result highlights when the
worst-case dominance definition is trivially satisfied, and how first period actions’ instrumental-
and direct utility value can be separated. First, suppose that the information experiment from x1
is more informative than from y1, Px1 ⊃ Py1 . If the direct utility from x1 is lower than from y1 at
p, then worst-case dominance will always be satisfied by Result B3. However, if the utility from
x1 is higher at p, then we need to check whether worst-case-dominance is satisfied. Similarly,
when x1 is less informative, Px1 ⊂ Py1 , but it is precisely chosen for it’s direct utility, we again
need to check worst-case dominance.
To understand the role of naivety, we present the Blackwell result for sophisticated agents:
Result B4: Take two experiments O and P , with perception biases MO, MP . OMO ⊃ PMP if
and only if Vs(O,MO) ≥ Vs(P,MP ).
The result follows from the observation that the sophisticated but biased agent’s utility of O is
equal to the rational agent’s utility, who faces OMO: Vs(O,MO) = Vs(OMO, I) = V (OMO).
Clearly, this statement has no implication for the ordering of O and P itself. Observing an agent
who takes an ‘objectively’ less informative experiments does therefore not imply that he is making
an incorrect choice.8 But this also implies that any sophisticated agent cannot be better off from
8To see this take a fully informative n × n vector P and some informative O of equal dimension. Let MP =
[1/n]n×n i.e. the matrix filled only with 1/n which will turn P completely uninformative and keep the information
value of O by setting MO = I, so that O ⊂ P but OMO ⊃ PMP .
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an incorrect prior. The incorrect prior may cause him to choose an alternative action y1 with
a different underlying experiment. Since he correctly accounted for the lower-information value
arising from his perception bias for any information experiment, this simply makes him choose
worse first period actions.
Adding a Biased Perception to a Biased Priors
We now turn the previous analysis around. Taking the agent’s biased prior as given, we show
under which conditions adding or increasing a perception bias can make him better off. This
result turns out to be more clear-cut. Adding any type of perception bias makes an agent worse-
off if his chosen action profile is not ‘too suboptimal’ given the true p. Otherwise, there exists
some type of perception bias that can improve the agent’s welfare.
Proposition 3: Let x = (x1, {xa, xb}) be a signal-sensitive action profile chosen at µ 6= p.
1. If E[u(x)|p] > max{E[u(x1, xa)|p], E[u(x1, xb)|p]} then increasing the degree of perception
bias strictly decreases expected utility for any type of perception bias.
2. If E[u(x)|p] < max{E[u(x1, xa)|p], E[u(x1, xb)|p]}, then increasing the degree of perception
bias strictly increases expected utility for some type of bias.
Statement (1) says that the signal-sensitive x is preferred by an agent with the correct prior p
over choosing the simple profile where the agent always chooses xa or xb in the second period.
Adding noise to the signals is equivalent to putting more weight on a simple profile and strictly
lowers µ’s payoffs. This is exactly what any distortion function does.
Statement (2) states that one of the simple action profiles is preferred to the contingent one
by the agent with belief p. In that case, the agent is strictly better off the more often he receives
the respective signal realization that makes him choose such a profile.
We can also interpret Proposition 3 in terms of how severe the bias in prior is. To see this,
recall that the action profile is signal sensitive at µ for exactly the reason that the posteriors
following the signal fall into different parts of the partition that prescribes optimal second-period
behavior. If we push up the prior, then after any signal action xa is relatively more appealing
compared to xb than before. Pushed far enough the agent only wants to take xa regardless of
the signal realization; xa is, after all, strictly better in state A. At this point, a perception bias
can help the agent. If the prior is too close to p he is always worse off due to losing information.
Finally, it should also be clear form this discussion that for every signal sensitive profile, there
always exists a region for either case.
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3.6.3 Martingale Bias
In the previous sections, the bias could generate a drift in beliefs whenever the perception bias
was unbalanced between signals. A rational observer aware of the bias would form an ex-ante
expectation over the posterior that is different from the prior. We now restrict the perception
bias to what we call a ‘martingale bias’: a bias such that the agent as well as the observer form
the same expectation over posteriors. The martingale bias represents a simple random error in
perception, that occurs indiscriminately of the signal type.9 This section will help to qualify our
previous Propositions. In contrast to Proposition 3, we show that under such a mistake, the agent
with a biased prior can never be better off when a martingale perception bias is added. Changing
the prior for an agent with such a perception bias can still be beneficial, however.
Consider a naive agent that thinks the signal strength is the true undistorted pi(x1, ω). Let
ka(x1, µ) = kb(x1, µ) ≡ κ ∈ [ 12pi(x1,A) , 1]. We can write the agent’s expected utility as
µ [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− µ) [(1− κ(1− pi(x1, B)))u(x1, xa|B) + κ(1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)]
(3.3)
From state independence, we know that κ ≤ 1. Since the martingale bias represents a pure
random error, in the extreme the signal should be pure noise and thus κ ≥ 12pi(x1,A) .
As can be seen from Equation (3.3), if the true probability of receiving an a signal in state A
is κpi(x1, A), but the agent believes this to be pi(x1, A), there is too much weight on u(x1, xa|A)
and u(x1, xb|B). The agent expects to achieve the high outcomes too often which overstates his
perceived expected utility of the action profile. It follows that as the perception bias becomes
worse, i.e. κ decreases, the agent is worse off. Moreover, this is true for any true p and any prior
belief µ, so that there is no way that adding a martingale perception bias to a bias in prior is
welfare improving:
Corollary 9: For any κ ∈ [ 12pi(x1,A) , 1] and any signal sensitive action profile {x1, {xa, xb}}
chosen at µ, a decrease in κ decreases the expected utility for any µ and p ∈ (0, 1).
Hence the restriction to a martingale bias yields a stronger result than Proposition 3. The
martingale bias adds noise and thus reduces the signal strength equally for all signal types.
Independent of the true state, this leads to strictly worse period 2 choices. However, it is still
possible that under such random error perception bias, the agent can benefit from an incorrect
9i.e. the garbling matrix is symmetric M =
[
m 1−m
1−m m
]
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prior:
Corollary 10: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ, and any action profile
y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ, there exists a κ such that E[u(y)] > Ed[u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ if
and only if
µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|A) + u(x1, xb)|A)] + 1− µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|B) + u(x1, xb)|B)] < E[u(y)|p]. (3.4)
Like Proposition 1 this assumes that the bias applies only to the chosen profile x. We can also
apply the bias symmetrically as long as we respect the condition that we can at most generate
pure noise (rather than achieve a negative correlation). This means the experiment with the less
precise signals determines the limit up to which we can garble symmetrically. We then get the
following result:
Corollary 11: For any signal sensitive action profile x that is chosen at µ, and any signal-
sensitive action profile y 6= x that is chosen at µ′ 6= µ and for κmin ≡ max{ 12pi(x1,A) , 12pi(y1,A)},
there exists a κmax with 1 > κmax > κmin such that Ed[u(y)] > Ed[u(x)] when p = µ 6= µ′ for
all κ ∈ [κmin, κmax) if and only if
E[u(x)|p, κmin] < E[u(y)|p, κmin].
In other words, if we want to check whether an agent with prior µ′ could be better off than one
at the true p, we have to compare y to x at the extreme point where one of the two information
experiments yields just noise. If at this point y is indeed preferred, such a reversal in the ordering
of x and y is possible. But of course, this could already happen at a less extreme distortion.
In this section, and indeed in all previous ones, the agent is overconfident in the signal as
he fails to discount the perception bias. The martingale property makes this quite similiar to
a related major updating mistake found in the literature: in inference problems agents tend to
sometimes over- and sometimes under-infer from a given sample of signals. For instance in the
classical paper by Griffin and Tversky (1992) agents over-infer from small sample sizes but under-
infer from large ones.10 Indeed one can find a corresponding martingale bias setup for someone
who over-infers: The two agents perceive the signal to be of the same strength and will receive
the same signal with the same likelihood. However, the key difference between the two mistakes is
that over- / under-inference takes the true signal process as given and only changes the perception
10For a current, extensive summary of the experimental evidence on this topic, see Appendix B of Benjamin
et al. (2013).
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of signal strengths, whereas the distorted transmissions fixes the perception of signal quality but
alters the actual probabilities with which signals are perceived. By changing the perceived signal
strength, anything can happen in terms of welfare consequences. This lack of structure leads us
to relegate the discussion to a footnote.11
3.6.4 Sophisticated vs Naive Agents
When the prior is correct, we have seen that a sophisticated agent is always weakly better off
than a naive agent. We finish this section with a short example that highlights that this no
longer needs to be true when µ differs from p. A sophisticated agent is aware of the reduced
information value of each experiment and thus may want to take a different choice than a naive
agent. If the true ordering of experiments under µ is different than under p, such behavioral
adjustments can be suboptimal.
Example 4: Example 1 serves again as the basis. Suppose that the agent suffers from a
martingale bias and tends to misperceive both a and b signals with probability 1 − κ = 0.7.
Suppose further that µ = 0.57. Compared to the naive agent, the sophisticated is aware of
the lower information value of xI and opts for the simple profile (xA, xA). If µ = p he clearly
does better than the naive who still chooses the information experiment in the first period. The
naive agent, however, can do better than the sophisticated when the actual p is lower, take for
example p = 0.4. His naivety causes him to pick the information experiment and subsequently
to take xB whenever he receives an b signal. For a low enough p this is always better than the
sophisticated’s choice of (xA, xA).
11With over- or under-reaction to information, the agent can almost trivially achieve a higher utility regardless
of which bias is adjusted:
First, suppose the sets of actions are X1 = {x1} and X2 = {xa, xb}. First, take the wrong prior as given: (1)
Let the signal sensitive action profile x be optimal at p whereas the agent with prior µ 6= p prefers the simple
profile (x1, xa). Then the agent is better off by exaggerating the signal quality so that his second period profile
becomes signal sensitive. (2) Similarly, suppose the simple action profile (x1, xa) is optimal at p. Then an agent
with µ 6= p, who prefers the signal sensitive profile, can be better off by inferring too little if he prefers (x1, xa)
over (x1, xb) in the absence of any signal.
Next take information processing bias as given: (3) Suppose that due to over-inference the agent prefers the
conditional profile when it is optimal to choose (x1, xa). Changing the correct prior to some µ > p where the
agent prefers (x1, xa) improves his utility.
The only non-trivial case (4) is under-inference and changing the correct prior. Suppose x is optimal at p but
due to under-inference the agent with the correct prior prefers z. Let y be the agent’s preferred choice at some
µ 6= p. If the actual signal strength of S(y1) is sufficiently larger than of S(z1), then shifting the prior from p to
µ helps the agent. To see why, notice due to under-inference his response to the signal is attenuated. However,
the likelihood of receiving the correct signal under y1 is higher (than he thinks) which will ‘too often’ select the
‘correct’ action from his conditional profile.
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3.7 Example: Investment with Information Acquisition
We finish this paper with a simple investment problem that captures the fundamentals of the
entrepreneur example outlined in the introduction.
An agent can invest his income w in either a risk-free or a risky asset, both having a unit
price. There are two states of the world Ω = {A,B}. The risk-free asset’s return in any state of
the world is normalised to zero. The risky asset yields a positive return of rh in state A but a
negative return of rl in state B. The agent has a prior µ0 = Pr(ω = A) and is risk averse with
U(c) = ln(c). Before investing, the agent has the opportunity to purchase a signal s ∈ {a, b}
at a cost c > 0 that fully reveals ω. He then decides on the fraction of income that he invests
in the risky asset, denoted by x. Finally, let the agent’s information perception bias be of the
following structure: Whenever he receives a b signal - a signal that tells him not to invest - he
might misinterpret it as an a signal with a probability δ. On the contrary, a signals are always
perceived correctly.
We now show how holding an incorrect prior can help mitigate the bias in information per-
ception through avoiding information. First, we solve for x as a function of the posterior µ:
x(µ, rh, rl) =

0 if µrh + (1− µ)rl ≤ 0
1 if µ ≥ −rl(rh + 1)/(rh − rl)
µrh+(1−µ)rl
−rlrh otherwise
Let Pr(ω = A) = p = 0.55. Let the risky asset’s return be rh = 60% in state A and rl = −95%
in state B. The agent’s wealth is w = 1.2. The cost of acquiring information is c = 0.25.
Furthermore, the agent’s information bias is δ = 0.4.
Notice that the expected return of the asset is 0.55 · 0.6 − 0.45 · 0.95 = −0.0975 < 0. When
µ = p, an agent, who does not acquire information, would never invest in the risky asset. If the
agent acquires the fully informative signal, he will invest everything into the risky asset when he
observes an a signal, and nothing at all following a b signal.
An unbiased agent (with the true prior) will acquire information since the information is
cheap enough, EU(acquire info) = p ln((1 + rh)(w − c)) + (1 − p) ln(w − c) = 0.21 > ln(1.2) =
EU(not acquire).
A naive agent with misperception bias makes the same choices as an unbiased one. When his
prior is correct, his true utility from acquiring information is only EUtrue(acquire info|µ = 0.55) =
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−0.33 since he sometimes invests his whole income when the state is B.12 If he instead holds a
rather incorrect prior, i.e. µ = 0.9, the information becomes of little value.13 He consequently
chooses not to acquire it and actually does better than if he had the correct prior.14 While holding
an initially more extreme belief, his posterior belief is lower than the naive agent who observed
a (possibly wrong) a signal. This makes him invest only 78% of his total income, which is useful
when the negative returns of an asset are large. On top of that, he benefits from saving on the
information cost.
If we interpret the cost of acquiring information either as the direct cost of going to univer-
sity or the opportunity cost of not working, this investment problem become analogous to the
entrepreneur example that was outlined at the beginning. If the would-be entrepreneur holds a
very inflated view about his abilities, he starts his business immediately (invests without infor-
mation). If not, he goes to university. Suffering from a perception bias, he might then become
even more convinced about himself, leading him to gamble even more on his endeavour. In ex-
pectation, the possibly useful information hurts him if the probability of misinterpreting it is too
high.
3.8 Discussion
We have analyzed the interaction of two fundamental mistakes in information processing. We
have seen how and when one bias can alleviate the problems caused by the other. The recent
worrying rise of the anti-vaccination movement, with their tendency to disregard surmounting
scientific evidence in favour of circumstantial observations that autism happens after (one of
many) childhood infections, is just one example for the potential importance of these biases.
The idea that a mistake on one dimension may counteract some failure on another is clearly not
new (Compte and Postlewaite (2004), De La Rosa (2011), etc.), yet to our knowledge it has never
been explored in this basic updating setting. In contrast, the recent literature on confirmatory
bias (Clements (2013), Roland G. Fryer et al. (2016)) as well as biases in information processing
(Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012), Kartik et al. (2016)) focuses solely on beliefs, how beliefs may
converge or diverge in group, or whether information can be aggregated in social settings. It
does not focus on the dynamic aspect of payoff-relevant decisions as information experiments and
12This is true for any µ ∈ [0.47, 0.89]
13The results hold for any extreme prior in the interval [0.89, 0.925]. An even higher prior causes too much
investment, lowering utility.
14His perceived expected utilities are: EUperceived(acquire info|µ = 0.9) = −.39 < −0.37 = EU(not acquire|µ =
0.9) while is actual utility (evaluated at the true prior) is EUtrue(not acquire|µ = 0.9) = −0.22.
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their consequences on future payoffs. In that sense, we think of this paper as an extension of
Blackwell (1951) to behavioral mistakes in information processing, for which we provide a full
characterisation.
97
3.9 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Result 2. Convexity follows directly from the fact that maximum expected utility is
convex in µ. This result extends to two period model with intermediate signals.
Let ~µ be row vector of belief about the different states Ω, ~µ = (Pr(ω = A),Pr(ω = B)). Define
~u(x) as the state contingent vector adjusted by signal probability and signal response:15
~u(x) =
pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)
pi(x1, B)u(x1, xa|B) + (1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)

Define maximum expected utility as a function of ~µ as g(~µ) = maxx∈X ~µ · ~u(x) and notice how
this expression coincides with the rewritten expected utility formulation of equation 3.1.
To show g(µ) is convex, let x′ (x′′) optimal choice given the belief ~µ′ (~µ′), and xˆ the optimal
choice for the convex combination ~ˆµ = λ~µ′ + (1− λ)~µ′′ with λ ∈ (0, 1). Then
g(λ~µ′ + (1− λ)~µ′′) = (λ~µ′ + (1− λ)~µ′′) · u(xˆ)
≤ λ~µ′ · u(u′) + (1− λ)~µ′′ · u(x′′)
= λg(~µ′) + (1− λ)g(~µ′′)
proving convexity.
Proof of Result B2. By Blackwell’s Result B1 it must be that V (O) ≥ V (OM). A rational (non-
biased) agent would never choose the distorted over the undistorted experiment. A sophisticated
agent is not able to choose the undistorted experiment, however. All he can do is to adjust his
second period action profile anticipating the lower information value. His utility from O given M
is equivalent to a rational agent facing the experiment OM . As a result the following inequalities
hold: Vs(O,M) = Vs(OM, I) = V (OM). This establishes the first inequality.
The naive agent acts as if he was fully rational, i.e. he applies the rationally optimal decision
rule for P to OM . Consequently, he holds an incorrect posterior after observing the signal -
which is equivalent to having wrong beliefs about the likelihood with which he receives a and b
signals. He makes (weakly) worse decisions than a sophisticated agent; if not, the sophisticated
agent could always imitate him.
15compare this to the simple 1 period convexity proof, where ~u(x) is defined as the state contingent utility vector
98
Proof of Result 4. Let the (unbiased) information experiment following action x1 be of the form
P =
 pi 1− pi
1− pi pi

with pi = pi(x1, A). Let experiment P ′ be the experiment arising from the distortion function
with the same action x1, namely
P ′ =
 da(pi, x1, µ) db(1− pi, x1, µ)
da(1− pi, x1, µ) db(pi, x1, µ)

If follows that P ⊃ P ′ , as we can find an M such that PM = P ′ . The corresponding M is:
M =
 ka(x1, µ) 1− ka(x1, µ)
1− kb(x1, µ) kb(x1, µ)

where da(pi, x1, µ) = ka(x1, µ)pi + (1− kb(x1, µ))(1− pi) etc.
According to Result B1, a rational (non-biased) agent would never choose the distorted over
the undistorted experiment. The utility arising from the distorted experiment is (weakly) lower.
To show the effect of an increase in the magnitude of the bias, we write the expected utility
from x1 as
p [(ka(x1, µ)pi + (1− kb(x1, µ))(1− pi))u(x1, xa|A) + (kb(xi, µ)(1− pi) + (1− ka(xi, µ))pi)u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− p) [(ka(x1, µ)(1− pi) + (1− kb(x1, µ))pi)u(x1, xa|B) + (kb(xi, µ)pi + (1− ka(xi, µ))(1− pi))u(x1, xb|B)]
Suppose that initially kb decreased. If we decrease it further to k′b < kb, the linearity property
of the expected utility in probabilities implies that the expected utility must also decrease.
The same argument holds for any further decrease in the alternative parameter ka.
Since there are no cross-interactions between changes of ka and kb, the same holds true for
any joint change.
Proof of Result 5. Note that we can write the matrix of the signal probabilities as a garbling of
the matrix containing the true signal probabilities:
 da(pi, x1, µ) db(1− pi, x1, µ)
da(1− pi, x1, µ) db(pi, x1, µ)
 =
 pi 1− pi
1− pi pi

 ka 1− ka
1− kb kb

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where the matrix on the right is the garbling matrix. Since the garbling matrix needs to be a
Markov matrix, we know that ka, kb ∈ [0, 1].
Now suppose we increase the magnitude of the bias resulting in a distortion function d′ and,
contrary to the statement in the result, we have d′a(pi, x1, µ) − d′a(1 − pi, x1, µ) ≥ da(pi, x1, µ) −
da(1− pi, x1, µ). This implies that:
pik′a + (1− pi)(1− k′b)− (1− pi)k′a − pi(1− k′b) ≥ pika + (1− pi)(1− kb)− (1− pi)ka − pi(1− kb)
where k′a, k′b are the elements in the modified garbling matrix reflecting the increase in the mag-
nitude of the bias. This can be rearranged to:
(2pi − 1)(k′a − (1− k′b)) ≥ (2pi − 1)(ka − (1− kb))
But this requires that since pi > 1/2, either k′a > ka, or k′b > kb, or both which contradicts the
increase in the magnitude of the bias.
Proof of Result 6. Take the action profile (x1, {xa, xb}). It’s actual expected utility is
p [pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− p) [pi(x1, B)u(x1, xa|B) + (1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)]
If we evaluate this with some µ > p, then the weight on the outcome in state A increases. This
has two potential effects. Firstly, according to Result 12, a different action might be chosen in
period 2 as the potential posteriors are now different. Furthermore, as follows from Result 1, a
different x1 might become optimal. Denote the potentially altered choice by (y1, {ya, yb}). Any
such alternative choice has the property that:
pi(y1, A)u(y1, ya|A) + (1− pi(y1, A))u(y1, yb|A)
> pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)
and
pi(y1, B)u(y1, ya|B) + (1− pi(y1, B))u(y1, yb|B)
< pi(x1, B)u(x1, xa|B) + (1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)
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As otherwise either the choice (y1, {ya, yb}) would not be optimal as it yields lower expected
utility when evaluated by µ or the choice under p would not be optimal since it results in lower
utility in both states. It then immediately follows that if any choice of action is different when
comparing optimal choices under µ and p, such a µ leads to a utility loss because of suboptimal
choices. Furthermore, fixing some µ > p and iterating this argument for µ′ > µ yields the result.
The equivalent argument applies to µ < p.
Proof of Result 7. If the agent prefers y over x, i.e. E[u(x)] < E[u(y)], the statement is trivially
true. If it does not hold, we show that there is such a d that makes
Ed[u(x)|µ] < Ed[u(y)|µ]
According to definition 2, we have that µu(x1, xs|A) + (1 − µ)u(x1, xs|B) < E[u(y)|µ] for some
s ∈ {a(x1), b(x1)}. Suppose wlog that s = a(x1). This implies that small enough  > 0, we have
(1− ) [µu(x1, xa|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xa|B)] +  [µu(x1, xb|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xb|B)]
= µ [(1− )u(x1, xa|A) + u(x1, xb|A)] + (1− µ) [(1− )u(x1, xa|B) + u(x1, xb|B)] < E[u(y)|µ]
(3.5)
which quite resembles the maximum expected utility representation (3.1).
Now set ka(x1, µ) = 1 and kb(x1, µ) = pi(x1,A) . This causes the agent to receive the worst-case
signal a in state B with probability da(pi(x1|B), S(x1), µ) = 1 − . Clearly, this also makes him
receive the (correct) worst-case signal a in state A with probability da(pi(x1|A), S(x1), µ) > 1− .
Consequently, the actual expected utility following this distortion is slightly larger than the left-
hand side of Equation 3.5 above, but as  becomes sufficiently small, Ed[u(x)|µ] < E[u(y)|µ].
Finally let there be no distortion for the signals S(y1), i.e. da(pi, S(y1), µ) = pi for all pi ∈ (0, 1).
The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Sufficiency is an almost immediate consequence of Result 7. We know
there exists d, such that Ed[u(y)|µ] > Ed[u(x)|µ] by worst-case dominance at µ and that an agent
with belief µ′ chooses y compared to x. Finally simply set µ = p.
In the other direction, suppose such an improvement is possible. Since any distortion gar-
bles the information, E[u(y)|p] ≥ Ed[u(y)|p]. But if worst-case dominance does not hold there
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is no marginal distribution over S(x1) such that Ed[u(x)|p] < E[u(y)|p] since Ed[u(x)|p] ≥
mins∈S(x1)E[u(x1, xs)] > E[u(y)|p]. A contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 8. Sufficiency : Similar to Proposition 2, consider the extreme distortion d
that only sends the signal
sx = arg min
s
µu(x1, xs)|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xs|B)
sx = arg max
s
µu(x1, xs)|A) + (1− µ)u(x1, xs|B)
If simple dominance holds, at least one of those signals must yield lower expected utility under
x than under y.
Necessity : Suppose such a distortion exists. Then
E[u(y)|p] < E[u(x)|p]
while
Ed[u(y)|p] > Ed[u(x)|p].
We can write the actual expected utility explicitly as a linear combination between the a and the
b signal.
p pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− p)pi(x1, B)u(x1, xa|B)
+p (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A) + (1− p)(1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)
and similarly for y. Any distortion can either lower terms or shift weight from one to the other.
If the distortion is such that weight is added in the sense that both pi(x1, A) and pi(x1, B) are
increased or decreased then if Ed[u(y)|p] > Ed[u(x)|p] it must be that either
pu(x1, xa|A) + (1− p)u(x1, xa|B) < pu(y1, ya|A) + (1− p)u(y1, ya|B)
or
pu(x1, xb|A) + (1− p)u(x1, xb|B) < pu(y1, yb|A) + (1− p)u(y1, yb|B)
or both which guarantees simple. If the distortion lowers both terms i.e. by garbling both type
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of signals equally, then pi(x1, B) and (1−pi(x1, A)) increase. If this increase leads to a reversal in
the expected utility ranking of x and y in the sense that Ed[u(y)|p] > Ed[u(x)|p], then because of
linearity this must also be true for the most extreme case with da(pi(x1, A)) = db(pi(x1, B)) = 12 .
But then
p
2
u(x1, xa|A) + (1− p)
2
u(x1, xa|B) < p
2
u(y1, ya|A) + (1− p)
2
u(y1, ya|B)
or
p
2
u(x1, xb|A) + (1− p)
2
u(x1, xb|B) < p
2
u(y1, yb|A) + (1− p)
2
u(y1, yb|B)
or both which means at least one of them is also true for da(pi(x1, A)) = da(pi(x1, B)) = 1 or
db(1− pi(x1, B)) = db(1− pi(x1, A)) = 1 which again guarantees simple dominance.
Proof of Result B3. To see take two separate experiments O and P , with O ⊃ P . First, let MO
be such that OMO = P and let P be undistorted, i.e. MP = I. It follows that the naive agent is
better off from P than O as Vn(P, I) = V (P ) > Vn(O,M1) (the inequality is strict if the agent
is signal sensitive). But by continuity this also implies that there exist some MO, MP such that
OMO ⊃ PMP yet Vn(P,MP ) > Vn(O,MO). As a result, the naive’s expected utility can neither
be ordered by the perceived information experiments, nor the actual ones. In the other direction,
we know that for Vn(P,MP ) > Vn(O,MO) it is possible that OMO ⊃ PMP , as well as O ⊃ P .
Proof of Proposition 3. Statement (1) says that the signal-sensitve x is preferred by an agent
with the correct prior p over choosing the simple profile where the agent chooses either always xa
or always xb in the second period. Adding noise weakens the correlation with the state and the
dominated outcomes occur more frequently.Hence the agent with prior µ can never be better off.
Statement (2) highlights that one of the simple action profiles is preferred to the contingent
one by the agent with belief p. Assume wlog that the preferred action profile is (x1, xa). Any
distortion function that increases the likelihood of an a signal will make the agent better off as
he will take action xa as a result, i.e. set ka(x1, µ) = 1 and kb(x1, µ) ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, the agent’s
expected utility is increasing as kb(x1, µ) decreases to 0. The extreme kb(x1, µ) = 0 represents
a perception bias where all b signals are interpreted as a signals and the agent always takes the
(second) best simple action profile.
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Proof of Corollary 9. A decrease in κ leads to a less informative signal.
µ [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− µ) [(1− κ(1− pi(x1, B)))u(x1, xa|B) + κ(1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)]
Trivially, the expected utility at µ as written above decreases as there is more weight on
u(x1, xb|A) and u(x1, xa|B). The agent is unaware of this and his choice in unaffected by κ.
For any κ, he evaluates the profile as follows:
µ [pi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− pi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− µ) [(1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xa|B) + (1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)]
The true p could be different from µ, so we just need to show that for any p, a decrease in κ has
a negative welfare effect. The actual expected utility is:
p [κpi(x1, A)u(x1, xa|A) + (1− κpi(x1, A))u(x1, xb|A)]
+(1− p) [(1− κ(1− pi(x1, B)))u(x1, xa|B) + κ(1− pi(x1, B))u(x1, xb|B)]
Simply notice since u(x1, xb|A) < (x1, xa|A), as well as u(x1, xa|B) < u(x1, xb|B), the random
noise indeed lowers expected utility for any p.
Proof of Corollary 10. If: Suppose the inequality in Equation 3.4 holds. Then a distortion of
κ = 12pi(x,A) turns the signals into complete noise. If this applies to the profile x only, y yields
higher expected utility at p even though without any distortion E[x|p] > E[y|p].
Only if: Suppose the property does not hold. The for any distortion κ ∈ [ 12pi(x,A) , 1], the
expected utility from x at p exceeds the one from y as for any such κ,
Ed[x|p] ≥ µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|A) + u(x1, xb)|A)] + 1− µ
2
[u(x1, xa)|B) + u(x1, xb)|B)]
Proof of Corollary 11. If: Follows directly as it is the case for κ = κmin and continuity guarantees
that for small enough  > 0 such that it is also the case for κ = κmin + 
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Only If: Note that for x to be chosen at p, we need that E[x|p] > E[y|p] as the agent is
unaware of the perception bias. The effect of a decrease in κ is
−∂Ed[u(x)|p]
∂κ
= −ppi(x1, A)[u(x1, xa|A)− u(x1, xb|A)]
−(1− p)pi(x1, A)[u(x1, xb|B)− u(x1, xa|B)]
This does not depend on κ itself. Therefore, if
[
∂Ed[u(x)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
>
[
∂Ed[u(y)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
then the inequality also holds for all allowable κ. Take the κe ∈ (κmin, κmax) such that
Ed[x|p, κe] = Ed[y|p, κe]. If this does not exist, then y is never the best choice which yields
the result. If it does exist, then it must mean that
[
∂Ed[u(x)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
>
[
∂Ed[u(y)|p]
∂κ
]
κ=1
But then for all κ ∈ [κmin, κe), the inequality also holds and therefore
E[u(x)|p, κmin] < E[u(y)|p, κmin]
as desired.
3.10 Appendix B: Blackwell ’51
This section provides a general introduction to Blackwell, going beyond the 2-stage, 2-signal case,
and providing clear definitions of value functions. In Blackwell’s comparison of experiments, an
agent compares two statistical information experiments, P and Q, which generate a signal about
the states of the world Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn}. As before, an information experiment is defined by a
n× nK Markov matrix K, where element Kij refers to the probability of receiving a signal s = j
in state ωi. We denote the set of possible signals from K by SK = {1, 2, . . . , NK}.
The agent is endowed with utility function u(x, θi), defined over A × Ω. After receiving a
signal sK , he chooses an action x from his finite action set X. His prior is denoted by the
vector µ0 = {µ(1), ..., µ(n)}, whereas his posterior after receiving signal s from experiment K is
denoted by µ(sK). The agent maximizes expected utility: maxx∈X
∑
i µ(i|sK)u(x|ωi). Denote
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the solution to this problem by x∗(µ(sK)) and the corresponding value function V (µ(sK)).
The agent’s probability of receiving an sP signal is pi(sP ) =
∑
i∈n PisP µ0(i). and expected
utility from observing experiment P is V (P ) =
∑
sP∈SP pi(s
P )V (µ(SP )).
Definition 4: Let P and Q be two experiments. We say that experiment P is more informative
than Q, denoted by P ⊃ Q, if there is a nP × nQ Markov matrix M with PM = Q.
This definition highlights how the information experiment P is garbled into Q by the matrix
M ; as if noise was added to create a less informative experiment. From this statistical notion,
Blackwell derives his famous result:
Result B5: Let P and Q be two n×nP and n×nQ Markov matrices. V (P ) ≥ V (Q) if and only
if there is a nP × nQ Markov matrix M such that PM = Q.
Simply put, a more informative experiment implies a higher utility. Surprisingly, the converse is
also true: If one experiment yields more expected utility than another, it must be that it is more
informative.
In Blackwell’s setup the agent is rational. He fully understands the signal generating structure
of the two experiments and correctly perceives each signal. The garbling matrix doesn’t represent
the agent’s misperception but is a tool to order the experiments by informativeness. Moreover,
the agent does not take any first period choice. All that occurs is a welfare comparisons of the
two experiments. Needless to say, if the rational agent had to make a choice in Blackwell, he
would prefer the more informative experiment.
In order to talk about a Blackwell setting when agents misperceive information, we need a new
function representing the agents’ expected utility from the experiments. Suppose the unbiased,
true information experiment is P but the agent misperceives some signals according to matrixM .
As a result, the agent faces an information experiment PM . We denote the expected utility of a
naive agent unaware of his perception bias by Vn(P,M), where the first argument always indicates
the original signal generating process and the second argument the agent’s misperception. This
agent believes the information experiment is P and thus chooses his action as if he was rational
facing P . If the agent is sophisticated, that is he is cognisant of his misperception M , we write
his utility as: Vs(P,M) =
∑
sP∈SPM pi(s
PM )V (µ(SPM )).
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3.11 Appendix C: Decision Problem Appendix
Result 12: For any action x1 ∈ X1 and any x2 ∈ X2 such that for some µ(s) ∈ (0, 1) we have
E[u(x1, x2)|µ(s)] ≥ E[u(x1, y)|µ(s)] ∀y ∈ X2, there exists an interval I ⊂ [0, 1] with the property
that x2 is chosen if and only if µ(s) ∈ I.
Proof of Result 12. If for some (x1, x2) ∈ X we have
E[u(x1, x2)|µ(s)] ≥ E[u(x1, y2)|µ(s)] ∀y2 ∈ X2
then continuity in µ(s) implies that this is also true for at least some [µ(s), µ) or (µ, µ(s)]. If this
interval is [0, 1], the proof is complete. If not, there is some µj for which xj ∈ X2 is the optimal
choice. Then either u(x1, xj |A) > u(x1, x2|A) or u(x1, xj |B) > u(x1, x2|B). This shows us that
for either µ > µj or µ < µj , xj achieves a higher expected payoff than x2. This completes the
proof.
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